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Editor's Preface 
This book by Sebastian Vollmer contributes to the empirical literature on economic and human 
development from a range of different perspectives. 
The first three essays are concerned with the world income distribution, studying its shape and 
evolution over time. The first essay presents a new parametric test for bimodality of a density. 
The test is more powerful than its nonparametric counterparts given that certain parametric as-
sumptions are reasonable. The essay also includes an application of this new methodology to 
the cross-sectional distribution of per capita log GDP across EU regions from 1970 to 1993. In 
fact, the test is able to identify convergence from two modes to one mode in this data set, while 
alternative tests are not able to do so. 
The second essay challenges the famous Twin Peaks claim by Danny Quah concerning the shape 
of the global income distribution. Vollmer argues that the number of modes of a distribution is 
not robust towards rescaling of the data (for example taking logs). Although information on the 
number of modes might be useful for proper visualization of the data, it is not appropriate to 
derive conclusions concerning the number and development of convergence clubs. The empir-
ical model of Vollmer's essay overcomes these shortcomings, and it turns out that the world's 
cross-country income distribution consists of three components since 1976 (and two compo-
nents beforehand). The three components are diverging since 1976, i.e. the richest component 
is growing faster than the middle component and the middle component is growing faster than 
the poorest component both in relative and absolute terms. In a posterior analysis probabilities 
of belonging to a certain component in a given year are assigned to each country. 
In the third essay, Vollmer focuses on a related, but fundamentally different question, namely 
the evolution of the global income distribution where the units of analysis are individuals rather 
than countries. The essay is original because of its unprecedented detail by generating global 
growth incidence curves for given time periods and also global regions which allows identifying 
the pro-poorness of past growth. Moreover, the essay finds that the global income distribution 
has experienced convergence since 1970, as the bottom-middle part of the distribution grew the 
fastest. These findings go hand in hand with declining poverty rates and absolute number of poor 
with Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America being exceptions. The most remarkable decline took 
place during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Most notably are the significant positive changes 
in the regional distributions of South Asia and East Asia. Overall global inequality declined 
slightly due to a decrease in between country inequality, which however is counteracted by a 
slight increase of within country inequality. 
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In the fourth essay, Vollmer analyzes the welfare effects of recently negotiated Economic Part-
nership Agreements between the European Union and African countries. The essay provides 
some background information on how the Economic Partnership Agreements evolved and then 
turns to a standard trade model in order to estimate whether consumption and trade creation ef-
fects outweigh trade diversion effects. The essay extends the literature in this field significantly 
by estimating elasticities of import demand from highly disaggregated data and applying the ac-
tual negotiated tariff reduction rates in the estimation of the agreement's welfare effects. It is a 
strength of the essay to use the empirical results for an extensive discussion of policy conclusions. 
In the fifth essay, Vollmer investigates whether democracy promotes the non-income dimensions 
of human development. The theoretical argument focuses both on quantitative aspects in form of 
redistribution as well as qualitative aspects such as accountability and needs oriented policies in 
democracies. Democracy is identified to have positive and highly significant impact on human 
development in a panel framework controlling for GDP per capita, inequality, fractionalization, 
HIV among other variables. Interestingly, the interaction effects of democracy with GDP per 
capita, inequality, fractionalization and education tum out to be insignificant or not robust. This 
implies that democracy itself is important for human development and less the circumstances 
under which it occurs. 
These essays all make important contributions to the empirical literature on economic and hu-
man development and I am pleased that this book has been included in our series of studies on 
development economics. 
Prof. Stephan Klasen, Ph.D. 
Gottingen, July 2009 
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Introduction 
It is a difficult task to write an introduction to a collection of essays which come from separate 
areas of economics. The essays cover a rather broad range of topics. Essay I is a methodological 
contribution to the analysis of densities and distributions. Essays 2 and 3 apply state-of-the-
art parametric statistical techniques to analyze the world income distribution from both cross-
country and individual perspectives. Essay 4 concerns the welfare effects of recently negotiated 
trade agreements between the European Union and African countries. Finally, Essay 5 addresses 
some interesting correlations between the non-income dimensions of human development and 
democracy. Due to the breadth of the topics, this is not an introduction in the classical sense, 
introducing the field of research treated by the essays, but rather more of an overview. Below, 
the main results of each essay are highlighted, followed by an explanation of how the essay 
contributes to its field of research. 
Essay 1: A Likelihood Ratio Test for Bimodality in Two-Component Mixtures 
This essay proposes a parametric test for bimodality based on the likelihood principle by using 
two-component mixtures. (Bimodality means that the density function of a distribution has two 
modes.) The hypothesis that the density function only has one mode is tested against the alterna-
tive that it has two modes. The test uses explicit characterizations of the modal structure of such 
mixtures in terms of their parameters. The asymptotic distribution of the proposed test is ana-
lyzed. Analyzing the modality of the distribution of a random sample is an important problem, 
particularly for proper graphical visualization of the data. In particular, it is important to decide 
whether modes present in a certain fit are merely sampling artifacts or whether they are actual 
features of the underlying density. (We will see in the second essay, however, that it might be 
misleading to rely upon the number of modes alone when analyzing a distribution.) 
The essay is foremost a methodological contribution to the literature which already comprises 
two major tests for the number of modes, the test by Silverman (1981) and the dip test by Harti-
gan and Hartigan (1985). Both tests are nonparametric and therefore applicable to more flexible 
settings than the likelihood ratio test (LRT). The finite sample performance of the LRT is inves-
tigated in a simulation study and compared to Silverman's test and the dip test. The simulation 
confirms that the LRT is keeping its level and has a greater power than either Silverman's test 
or the dip test if the principle distributional assumptions are fulfilled. The nonparametric tests 
also work well for cases where the distributional assumptions of the LRT are violated. Hence, 
this essay provides a new statistical tool which is more powerful for certain types of applications 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
2 INTRODUCTION 
than existing techniques. An additional highlight of the LRT compared to the nonparametric 
tests is that the LRT is also applicable to mixtures of multivariate normal distributions and the 
von Mises distribution (the so-called circular data), cases for which no tests for bimodality have 
to date been available. 
The final section of the essay is an empirical application with real data. The modal structure 
of the cross-sectional distribution of per capita log GDP across EU regions from 1977 to 1993 
is investigated using mixtures. While these mixtures clearly involve two components over the 
whole time period, the resulting distributions evolve from bimodality toward unimodality at the 
end of the seventies. This example proves how useful the LRT is in some settings because 
Silverman's test is not able to identify the transition from bimodality to unimodality in this case 
due to its lack of power in such settings. 
Essay 2: Twin Peaks or Three Components? 
What is it that makes some countries so much more prosperous on average than others? This and 
related questions are at the heart of the second essay. The topic of this essay is the world's cross-
country distribution of GDP per capita and its evolution from 1970 to 2003. It contributes to a 
large body of empirical growth literature which tests for absolute and conditional convergence 
among the countries of the world (Barro 1991 and Quah 1996a, among others), but also to a 
more theoretical branch of the growth literature which predicts multiple equilibria in the world's 
cross-country income distribution (Quah 1996b and Galor 1996, among others). Quah describes 
these equilibria as emerging Twin Peaks, while Galor (1996) introduces the concept of multiple 
steady-state equilibria without any restriction on the number of steady states. Bianchi (1997) 
was the first to formally test for the number of modes in the world's cross-country distribution 
of income using the method by Silverman (1981). He confirmed the predictions of Quah (1996). 
Paap and Dijk (1998) model the cross-country distribution of income as parametric mixture; 
however, they obtain the number and type of mixture components merely by visual inspection 
and not by statistical inference. 
This essay challenges the Twin Peaks claim. It can easily be shown that the number of modes 
is not invariant of the scale; this means that the number of modes might change when switching 
to the logarithmic scale from a regular scale. Such a property is extremely undesirable for this 
type of economic analysis. Since the scale of GDP per capita does not alter the economic char-
acteristics of a country, it should therefore not be responsible for the assignment of a country 
to one convergence club or the other. Though the number of modes is of interest in a different 
context, one can argue that the concept of Twin Peaks is misleading and does not help to identify 
convergence clubs. 
Thus, the essay proposes to model the cross-country income distribution as a mixture of nor-
mal distributions. The number of components is determined by recently published modified 
likelihood-ratio tests by Chen et al. (2001, 2004) and Chen and Kalbfleisch (2005), as well as 
model-selection criteria. The parameters of the normal components are fitted from the data. One 
advantage of this approach is that the components in the mixture have a clear interpretation as 
income groups or convergence clubs and, in contrast to modes of the density, their number does 
not depend upon the scale of the data. It turns out that the cross-country distribution of GDP per 
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capita consists of two components from 1970 to 1975. In 1976 a third component emerges and 
becomes progressively more pronounced with increasing statistical significance until 2003. 
The model allows a so-called posterior probability to be assigned to each country. The posterior 
probability describes the probability of a country belonging to a certain component (interpreted 
as convergence club) in a given year. This concept takes into account the fact that it does not 
make much sense to assign countries to income groups based on their GDP per capita, alone, but 
rather to show the different possibilities of group affiliations since GDP per capita alone does not 
provide enough information about the future growth path of a country. Looking at the develop-
ment of each component's mean income over time leads to some interesting observations. The 
mean income of the poorest component had a growth rate of 0 from 1976 to 2003, whereas the 
middle component had an average annual growth rate of 1.2 percent, and the richest component 
had an average annual growth rate of 2.2 percent during the same period. This implies that the 
three components were diverging both in absolute and in relative terms. 
A drawback to this approach is that the a parameters of the normal distributions in the mixture 
must be equal because there are no tests for unequal a parameters available to date (at least not 
for two of three components). Another justification for this restriction is the fact that the fit of the 
richest component would be extremely narrow if one allowed for unequal a parameters. The fit 
would be so narrow around a group of high-income European countries that the richest countries 
(in particular the United States) would be excluded by this component and instead captured by 
the longer tail of the middle component. Hence, the restriction of equal a parameters forces the 
richest component to include the richest countries, which makes much more sense for economic 
interpretation. Nevertheless, one has to admit that the assumption of equal a parameters is a 
restriction of the model. 
Essay 3: Income Distribution Dynamics and Pro-Poor Growth 
The second essay shows divergence of three components in the cross-country income distribu-
tion. About one third of the world's countries are caught in a poverty trap without any economic 
growth. Nevertheless, official statistics from the World Bank show a rapid decline of poverty 
during the given period. How are these disparate facts reconcilable? The cross-country anal-
ysis also shows that particular populous countries grew quickly enough to catch up to richer 
countries; in fact, China, India, and Indonesia belong to the group of the largest gainers, as mea-
sured by differences in their posterior probabilities. While the cross-country perspective is useful 
to analyze growth, convergence, and income polarization, it fails to address size and income in-
equality within countries. Thus, a different perspective on world income distribution is necessary 
to further explore questions of welfare, inequality, and poverty. 
From an individual perspective, world income distribution is an appealing topic for current re-
search. A better understanding of the participatory nature of growth is clearly relevant for the 
world community when it comes to meeting the Millennium Development Goals of halving 
global poverty and hunger by 2015. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about how 
global growth, inequality, and poverty should be measured. National accounts or survey data? 
Micro or macro data? Measure poverty based upon income or upon consumption? These and 
other questions are discussed by Ravallion (2003), Deaton (2005), and Milanovic (2006), among 
others. Two main concepts are applied to obtain estimates of world income distribution: The first 
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approach, labeled Concept 2 by Milanovic (2006), combines national accounts income data with 
household survey inequality data to derive a global income distribution. The second approach, 
labeled Concept 3 by Milanovic, 2006, is purely based upon income and inequality data from 
household surveys. 
Milanovic (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2006) are the most important contributions to literature 
which actually estimates world income distribution. Milanovic (2002) estimates it based upon 
household survey data, alone, whereas Sala-i-Martin (2006) combines GDP data from the Penn 
World Tables with inequality data from the World Institute of Development Economics Research 
(WIDER) data set. Clearly, Milanovic's approach is the most adequate for analyzing world 
income distribution for recent years, but it is less useful for analyzing the dynamics of the past 
40 years; only for recent years is there a sufficient amount of survey data available and it is also 
only recently that major efforts have been made to make household surveys more comparable 
over space and time. Thus, although the approach of Milanovic is, in principle, superior to other 
approaches, it cannot answer all questions of interest about world income distribution. 
This essay takes a similar approach to Sala-i-Martin (2006); GDP data from the Penn World 
Tables are combined with improved Gini data based on the WIDER data set. Sala-i-Martin 
(2006) uses quintile and decile data to obtain estimates for national income distributions based 
on non-parametric techniques. One could argue that the data at hand are not sufficient to fully 
exploit these techniques; in fact, Sala-i-Martin (2006) claims to be more precise and sophis-
ticated than is justified by the data. This essay thus exploits the information in the data by a 
simpler methodology-national income distributions are modeled parametrically as log-normally 
distributed. Although this is a no-progress approach from a methodological point of view, one 
can nevertheless argue that it is as good as Sala-i-Martin's approach, and, moreover, it is useful 
for answering questions regarding growth incidence and inequality decomposition which have 
not yet been treated by Sala-i-Martin (2006) or Milanovic (2002). 
The results show that the past 34 years have witnessed a strong global income convergence ac-
companied by a drastic decline in global income inequality and poverty. Noticeably, overall 
inequality declined because of diminishing inequality between countries, while economic in-
equality within countries increased. Furthermore, the analysis of growth-incidence curves shows 
that the bottom-middle part of the income distribution experienced above average percentile 
growth rates, which growth explains the existing global income convergence. In particular, the 
late 1970s and early 1980s are characterized by high global rates of pro-poor growth, initiating 
the rapid decline of global poverty rates. 
A regional decomposition of the data reveals that, in particular, the extraordinary growth record 
of East Asia and South Asia, which includes the two population heavyweights China and India, 
accounts primarily for the global income convergence and rapidly declining poverty rates. Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa showed slower but steady progress in poverty re-
duction. However, their more modest growth experience implies a relative income deterioration 
vis-a-vis the richer regions and also East and South Asia, and thus, can be seen as a remain-
ing divergent factor in the global income distribution. Lastly, Sub-Saharan Africa has remained 
virtually stagnant and has become the poorest region in relative and absolute terms, implying 
a steady divergence and disconnection from the global growth process. Given the large share 
of extremely poor people and high poverty headcounts in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear from 
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the analysis that any further large gains in extreme poverty reduction can be only achieved by 
pro-poor, or at least distributionally neutral, growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Essay 4: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 
The European Union (EU) and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries have a rather 
long common history. Due to these special historic relationships, the EU granted more-or-less 
duty and quota-free access for exports from ACP countries to EU markets. Other developing 
countries did not receive the same treatment. However, WTO rules only allow different treat-
ment for different types of countries, i.e., it is possible to give preferential access to all devel-
oping countries while discriminating against high-income countries. In contrast, it is not possi-
ble to give preferential access to some developing countries while discriminating against other 
developing countries. Thus, the special treatment for ACP countries was not compatible with 
fundamental WTO principles. However, acknowledging the special relationship between the EU 
and ACP countries, the EU benefited from a WTO waiver until 2007. 
Trade agreements on a reciprocal basis created the possibility of sustaining preferential market 
access to the EU for ACP countries. Hence, the EU started negotiations focused upon so-called 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with six ACP regions which were self-defined by the 
ACP countries in 2003. These regions include the Caribbean (CARIFORUM), Central Africa 
(CEMAC), South-East Africa (ESA), West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern Africa (SADC), and 
the Pacific. 
At the core of the EPAs are regional trade agreements between the EU and each of the six regions 
of ACP countries. However, the EPAs are also intended to support ACP regional integration, to 
foster their integration into world markets, and to improve coherence between trade and devel-
opment. While the previous trade preferences for ACP countries were determined unilaterally 
by the EU, the current EPAs are jointly designed in negotiations between the EU and the ACP 
countries. ACP countries are requested to open their markets to EU products to some extent 
in return for their access to EU markets. However, it is possible that developing countries will 
open their markets to a much smaller extent than the EU does (in case of the EPAs, an average 
SO-percent increase in accessibility within 15 years). 
Critics claim that EPAs are harmful for ACP countries mainly because the reciprocal market 
access for EU exports to ACP countries dramatically reduces tariff revenues in ACP countries. 
Moreover, local industries suffer from stiff competition with companies from the EU. One could 
argue against such critiques that there is no reasonable alternative to EPAs because the conse-
quence of not having a trade agreement would be the loss of preferential access to EU markets 
(which would be severe). Nevertheless, the points mentioned by these critiques could be perhaps 
justified as the price ACP countries have to pay for sustained access to EU markets. Therefore, it 
is important to estimate the welfare effects of tariff reductions for products from the EU in ACP 
countries (e.g., the price ACP countries have to pay for sustained access to EU markets). This is 
done in the fourth essay using as examples nine African countries: Botswana, Cameroon, C6te 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
Studies by Karingi et al. (2005), Milner et al. (2006), Busse and GroBmann (2007), and Fontagne 
et al. (2008) take a similar approach. The main limitations of these previous studies are that elas-
ticities of import demand were chosen rather arbitrarily and, in some cases, that ,only rather 
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general scenarios of tariff reduction are simulated. This essay overcomes these limitations. First, 
the elasticities of import demand for the nine African countries are estimated from highly disag-
gregated trade data. Second, the real negotiated tariff reduction rates are applied to access the 
trade agreement's real welfare effects on the African countries. 
The results show that Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda experience small 
welfare losses, while Botswana, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Namibia experience remarkable 
welfare gains. A simulation comparing the EPA tariff reductions to the theoretical scenario of 
a full liberalization show that Tanzania and Uganda could also have experienced welfare gains. 
This indicates that different priorities were in place when excluding certain products from liber-
alization. Although consumption and trade-creation effects compensate or even overcompensate 
in most cases for the decline in tariff revenues and appropriate transition periods are in place, 
the question of revenues remains of importance for the national budget of the African countries 
(since all of them highly depend upon tariff revenues and because trade with the EU was previ-
ously an important source of such revenue). A possible solution to this problem of revenue losses 
would be for the EU to provide budget support to the most affected countries, to help improve tax 
administration, and to ensure reliable tax collection. The essay also provides policy conclusions 
for a number of other questions. 
Essay 5: Political Institutions and Human Development 
Sen (1983), among others, revolutionized the way economists look at development. Thanks to 
him, development today is a rather broad concept, whereas economic development oftentimes 
used to be only a synonym for economic growth. Development, as a whole, depends upon each 
individual's capabilities, which define the freedoms to choose a valuable life in accordance with 
individual preferences. This approach inspired the emergence of the pluralist and integrative 
conception of "human development" and operationalization in the form of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. It is not only income but also 
health, education, and other factors that enable people to shape their lives in accordance with 
their desires. 
It is the purpose of this fifth essay to answer the question as to which political system is the 
best for obtaining a high level of human development for the population. Singapore's former 
president, Lee Kuan Yew, claimed that authoritarian rule is more efficient than democratic gov-
ernments and therefore beneficial to economic development (and as a consequence, also for 
human development). There are in fact many examples that could help to prove him right: His 
own country, Singapore, is today a high income country with life expectancy at birth of 79 years 
and a literacy rate of 97 percent. Also, the relatively poor Cuba managed to achieve a very high 
life expectancy rate at birth of 77 years and a literacy rate of 93 percent. The democracy Niger, 
in contrast, is not only much poorer (the average GDP per capita is eight times higher in Cuba 
and 32 times higher in Singapore) but also the life expectancy rate is very low at 44 years and 
only 18 percent of the population is literate. A similar picture holds true for India with a life 
expectancy rate at birth of 63 years and a literacy rate of 60 percent. 
These examples and also controversies in the theoretical literature show that it is not self-evident 
that democratic governments are superior to autocratic leaders in terms of economic and human 
development outcomes. The literature points to a possible trade-off between growth-enhancing 
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property rights protection and redistribution. On the one hand, property rights protection is a 
necessary condition for an increase in the overall wealth of a nation (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 
2002), but whether all can benefit depends on redistribution, as well. Moreover, corporatism 
may lead to lock-in effects and decreasing reform capacity in democracies. The causal direction 
is not clear: Is democracy a cause or a consequence of the development process? Finally, there is 
a debate as to which conditions are necessary for democracy to have a positive effect on human 
development. 
Empirical studies with a focus on democracy and economic growth do not provide a coherent 
answer. Barro (1996), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), and Minier (1998) find a moderately nega-
tive or nonlinear correlation between democracy and growth. In contrast, Persson and Tabellini 
(2006) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) find a positive, or at least the absence of a negative, 
correlation between democracy and economic growth. There is also uncertainty about the cor-
relation with democracy for the non-income dimensions of human development. Very few em-
pirical studies focusing on the non-income dimensions of human development and democracy 
are available. Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) and Tsai (2006) find a positive correlation between 
democracy and human development, while Ross (2006) finds the opposite. All studies have cer-
tain limitations which might explain why they do not have a coherent theme. They are either 
confined to a sub-sample of developing countries, are focused upon only one dimension of hu-
man development, or are restricted to a cross-section which disregards the time dimension of the 
data. None of the previous empirical studies investigate possible conditions that might have an 
impact on democracy's performance measured in human development outcomes. 
This essay analyzes the relationship between democracy and the non-income dimensions of hu-
man development. It extends the existing literature in several ways. The essay develops a the-
oretical argument as to why democracy should lead to better non-income human development 
outcomes than authoritarian rule. Capital redistribution is less important for obtaining high lev-
els of GDP per capita in a democracy; for instance, a society with a small group of extremely 
rich and many poor people could have the same GDP per capita as a society where everybody 
is moderately rich. However, this is not true for life expectancy or literacy. The life expectancy 
of a society where a small group reaches age 100 and everyone else dies at age 20 will be very 
close to 20 years. This is even more obvious for the literacy rate, being a direct measurement of 
the percentage of the public that reads. Thus, the theoretical reasoning of the essay rests upon 
the redistributive effects of democracy, based upon qualitative arguments by Sen (1999), among 
others, and a quantitative argument based on the median voter theory. The empirical section is 
a panel analysis that covers all countries of the world (subject to data availability) and a time 
span of 30 years. Moreover, interaction effects are included, as well, to determine whether the 
performance of democracy is affected by certain circumstances. 
The empirical investigation shows a strong and robust correlation between democracy and human 
development, measured by life expectancy and literacy, and controlling for the level of economic 
development and other important variables. The model is constructed in such a way, that the cor-
relation can be cautiously interpreted as causal. Interestingly, the interaction between democracy 
and its presumed conditions of functioning turned out to be insignificant or not robust. 
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Essay 1 
A Likelihood Ratio Test for Bimodality in 
Two-Component Mixtures 
1.1 Introduction 
Analyzing the modality of the distribution of a random sample is an important problem, espe-
cially for proper graphical visualization of the data. In particular, it is relevant to decide whether 
modes which are present in a certain fit are merely sampling artifacts or whether they are actual 
features of the underlying density. 
Most testing procedures for multimodality, which were suggested in the literature, are nonpara-
metric in nature. The arguably most popular method, which is based on kernel estimates with the 
normal kernel, was suggested by Silverman (1981). He observed that for fixed observations the 
number of modes in such an estimate is a monotonically decreasing function of the bandwidth. 
Using this fact Silverman (1981) defined the k-critical bandwidth hk as the minimal bandwidth 
for which the kernel estimate still just has k modes. If hk exceeds a critical value, which is con-
structed from a bootstrap procedure, then the hypothesis for k modes of the underlying density 
is rejected. See also Mammen et al. (1992), Fisher et al. (1994) and Hall and York (2001). A 
test for unimodality against multimodality, which is based on measuring the distance between 
the empirical distribution function and the class of unimodal distribution functions, was intro-
duced by Hartigan and Hartigan (1985), it is called the dip test. Millier and Sawitzki (1991) used 
the so-called excess mass functional to construct a test for k-modality. For k = l their test is 
equivalent to the dip test. See also Fisher and Marron (2001). 
The notion of multimodality of the distribution of a population is closely related to the notion 
of population heterogeneity. A popular way to model population heterogeneity parametrically is 
via mixture models. In particular, the likelihood ratio test for homogeneity in two-component 
mixtures has been extensively studied in recent years, cf. e.g. Chen et al. (2001). However, 
mixtures with two distinct components need not be bimodal, and two component mixtures of 
based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann. 
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unimodal component densities can have more than two modes. Therefore, there is no immediate 
connection between the number of components in a mixture and the number of modes of the 
resulting density. Nevertheless, the modal structure of two-component mixtures of certain para-
metric families, notably the normal distribution (Robertson and Fryer, 1969) and the von Mises 
distribution (Mardia and Sutton, 1975), is completely known in terms of the parameters of the 
mixture. For two-component mixtures, for which such an explicit characterization of the modal 
structure is available, we construct a likelihood ratio (LR) test for unimodality against bimodality. 
The asymptotic distribution of the LR test for bimodality, though not a standard x2 -distribution, 
can be deduced from existing results on the behavior of LR statistics on the boundary of the 
parameter space, cf. Chernoff (1954) and Self and Liang (1987). 
When compared to the nonparametric methods mentioned above, the LR test has certain merits 
as well as certain limitations. Concerning the advantages, the LR test is more powerful than 
competing nonparametric methods if the distributional assumptions are satisfied. Further, using 
von Mises mixtures, the LR test can easily be applied to circular data. Note that for circular 
data, only few methods are available, notably the tests by Fisher and Marron (2001) and by Basu 
and Jammalamadaka (2002). Moreover, using recent results by Ray and Lindsay (2005) on the 
modal structure of multivariate normal mixtures, it can be extended to the multivariate setting 
where no methods seem to be available yet. Concerning limitations, the LR test can only test 
for unimodality against bimodality and not for k against more than k modes, since there are no 
parametric descriptions for these cases. Further, it loses power if the mixture component densities 
are not normally distributed but have heavier tails (like the t-distribution). 
Section 1.2 describes the asymptotic distribution of the LR test for bimodality in two-component 
mixtures and gives two examples. In Section 1.3 we investigate the performance of the LR test 
via a simulation study. As an application, in Section 1.4, following Pittau (2005) and Pittau and 
Zelli (2006) we analyze the cross-sectional distribution of per capita log GDP across EU regions 
via mixtures. After excluding the mere urban areas, it turns out that a two-component mixture 
model with equal variances for the two components adequately describes the data for all years. 
We further investigate whether the distribution is actually bimodal, both by using Silverman's 
test as well as via the LR test for bimodality. Silverman's test can never reject the hypothesis of 
unimodality. In contrast, for the years 1977-79 the LRT rejects unimodality with level 5%, while 
in the following years, it can no longer reject this hypothesis with increasing p-values. Thus, 
while the cross-sectional distribution of per capita log GDP in the EU regions under investiga-
tion remains heterogeneous in the sense of being well-modeled by a two-component mixture of 
normal distributions, these components only significantly result in a bimodal distribution in the 
years 1977-1979, while in the following years the two components start to merge and form a 
unimodal distribution. 
1.2 The Likelihood Ratio Test for Bimodality 
Let f(x; 0), 0 E 8 c !Rd, x E !Rq, be a parametric family of q-dimensional densities, and consider 
the two component mixture family 
f(x; 01, 0z,p) = pf(x; 01) + (1 - p)f(x; 02), 
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where 
(81,fh,p) E 0 X 0 X [O, I]= E>mix C IR.2d+l_ 
In order to allow for possible joint parameters of the component densities ( e.g. equal variances), 
we consider a subset Emix C E>mix, where Emix C IR.q for a minimal q :C::: 2d + I. Suppose that 
the mixture density is at most bimodal, so that we can split the set Emix disjointly into Emix = 
Eunim U Ebim, the unimodal part Eunim and the bimodal part Ebim· We will denote the boundary 
between Ebim and Eunim by dEunim, i.e. dEunim = Eunim nEbim, where Ebim denotes the closure 
of Ebim· Given observations X1, ... ,Xn from the mixture density, we consider the log-likelihood 
function 
n 
2'n(01,lh,p) = L logf(Xk;81,82,P)-
k=I 
Assumption 1. The partial derivatives of logf (x; 81, (h, p) of order 3 with respect to 81, 82 and 
p exist a.s., at least in a neighborhood N of the true value ( 0?, 0f, p0 ). 
Assumption 2. For ( 81, (h, p) E N, the first and second order partial derivatives of 
f(x;81,lh,p) are uniformly bounded in absolute value by a function F(x) E L1(IR), and the 
third order partial derivatives of logf(x; 81, (h, p) are uniformly bounded in absolute value by a 
function H(x) with EH(X1) < oo. 
Assumption 3. The expectation of the matrix of second order partial derivatives of 
logf (x; 81, (h,p) is finite and positive definite for ( 81, 82, p) EN. 
Note that Assumption 3 will not be satisfied in a neighborhood of a single component density (i.e. 
if p = 0 or p = I or 01 = (h, see e.g. Goffinet et al., 1992). However, for unimodal component 
densities such as normal or von Mises densities (see the examples below), a density on the 
boundary dEunim will be a proper two-component mixture, so that Assumption 3 is satisfied. 
Theorem 1. Suppose that the true parameter vector ( 0?, 0f, p0) of the mixture density lies on the 
boundary dEunim, and that locally around ( 0?, 0f ,p0 ), dEunim is a smooth (q- !)-dimensional 
surface in IR.q. If furthermore Assumptions I - 3 hold true, then we have that 
Rn:=2( sup 2'n(01,82,p)- sup 2'n(01,lh,p))~(X&+Xf)/2, (1.1) 
(01 ./Ji.p )EEmix ( 01 ,/Ji.p)EEun;m 
where X& is the measure with mass one at x = 0 and xf is the chi-square distribution with I 
degree of freedom. 
This result follows from the theory of the likelihood ratio test for parameter vectors which lie on 
the boundary of the parameter space, cf. Chernoff (1954) and Self and Liang (1987). Note that 
if the true parameter vector lies in the interior of Eunim, then due to consistency, the unrestricted 
maximum likelihood estimator will asymptotically lie in a neighborhood U of~ with U c Eunim, 
so that Rn --+ 0 in probability. Therefore the test will also asymptotically keep the level in this 
case. 
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Example 1 (Nonna] distribution). For the normal density f (x; µ,a) = ~o e ( 1';:/) we obtain 
the general two component mixture as follows: 
f(x;p,µ1 ,µ2, <J1, a2) = p f(x;µ1, <J1) + (1 - p)f(x;µ2, <J2), (1.2) 
where OS p S 1 and without loss of generality, µ2 2': µ1. Introducing the parameters r = aif a2 
and d = (µ2 - µi)/(2✓a1 a2), one easily sees that f(x;p,µ1 ,µ2, <J1, cr2) has the same number of 
modes as f(x;p, -d,d, r, 1/r), cf. Behboodian (1970). Thus, bimodality solely depends on the 
three parameters (p, d, r). Let us mention that such an argument can be made for general location-
scale families (e.g. also for the t-distribution with fixed degrees of freedom). In case of equal 
variances, a1 = a2 = a, one obtains r = 1, and the conditions read as follows: f(x;p,µ1 ,µ2, a) 
is unimodal if and only if d S 1 or if 
d>l and llog(l-p)-logpl2':2log(d-Jd2-1)+2d~, (1.3) 
otherwise, it is bimodal. In Figure 1.1, the region of bimodality is depicted, where for r # 1 the 
characterization in Robertson and Fryer (1969) was used. 
If we assume that the variances <J1 = <J2 = a are equal (though possibly unknown) and that pis 
known and fixed, then the smoothness assumption on the boundary of the unimodal parameter 
domain is satisfied everywhere, and thus Theorem 1 holds true. 
This is e.g. obvious for the case p = 1 /2, in which case the mixture is unimodal with mode at 
(µ1 + µ2) /2 if and only if µ2 - µ1 S 2a. For other values of p it follows from equation (1.3). 
However, in case of variable p and equal variances, the boundary has a singularity for d = 1 and 
p = 1/2, which follows from equation (1.3) by taking equality there and the limit d ---t 1. 
If d = 1 and p = 1 /2, the likelihood ratio statistic will be asymptotically stochastically smaller 
than the limit distribution in (1.1). This is because the angle between the tangents to the bimodal 
region at these points is less than 11:, so that the unrestricted ML estimator will in more than 50% 
of all cases fall into the unimodal region, and the LR statistic will be zero. See also Figure 1.1. In 
summary, a test based on the critical value of the 1 /2(X~ + xf) distribution will asymptotically 
keep the level everywhere in the unimodal parameter space. Extensions to the characterization 
of the number of modes of higher dimensional normal distributions were recently obtained by 
Ray and Lindsay (2005). 
Example 2 ( Von Mises distribution). The von Mises distribution is given by the density 
1 
f(x;µ, IC)= -2 ( ) exp (1Ccos(x-µ)), 0 Sx < 211:, 11:/0 IC 
whereµ E [0,211:), IC> 0 and /o(IC) is a norming factor given by the modified Bessel function of 
the second kind. The two component mixture of von Mises distributions will be denoted by 
f(x;p,µ1,µ2, 1C1, 1C2) = pf(x;µ1, 1C1) + (1- p)f(x;µ2, 1C2), 
where w.l.o.g. µ2 - µ1 =: d E [O, 11:] (since the maximal distance on the circle of two points 
along the arc is 11:). Mardia and Sutton (1975) give precise conditions for bimodality for general 
parameters constellations. Here we only review their results for the case of equal concentration 
parameters, i.e. ICJ = 1C2 = IC. In this case, the mixture is unimodal if and only if either d = 0 or 
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Figure 1.1 : Regions of bimodality of 
the normal distribution, where d = (µ2 -
µi)/(2~) and r = crJ/cr2. On the right 
side of the curves are those parameter con-
stellations of p and d for which for fixed r 
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Figure 1.2: Regions of bimodality of the van 
Mises distribution, where µ = µ2 - µ 1 and 
1(1 = 1(2 = I(. On the right side of the curves 
are those parameter constellations of p and µ 
for which for fixed I( the resulting mixture is 
bimodal. 
• d = 7r and O :C::: p :c:; (1 +exp(21e))- 1 or (1 +exp(-21e))- 1 :C::: p s 1 or 
• 0 < d < 7r and either 
- sind < 21esin3(d/2), 0 :C::: p S 1, or 
- sind 2: 21esin3(d/2) and O :C::: p S -t(8)/(l-t(8)) or l/(l-1(8)) :C::: p :c:; l, where 
8 is the solution of 
21ecos3 8 - 1e(l +cosd)cos 8 - 2cos(d/2) = 0, 0 < 8 < d/2, (1.4) 
and 
t(8) = sin(d/2 + 8) . . sin(d/2 _ 8) exp ( -21CS!n(d/2)sm8). 
The conditions for von Mises mixtures are more complicated than those for normal mixtures, 
since it is not a simple location-scale family (this notion is not defined for circular distributions). 
Still, although one has to distinguish several cases, these cases merge continuously. For example, 
for sind = 21esin3 (d/2), the mixture is still unimodal for all O :C::: p :c:; 1. Further, ford-> n, one 
has that -t(8)/(l -t(8))-> (1 +exp(21e))- 1 (and similarly on the other side). In Figure 1.2, 
the region of bimodality is displayed. 
For fixed p, Theorem 1 is again generally applicable. However, for p variable and equal concen-
tration parameters, there occurs a singularity on the boundary of the set of unimodal parameter 
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constellations for p = 0.5 if sind = 21C sin3 ( d /2). Again, the test will nevertheless asymptotically 
keep the critical value. 
1.3 Simulations 
In this section we conduct a simulation study in order to analyze the practical feasibility of the 
LR test for bimodality. 
First let us investigate the quality of the approximation by the asymptotic distribution as given 
in Theorem 1. To this end, for certain parameter constellations on the boundary of the unimodal 
region we simulate the actual level of the test when using asymptotic critical values. Here we 
use 104 samples of various sizes. Further, direct numerical maximization of the log-likelihood 
function is employed, and for the constrained estimate we reparameterize the problem in order 
to use unconstrained maximization. 
Table 1.1: Simulated level of Rn on the boundary for normal mixtures, using asymptotic critical 
values 
scenario free parameters sample size nominal level simulated level 
µ1 = 0, µ2 = 3 µ1,µ2,P 100 0.10 0.12 
0"1 = 0"2 = O" = 1.3 0.05 0.059 
p = 0.442 0.Ql 0.015 
250 0.10 0.11 
0.05 0.057 
0.Ql 0.012 
µ1,µ2,p,O" 250 0.10 0.14 
0.05 0.072 
0.01 0.016 
500 0.10 0.13 
0.05 0.066 
0.Ql 0.014 
µ1 = 0, µ2 = 2.5 µ1,µ2,P 100 0.10 0.16 
0"1 = 1.1, 0"2 = 0.8 0.05 0.086 
0.Ql 0.019 
250 0.10 0.10 
0.05 0.052 
0.01 0.011 
The results for the normal distribution are displayed in Table 1.1, simulations for the von Mises 
distribution led to similar results. It turns out that the test keeps the nominal level quite well 
even for moderate sample sizes, both for normal and von Mises mixtures, as long as either 
equal variances ( or concentration parameters) are employed or if the variances are assumed to 
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be known. However, further simulations indicated that if both variances are allowed to vary, the 
approximation is rather inaccurate and should not be used. 
Now let us investigate the power properties of the LR test for bimodality. For simplicity we 
restrict ourselves to normal mixtures, and we compare the performance with Silverman's ( I 981) 
test and with the Dip test by Hartigan and Hartigan (1985). When implementing Silverman's 
( 1981) test we use 1000 bootstrap replications to estimate the critical value for the bandwidth. 
Further the R-library "Diptest" is used for the Dip test by Hartigan and Hartigan (1985). We con-
sider several alternative scenarios. In each scenario 1000 samples of various sizes are generated. 
a. First alternative: a normal mixture f1 (x) = f(x, 0.5, - 1.5, 1.5, 1, 1 ). The density is symmetric 
and clearly bimodal, cf. Figure A. l. where also the unrestricted ML fit and the ML fit restricted 
to the unimodal region are displayed for a sample from f 1. Here we use only equal variances, 
and CJ is allowed to vary. The LR test performs slightly superior to Silverman's test, and both 
outperform the Dip test. See Table 1.2 for the simulation results. 
Table 1.2: Power under first alternative, the normal mixture Ji = f(x, 0.5, - 1.5, 1.5, 1, 1) 
sample size nominal level LR Silverman's Dip 
200 0.10 0.89 0.77 0.30 
0.05 0.80 0.63 0.20 
O.Dl 0.53 0.35 0.06 
500 0.10 0.99 0.97 0.60 
0.05 0.98 0.92 0.47 
0.01 0.93 0.75 0.24 
b. Second alternative: a normal mixture h(x) = f(x,0.3, - 1.5, 1, 0.75,0.75). The density is 
asymmetric but bimodal, cf. Figure A.2. Again we only use equal variances for the fit, and CJ 
is allowed to vary. The results are displayed in Table 1.3. The dip test has no significant power 
exceeding the level for this hypothesis for sample sizes up to n = 500, and the LR test strongly 
outperforms Silverman's test. 
Table 1.3: Power under second alternative, the normal mixture h = f(x,0.3, -1.5, 1,0.75,0.75) 
sample size nominal level LR Silverman's 
200 0.10 0.80 0.57 
0.05 0.70 0.39 
0.01 0.45 0.11 
500 0.10 0.99 0.97 
0.05 0.98 0.92 
O.Dl 0.93 0.75 
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c. Third alternative: a normal mixture h(x) = f(x,0.6, -1.5, 1.4,0.6, 1.4). The density is asym-
metric but bimodal, cf. Figure A.2. Here we use distinct variances which are assumed to be 
known. Only the LR test has a reasonable power against this alternative, and therefore we do not 
present a table for this simulation setting. In fact, the comparison is not really fair since the LR 
test uses the exact values of the variances, which are hardly available in practice. 
d. We also investigated the behavior of the LR test for bimodality if the distributional assumption 
of normal mixtures is not satisfied, and briefly report the results. We simulated 1000 samples 
of sizes 200 and 500 from a mixture of two t-distributions with 5 degrees of freedom. One 
component has location parameter O and the other 3. Both have unit scaling parameter, and a 
weight of p = 0.4 for the first component is used. The density is clearly bimodal. However, 
due to the heavy tails of the t-distribution, the variance in the normal fit is typically too large. 
Therefore the modes in the normal mixture are much less distinctive than in the t mixture, and 
the LR test looses power. In fact, the LR test looses much power as compared to Silverman's 
test, while the LR test and the dip test perform similarly. 
1.4 Application to the Cross-Regional Income Distribution in 
the EU 
The convergence hypothesis states that poorer economies are growing faster than richer ones, 
hence, catching up such that eventually there will be no differences between real average per 
capita income across countries. This would imply a unimodal cross-national or even cross-
regional distribution of income which should become constantly less dispersed. The literature 
distinguishes between two types of convergence, /3-convergence and a-convergence (Sala-i-
Martin, 1996). By definition, /3-convergence occurs if the coefficient on initial income is negative 
when regressed on the change of log real income, or in words, if initially poorer economies grow 
on average faster than the initially rich. Moreover, a-convergence is defined as the decrease 
of the dispersion of the entire income distribution measured by the standard deviation of log 
incomes. If there are no other control variables in the growth regression, we speak of absolute /3-
convergence, which would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a-convergence. Thus, 
for the convergence hypothesis to hold we need absolute B-convergence and a-convergence such 
that the income distribution converges to one common mode. 
However, the extended Solow growth model, given its assumptions, only implies a restricted 
type of conditional /3-convergence. Indeed, if two groups of countries are governed by different 
parameters, but display within group homogeneity of parameters, it would imply a divergence 
of the two groups, but a within group convergence of economies to their respective group steady 
state. Quah (1997) developed a theoretical and empirical framework for so called club conver-
gence from the viewpoint of income distribution dynamics, implying an emerging twin peaks 
phenomenon for the global cross-country income distribution. Bianchi (1997) finds empirical 
evidence for a bimodal cross-country income distribution occurring in the 1970s for all subse-
quent years. For regions in the European Union this picture however is less clear (cf. e.g. Quah, 
1996c, and Le Gallo, 2004). 
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The framework of EU regions is of special interest, since cohesion among EU regions has been 
a major priority of all EU treaties so far. The European Development Fund (EDF) has been 
in operation since the very beginning in 1959. Starting with 3.4 million Euro, it went up to 
244.7 million Euro in 1977 and 1353.6 million Euro in 1993. Other relevant policy outcomes are 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) established in 1962 and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) created in 1975. The EAGGF started with 28.7 
million Euro in 1975, increasing to 6587.1 million Euro in 1977 and 34935.8 million Euro in 
1993. The EDF already started with 150 million Euro and increased to 400 million Euro in 1977 
and 5382.6 million Euro in 1993. 1 Hence, one should expect that policy interventions assimilate 
the parameters of the extended Solow growth model in the European Union over time, implying 
absolute convergence in the long-run. Furthermore, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) argue that 
convergence of incomes between regions is in general supported and accelerated by an economic 
environment without restrictions on the free movement of capital, labor and tradeable goods, 








3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 
Figure 1.3: Unrestricted (solid lines) and restricted unimodal (dashed lines) fits to the cross-sectional 
distribution of log GDP PPS per capita for European regions in the years 1977 (left) and 1993 (right). 
We use a data set on regional GDP in the European Union available from CRENoS 2, covering 
the period from 1977 to 1993 and including administrative regions defined by the Nomencla-
ture of the Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) established by Eurostat. The GDP figures are 
given in 1990 constant prices and are converted to Purchasing Power Standard (PPS). The data 
set includes regions from all EU-12 member countries at that time. Following Pittau (2005) and 
Pittau and Zelli (2006) we use the territorial units as follows: NUTS-0 (countries) for Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Ireland; NUTS-I for Belgium (3 Regions), West-Germany (11 Lander), the 
Netherlands (4 Landsdelen) and UK (9 Government Office Regions and 3 Countries); NUTS-2 
1 For these facts see: European Commission (2000), The Community Budget: The Facts in Figures. 
2Center for North South Economic Research, http://www.crenos.it 
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18 1. A LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST FOR BIMODALITY IN Two-COMPONENT MIXTURES 
for Italy (20 Regioni), France (22 Regions), Spain (17 Communitades Autonomas), Portugal (5 
Comissaoes de Coordenacao Regional), Greece (13 Development Regions). Though not equally 
sized, these regions are, due to administrative structure of the different countries, the best units 
available for comparisons below the national level. Urban regions usually have their own eco-
nomic structure and are not comparable to regions covering both urban and rural parts. There-
fore we decided to exclude the mainly urban regions from our analysis (Briissel B3, Bremen D4, 
Hamburg D5, Ile de France Fl and Luxembourg LU). 
Pittau (2005) and Pittau and Zelli (2006) analyze a similar data set (without the exclusion of the 
urban regions) by using finite mixtures of normal distributions. For our more homogeneous data 
set, in a first step we determine the number of components in the mixture as well as the structure 
of the mixture (in particular equal or unequal variances for the components of the mixture). To 
this end we use the model selection criteria AIC and BIC. Table B.l shows the results for the 
years 1977 and 1990. Both model selection criteria select the two-component mixture model 
with equal variances for the components. This is in fact true for all years from 1977-1993, thus, 
it is the model of choice for this period. 
Pittau (2005) and Pittau and Zelli (2006) also test the number of components by using a bootstrap 
version of the likelihood ratio test. Here, in order to confirm that two components are indeed 
present in the data, we use the modified likelihood ratio test for homogeneity (cf. Chen et al., 
2001). In contrast to the usual LRT for homogeneity, this test retains a comparatively simple 
limit theory, thus a parametric bootstrap (with the resulting loss in power) is not necessary. We 
test the hypothesis of a single normal distribution against a two-component mixture with equal 
(but unkown) variance, and to this end use a version of the modified LRT with a structural 
parameter as investigated in Chen and Kalbfleisch (2005). They show that the x}-distribution is 
an asymptotic upper bound for the distribution of the modified LRT statistic in this case. Based 
on this bound we find p-values of less than 0.001 for all years in the period 1977-1993, thus, 
there is strong statistical evidence of two components in the distribution. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the introduction this does not necessarily imply that the distribution 
is bimodal, so that the components are strongly pronounced. Therefore, we test for unimodality 
against bimodality, both by using the LRT for bimodality in a two-component normal mixture 
Table 1.4: Tests for unimodality for the distribution of log GDP per capita in European regions 
year p-val LRT p-val. Silverman 
1977 0.006 0.14 
1978 0.009 0.23 
1979 0.042 0.29 
1980 0.105 0.28 
1985 0.222 0.98 
1990 0.214 0.69 
1993 0.347 0.54 
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1.4. APPLICATION TO THE CROSS-REGIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE EU 19 
with equal variances, as well as using Silverman's test. The results are displayed in Table 1 .4. 
While Silverman's test never rejects the hypothesis of a single mode, the LRT rejects in favor of 
bimodality in 1977-1979. Afterward, the hypothesis can no longer be rejected, indicating that 
the two groups, though still present, start to merge. Figure 1.3 shows the restricted unimodal and 
the unrestricted fit for the years 1977 and 1993, respectively. 
Conclusions can be drawn both from an economical and a statistical point of view. Economi-
cally the empirical results indicate that the two component mixture describing the cross-regional 
income distribution in the European Union became less and less dispersed, meaning that well 
separated clusters of poor and rich regions in the EU moved closer together and might tend to 
converge to a single group in the long-run. However, further research is necessary to evaluate the 
long-run impact of EU cohesion policy on regional GDP, of special interest would be an analysis 
of the distribution dynamics past the more recent EU enlargements. From a statistical point of 
view, we find, that the LRT is able to detect a second mode in a real-data application, while 
Silverman's test is not able to do so. 
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Essay 2 
Twin Peaks or Three Components? 
2.1 Introduction 
The behavior of the cross-national income distribution is for many reasons of great interest. In 
particular, the development of twin or even more peaks would characterize a world of growing 
cross-country average income polarization and suggest the existence of multiple equilibria. Nu-
merous papers (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Mankiw 
et al., 1992; Jones, 1997; Quah, 1996a,b, 1997; Romer, 1990; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Durlauf et 
al., 2005; Beaudry et al., 2005; Graham and Temple, 2006) have this debate at heart and discuss, 
which type of convergence governs the development of the cross-national income distribution 
and what is to be expected in the future. In particular, they show that a focus on /3-convergence 
is informative on the nature of intra-distributional dynamics but cannot convey information con-
cerning the development of the entire distribution, which appears to be polarizing. In order to 
overcome this traditional shortcoming of the /3-convergence debate, probabilistic income mobil-
ity models are used to estimate likelihoods of convergence groups. Hence, there is a discussion 
on whether the so called twin peak phenomenon is either persistent as probabilities of switching 
are too low (Quah, 1996a,b) or is only a temporary occurrence due to increasing frequencies of 
growth miracles (Jones, 1997). Thus, existing literature either shows a descriptive picture of the 
cross-national income distribution by observing the development of two income per capita peaks 
in the cross-national income distribution, or, alternatively, is concerned with /3-convergence in 
cross-national income growth regressions. Bianchi (1997) employed a nonparametric test for 
multimodality based on kernel density estimation to the cross-country income distribution. Fur-
ther nonparametric approaches include those by Anderson (2004), who used stochastic domi-
nance techniques, and by Maasoumi et al. (2007), who analyzed the cross-sectional distribution 
of growth rates. Regarding parametric modeling, for the cross-country income distribution, Paap 
and Dijk (1998) used a two-component mixture, consisting of a truncated normal distribution 
and a Weibull distribution. 
based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Julian Weisbrod. 
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From nonparametric kernel density estimates, several authors find a twin-peaked cross-country 
income distribution (Quah, 1996b; Bianchi, 1997). In particular, Bianchi (1997) observes in-
creasing evidence for bimodality in the GDP per capita distribution across countries over the 
period from 1970 to 1989, indicating global divergence rather than convergence. However, in-
come data are often analyzed on a logarithmic scale, and the number of modes of the log-income 
distribution may differ substantially from the number of modes of the income distribution itself. 
In contrast, when modeling a density as a finite mixture, the number of components of this mix-
ture is independent of the chosen scale. Furthermore, if one wishes to address convergence one 
can argue that it is not the number of modes in the cross-national income density which contains 
the most relevant information, but rather the number of convergence clubs, which correspond to 
the components in the finite mixture. 
When modeling the cross-national income distribution by a finite mixture, determining its num-
ber of components is an essential step in the analysis. In their model, Paap and Dijk (1998) use 
a mixture with two distinct components, which resembles the fit of a histogram of the cross-
national income distribution. Thus, the "stylized fact" of a distinction between poor and rich 
countries is already built into their model. We argue that via a statistical inference procedure, 
the data itself should determine the number of components and to this end a finite mixture with 
normal components of the log-income distribution (or log-normal components of the income 
distribution itself) is the appropriate tool. We shall apply the recently developed modified like-
lihood ratio test methodology (cf. Chen et al. 2001, 2004, and Chen and Kalbfleisch, 2005) for 
the number of components in a finite mixture to the cross-national income distribution. 
In contrast to the twin-peaks literature and also to Paap and Dijk (1998), we find evidence of 
two components only at the beginnings of the 70s, whereas in the mid 70s, a third intermediate 
component emerges, which tends to separate itself ever more clearly from the poorest component. 
Thus, we find statistical evidence for three components rather than "twin peaks" in the cross-
country income distribution. 
After determining the number of components (three components from 1976 onward), we con-
tribute to the convergence debate by extensively investigating the evolution, number of compo-
nents and the inter-distributional dynamics of the cross-country income distribution by using the 
posterior probability estimates from our fitted model. In particular, we find intra-distributional 
dynamics for Asian (upward mobility) and Latin American (downward mobility) countries. The 
overall picture that we obtain is that of three diverging groups in the cross-national income dis-
tribution. 
2.2 Statistical Methodology and Data 
2.2.1 Data 
Following most other papers, our analysis is based on income data from the Penn World Tables 
Version 6.2, from which we extract the real PPP GDP per capita series of all years and countries 
available ( chain series, base year 2000 in international $). 
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In order to compare our observations over time, we restrict ourselves to those countries, of which 
complete income data for the whole time period are available. Further we decided to exclude 
small oil states or tax heavens, and for simplicity we therefore excluded countries having less 
than half a million inhabitants. This restriction leaves 124 countries for the period from I 970 to 
2003 in our analysis. These countries represent about 95 percent of the world's population. 
2.2.2 Testing for the Number of Components in a Finite Mixture 
Let fx denote the density of the cross-country income distribution of a fixed year, and let fy be 
the corresponding density of the log-incomes, so that fy (y) = fx ( eY)eY. Multimodality of fx can 
arise by fx being a finite mixture of other (unimodal) densities, so that 
x>O, (2.1) 
where the weights p; 2'. 0, L p; = I and g(x; µ, <r) is a parametric family of densities, e.g. the 
log-normal distribution. 
If fx is a finite mixture of densities g(-;µ,<r), there is no general simple connection between 
the number of modes of fx and the number of components m. Typically, for unimodal g, the 
number of modes off will be at most m, but often will be less than m. Furthermore, one is rather 
interested in the number of components m of the finite mixture than in the number of modes. For 
example, in the cross-country income distribution the components correspond to groups with 
different income level. Therefore, if we model the cross-country distribution of income by a 
finite mixture, determining its number of components statistically is a task of major importance, 
since this number will have essential economic consequences. 
Further, the number of components is preserved if the data are transformed via a strictly mono-
tonic transformation. Therefore, in this essay we model fx (and hence fy) as a finite mixture and 
then determine its number of components, mainly via hypothesis testing, but also by the use of 
model selection criteria. We model fy as a finite mixture of normal distributions, so that fx is a 
finite mixture of log-normal distributions. 
Estimation in finite mixture models (with a fixed number of components) typically proceeds by 
maximum likelihood. However, the likelihood function in a finite normal mixture with different 
variances is unbounded, thus, a global maximizer of the likelihood function does not exist. There 
are some solutions around this problem. One is to look for the largest local maximum. Another 
is to bound the variances by restrictions of the form a? :::; c aJ for all i, j = I, ... m and some 
c > 1 (cf. Hathaway 1985), which again leads to the existence of a global maximum and, if 
the true parameters satisfy the restriction, consistency. These solutions have practical problems, 
since the unknown true parameter has to fulfill the assumed restrictions, and therefore, here and 
regarding the analysis in Section 2.3 we shall use finite mixtures with equal variances. For further 
discussion see Section 2.2.4. 
Testing in parametric models is often accomplished by using the likelihood ratio test (LRT). 
However, in order to test for the number of components in finite mixture models, it has long been 
known that the standard theory of the LRT does not apply: the asymptotic distribution is the 
superimum over a truncated Gaussian process (Dacunha-Castelle and Gassiat, 1999), and hence 
is impractical for applications. 
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Recently, Chen et al. (2001, 2004) and Chen and Kalbfleisch (2005) suggested modified LRTs 
to partly overcome these problems, which retain a comparatively simple limit theory as well as 
the good power properties of the LRT. We shall apply these tests to our problem concerning the 
number of groups in the income distribution. At this point, we want to mention that the LRT 
and also the modified LRT are invariant under strictly monotonic transformation of the data (if 
candidate densities are correspondingly transformed). Thus, we could test on the level of the 
x; as well as on the level of the y;, the results are (in contrast to Silverman's test) completely 
consistent. For convenience, we shall use the Jog-data. 
We first consider testing one against two components in a mixture. Suppose that <Jl(y;µ,a) is 
the normal distribution with meanµ and standard deviation a, and consider the two-component 
mixture 
fr(y;p,µi ,µz, a)= p</J(y;µi, a)+ (1 - p)</l(y;µz, a) 
with equal standard deviation a. The testing problem is 
Hi : fr is normally distributed 
The modified likelihood function is given by 
n 
against Ki : fr is of the form (2.2). 
ln(P,µi ,µz, a)= L, log (p</J(y;;µi, a)+ (I - p)<Jl(y;;µz, a)) +h(p), 
i=i 
(2.2) 
where h(p) is a penalty function which satisfies h(l/2) = 0 and h(p) ----. -oo, p-> 0, l. The 
choice of h is discussed in Chen et al. (2001) and Li et al. (2009), it does not have much 
effect on the performance of the MLRT. We shall use h(p) = 2log (p(l - p) ). Let (p,P,i ,P,2, &) 
maximize ln(p,µi ,µ2, a) over the full parameter space, and let (P,, G) maximize ln(l/2,µ,µ, a). 
The hypothesis Hi is rejected for large values of the modified LRT statistic 
Mn= 2(tn(fi,P,i,P,2,&)-ln(l/2,P,,P,,G)). 
More precisely, Chen et al. (2001) show that for known a, Mn asymptotically follows the distri-
bution 1/2.zj + 1/2Xf, where X& is the point mass at zero. For unknown a, as formulated above, 
the precise asymptotic distribution of Mn is unknown, however, Chen and Kalbfleisch (2005) 
show that the Xi distribution is an upper bound to the asymptotic distribution of Mn. 
Chen et al. (2004) also consider the problem of testing for two against more components of a 
mixture distribution. More precisely, the problem is to test 
Hz : fr is of the form (2.2) against K2 : fr has more than two components. 
Here, we again assume equal variances for all components, also under the alternative. Fur-
thermore, one fixes a maximal number of components under the alternative (which can also be 
estimated, e.g. m = 4). For a mixture with m components, slightly changing the notation, the 
modified maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) are defined as the maximizer of 
n m 
ln(µi, ... ,µm,G) = [,log(pi</J(yi;µ1,a)+ ... +pm<Jl(ym;µm,a)) + Clog(TTp;), 
i=l i=l 
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where C > 0 is some fixed constant (we take C = 2, its exact choice does not influence the per-
formance of the test much, see Chen et al., 2004). These estimates are then inserted into the LRT 
statistic. Chen et al. (2004) showed that given a known cr, this modified LRT is asymptotically 
distributed as qxJ + ½x? + (1 - q)Xi, where the proportion q depends on the mixing distribu-
tions. For unknown cr, Chen and Kalbfleisch indicate that the XS distribution is an upper bound 
of the asymptotic distribution. 
As an illustration, we give the results of the analysis of the year 1976. The complete results are 
discussed in Section 2.3.1. First we fit a single normal distribution to the log-income distribution 
(log to the base 10). Doing so, we obtain the following parameters: P, = 3.52 and d' = 0.46. The 
modified MLEs of the two-component mixture with equal variances are calculated as f} = 0.51, 
P,1 = 3. 15, P,2 = 3.89 and d' = 0.26. The resulting value of the modified likelihood ratio function 
is equal to Tn = 14.00, which based on the upper bound of the x?-distribution yields a p-value of 
0.0009. Thus, the hypothesis of a single component is clearly rejected. 
Next we consider testing two against three ( or more) components. Concerning the fit using 
three components and equal variances, the parameter estimates based on penalized maximum 
likelihood are given by 
The resulting value of the modified LR statistic is Tn = 7 .91. Based on the upper bound by a XS-
distribution, this gives a p-value of 0.048, in favor of three components. The three-component fit 
based on the modified MLEs, both for the y;'s as well as for the x;'s, are displayed in Figure 2.1. 
Apart from testing the number of components, we also compare the mixture models via two 
popular model selection criteria, namely the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC), given by -2/ + 2k and -2/ + klogn, respectively, where l is the 
log-likelihood, k the number of parameters and n the number of observations. The results are 
displayed in Table B.l. 
Here, the model selected by AIC is the model with three components, while BIC is slightly 
in favor of a model with only two components. Although it is theoretically known that the 
BIC is consistent in finite mixtures (Kerebin, 2000), in finite samples it often selects too few 
components. 
In Figure B.1 we compare the fitted three-component density with a nonparametric density es-
timate with bandwidth hc(3) (cf. Section 2.2.5). Such a comparison could also be used for a 
formal goodness of fit test for our mixture model, cf. e.g. Fan (1994). The nonparametric and 
our parametric estimate are quite close, thus, our model of the data seems appropriate. In Figure 
B.2, we furthermore plot the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the data and the 
cdf of the fitted three component mixture, Figure 2.1 comprises a Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot 
of the data against the fitted mixture. Both plots clearly show that the three component mixture 
with equal variances provides an good fit. 
The whole picture that we get from our analysis of the log cross-country income distribution in 
1976, taking into account the modified likelihood ratio tests and the model selection criteria, the 
shape of nonparametric density estimates and the QQ plots as well as the plots of the cdfs, shows 
that the three component mixture with equal variances adequately describes the data. 
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Figure 2.1: Left: Three-component mixture density with equal variances (solid line) and kernel 
density estimate based on hc(3) (dashed line) for the log-data (logarithm to the base 10) for 
1976. Right: QQ-Plot of the log-data for 1976 against the quantiles of the normal mixture (three 
components, equal variances) together with least squares fit (dashed line). 
QQ-Plot 
~ LO -i ,;· 
CX) 
c:i 0 .f 
-i 
// (0 c:i 
LO 
'St C') ;/ c:i 
N 0 ,,,.1 c:i C') 
0 ._~,J 
c:i I I I I I 
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
Figure 2.2: Left: Three-component mixture density with equal variances (solid line) and kernel 
density estimate based on hc(3) (dashed line) for the log-data (logarithm to the base 10) for 
2003. Right: QQ-Plot of the log-data for 2003 against the quantiles of the normal mixture (three 
components, equal variances) together with least squares fit (dashed line). 
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2.2.3 Discriminant Analysis via Posterior Probabilities 
Mixture models are routinely used for discriminant analysis, see e.g. Fraley and Raftery (2002). 
In our analysis of the cross-country income distribution via mixtures, once we have a mixture 
fitted to the cross-country income distribution, each observation can be assigned posterior prob-
abilities which give the probability of the observation to belong to each of the components in the 
mixture model. 
Consider the log-income distribution in 1976. In Section 2.2.2, we fitted a three-component 
normal mixture 
Jy(y;fh ,fh, P.1, P.z, {J.3, a) = fi1 ¢ (y; P.1, a)+ h<P (y; P.2, a)+ ( 1 - fi1 - fiz)cp (y;µ.3, a), (2.4) 
where the parameter estimates are given in (2.3). This yields three levels of income which we 
label poor, middle and rich, with indices 1, 2, 3. The posterior probability of an observation y to 
belong to group j, j = I, 2, is equal to 
( .. ) _ fi1¢(y;fi.1, a) PJ,Y-,.( A A A A A')' 
JY y;p1,P2,µ1,µz,µ3,CJ 
and p(3;y) = 1 - p(l ;y) - p(2;y). Therefore, we do not merely assign an income level to each 
country, but rather a probability distribution, which makes transitions from one group to the other 
much more transparent. 
If one wishes to assign a single number to each country y, one has several possibilities. One 
is the maximum a-posterior estimate (MPE), which assigns to observation y the j, j E { 1, 2, 3}, 
such that p(j;y) is maximal. One can also determine the thresholds tJ.J+l, j = 1,2, for the 
values of y at which the MPE changes between the state j and j + I, by solving the equations 
p(j,tJ.J+l) = p(j + l,tJ,J+il, j = 1,2, yielding the (in model (2.4)) unique solutions 
t .. _ P-1+P-1+1 +a'zlog(fi1/fi1+il J,J+l - 2 , , , µ}+I-µ} 
j = 1,2. 
If the weights /Jl and pz are sufficiently close, the values fJ.J+l will indeed be between P.1 and 
P-J+I, in which case they may be properly interpreted. For example, for the year 1976 we get 
t1,2 = 3.32 and tz,3 = 3.83, which on the original scale correspond to the values 2089.30 and 
6760.83, respectively. In 1976, by maximum a-posterior estimation there are 46 countries in the 
poor group, 42 countries in the middle group and 36 countries in the rich group. 
Another (more informative) possibility is the posterior mean (PM) of y, which is defined as 
p(l;y) + 2p(2;y) + 3p(3;y), a number between one and three. In our situation, since the choice 
of the values I, 2, 3 is arbitrary, this should not be interpreted as a mean but rather as a refined 
one-number summary of the posterior distribution. For example, if the PM of y is 1.3, then 
the country will belong to group I, but will have a tendency toward group 2. A tedious but 
straightforward computation shows that the posterior mean in model (2.4) with equal a2 is a 
monotonically increasing function of y. Thus, one can uniquely determine thresholds SJ,J+l, 
j = 1, 2, for which the PM is equal to i + I /2. Solving these equations numerically for the 
parameters in 1976 yields the values 3.32 and 3.84. 
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2.2.4 More Flexible Mixtures and Model Checking 
In Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.1 we restricted the model class of finite normal mixtures to have equal 
variances. There are two major technical reasons for this restriction. 
First, maximum likelihood inference in mixtures of normal distributions with distinct variances 
becomes technically difficult since the likelihood function is unbounded. This can be overcome 
by restricting the range of the estimates, but the true (unknown) parameter must satisfy these 
restrictions. 
Second, if distinct variances are allowed, the posterior analysis is no longer consistent. In fact, 
higher observations can have smaller MPE or posterior mean than smaller observations, if the 
variance of components with smaller mean are much larger than those with higher mean. Thus, 
a posterior analysis does not make sense for such general models. 
Nevertheless, in the following we briefly investigate what happens if we drop the assumption 
of equal variances. Figure B.3 gives density estimates and QQ Plots for the fits with distinct 
variances for the log-data in 1976. Compared to the kernel estimate, the density of the three-
component normal mixture looks somewhat overfitted in the third component. The QQ Plot is 
similar to that in Figure B.2 for equal variances, with less deviation in the upper tail but more 
deviation in the lower tail. The AIC and BIC for the three component models with equal and 
distinct variances are also about equal. 
For the log-data at the end of the observational period in 2003, the estimated density of the normal 
mixture with distinct variances (Figure B.4) looks a little better than that with equal variances 
(Figure 2.2) when compared to a kernel estimate, though both seem appropriate. The QQ Plots 
(Figures 2.2 and B.4) are very similar. However, the AIC and BIC are rather in favor of the more 
complex model. 
However, the standard deviation CJ of the third component is about twenty times smaller than 
the CJ parameters of the other two components. This makes the model inaccessible to posterior 
analysis. For example, posterior analysis would assign the USA to the second group. Therefore, 
in the analysis we stick to the model with equal variances discussed in Section 2.3.1, since it 
already provides an adequate fit to the data, and allows the analysis of the interdistributional 
dynamics via posterior analysis. Furthermore, we indicate that both models are not rejected with 
high p-values when compared to nonparametric fits via the Kolmogorov-Smimov test. Moreover, 
note that use of the model with three distinct variances would not change anything about the 
conclusion that three components are indeed required. 
As in Paap and Dijk (1998), one could also use distinct parametric distributions in each com-
ponent. We chose not to do so since we wanted to emphasize the selection of the number of 
components. If we allowed distinct parametric models for the components for distinct numbers 
(i.e. two and three) of components, the models, which would no longer be nested, could not be 
compared properly. However, this approach could be further pursued in the future. 
2.2.5 Parametric and Nonparametric Kernel Density Estimation 
When using parametric models such as the finite mixture models above, care must be taken to 
avoid (strong) misspecification and hence misleading results. Therefore, one often additionally 
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considers nonparametric estimates such as kernel density estimates, and investigates whether the 
results are similar. Indeed, one can formally compare parametric and nonparametric estimates 
in so-called goodness-of-fit statistics, which are based on the L2 or L~ distance between the 
estimators (Fan 1994). Less formally, one can simply visually compare the estimates, as we 
choose to do here. 
However, also nonparametric estimates do not "always" work. Indeed, the cross-country income 
distribution is concentrated in lower regions, and then has a rather long, small tail at the upper 
end. For example, in 2003 most values are< 104, but there is a tail up to 4 · 104 (cf. Figure B.5). 
Such a shape can lead to a rather poor performance of kernel estimates with a global bandwidth 
(cf. Wand and Jones 1995, p. 36). As an illustration, we therefore also fitted a transformation 
kernel density estimate (Wand and Jones, 1995, p. 43) based on the log-transform to the data 
(cf. Figure B.5). Evidently, the two nonparametric estimates differ strongly, as the usual kernel 
density estimator puts too much mass to the tails. This leads to the emergence of the second 
peak in the "twin peaks" phenomenon of the cross-country income distribution, which is thus 
mainly an artifact of direct kernel density estimation with global bandwidth of heavy-tailed data. 
Also note that the usual kernel estimator has a boundary problem at 0 (cf. Wand and Jones 1995, 
p. 46). However, note that the transformation kernel density estimator is quite similar to the 
three-component log-normal mixture. 
Instead of using a transformation kernel density estimator, one can also work directly with the 
log-data. In order to illustrate that testing the number of components can yield more refined 
results than nonparametric methods, we apply Silverman's test to the log-data in 2003. Let us 
first briefly recall Silverman's test. Formally, a mode of fx (and similarly of the kernel estimator 
f) is a local maximum of fx (or}). Silverman (1981) showed that the number of modes of j is 
a right-continuous, monotonically decreasing function of the bandwidth h if the normal kernel is 
employed for K: K(x) = (2;r)- 1 exp(-x2 /2). This allowed him to define the k-critical bandwidth 
hc(k) as the minimal h for which f(-;h) still just has k modes and not yet k + I modes. Based 
on the notion of the k-critical bandwidth, Silverman (1981) proposed a bootstrap test for the 
hypothesis 
fh : f has at most k modes against kk : f has more than k modes, 
where in our context, f = fx (or f = fr, the density of logarithms y; = log(x;)). 
The results of Silverman's test for the year 2003 are displayed in table B.2. Here one typically 
proceeds iteratively by testing fh for increasing k, starting with k = 1, until one finds k such that 
fh cannot be rejected with a given level a (e.g. a = 0.05). Concerning the log-incomes and 
their density fr, the hypothesis fl1 cannot be rejected at a 5% (or even 10%) level. However, the 
corresponding p-value is still comparatively small. Note that this result does not mean that fl1 is 
true, only that there is not enough evidence to reject it on a level of 5% (or 10%). However, if 
one continues the analysis, one can clearly reject fl2 (p-value < 0.001), but H3 has a high p-value 
of 0.45. Thus, there is some evidence of three modes in fr, but none of only two modes. The 
associated density estimates with the critical bandwidths are displayed in Figure B.6 (right). 
As an illustration we also applied Silverman's (1981) test to the original income data x;. The 
hypothesis fl1 is clearly rejected with a p-value of< 0.001, and the hypothesis fl2 is not rejected 
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with a high p-value. Thus, the procedure stops at k = 2, strongly indicating two modes. However, 
observe Figure B.6 (left). It shows (boundary corrected) plots of the densities with bandwidths 
hc(l) and hc(2). For hc(2), the third mode (which is not statistically significant according to 
Silverman's test) is about to occur in the two highest observations of the distribution (at about 
35 · 103). Thus, the kernel density estimator is about to put a spurious mode into the tail, and all 
that Silverman's test tells us is that this mode is indeed spurious. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Selecting the Number of Components 
Applying the methodology above to the time range from 1970 to 2003 for the 124 countries for 
which we have consistent GDP data yields some surprising and telling insights into the evolu-
tion of the cross-country distribution of income. Table 2.1 displays the results of the modified 
likelihood ratio test for one vs two components and two vs three components as well as the AIC 
and BIC model selection criteria for the respective fitted models ranging from I to 4 compo-
nent mixtures (all having equal variances). First of all, we note that two components are always 
preferable to one. In 1970 we cannot reject the hypothesis of two vs three components, however, 
over the first years of the 1970s the p-values are decreasing and by 1976 the modified likeli-
hood ratio test rejects a two component model at a level of 5%. This is also supported by the 
values of the model selection criteria AIC and BIC, which initially are in favor of a two compo-
nent model, but over time switch toward the three component mixture model. In summary, our 
analysis shows that starting with a two-component (twin-peak) mixture distribution in 1970, in 
between the "rich" and "poor" components, in the middle of the 1970s a third component evolves 
in the cross-national distribution of income, thus resulting in a three-component mixture model. 
All subsequent distributional analysis is based on the three component mixture model from 1976 
to 2003. 
2.3.2 Evolution of the Cross-Country Distribution of Income 
Table B.3 summarizes the main distributional characteristics of the three component mixture 
model after 1976. The first three columns display the weights Pl, pz and p3 of the three com-
ponents in the mixture model, which can be directly interpreted as the percentage of data, i.e. 
the relative number of countries, ascribed to a certain component. As can be seen in Figure B.7, 
the percentage of data ascribed to the first "poor" component, despite small variation, dropped 
slightly over time from initially 37.9 percent in 1976 to 35.7 percent in 2003. In comparison, the 
second component weight gained slightly over time from 33.8 percent to 35.3 percent, leaving 
the third component weight largely unaltered (28.4 percent in 1970 and 29 percent in 2003). 
Hence, the relative number of countries ascribed to each component is rather stable over the 
given observational period. 
Regarding the log-income data, it can be observed that the mean of the first component did not 
grow, but rather experienced stagnation and even slight decline. In comparison, the mean of the 
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second and third components clearly increased over the given time period from 3.59 to 3.73 and 
4.08 to 4.33 respectively. The standard deviation parameter CJ of the three components remains 
also rather stable over the given time period. However, these model parameters are harder to 
interpret on the logarithmic scale. Therefore, we also computed the mean and the standard 
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Figure 2.3: Means of the distinct groups (solid lines). Income levels where the maximum a-
posterior estimates switch from one group to the other (dashed lines). 
Observing Table B.3 and Figure 2.3 we note that the mean GDP per capita of the countries be-
longing to the first component decreased slightly over time from $1147 to $1128. The countries 
belonging to the second component saw a strongly increasing income from on average $3998 to 
$5504 which corresponds to an overall 37 percent increase between 1976 and 2003. However, 
over the same period the countries in the third (the richest) component experienced an increase 
of mean income from $12335 to $21938 (increase of77 percent). Hence, from 1976 onwards the 
countries in the poorest component experienced stagnation in or even slightly declining average 
income. Moreover, despite the clear emergence of a third "transitional" component in the middle 
of the 1970s, the mean income gain experienced in this component is not sufficient to facilitate 
any catch-up to the third "rich" component, which in turn improves not only its absolute, but 
also its relative position. Thus, the three components of our model of the cross-national distri-
bution of income per capita actually diverge over time. This leaves slightly over 1/3 of the poor 
economies in a poverty trap, whereas slightly over 1/3 of the 124 countries, "the middle group", 
experience growth, but not fast enough to catch-up with the rich countries club, which consists 
of little less than 1/3 and which improved its absolute and relative position. Thus, one may claim 
that the cross-national distribution of income is not converging. 
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2.3.3 Intra-distributional Dynamics Based on Posterior Probabilities 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, one major advantage of a mixture model with equal variances 
for the components is that it makes accessible consistent posterior analysis. In the following, 
we shall mainly use the posterior mean. In Table B.4 all countries are ranked by their change 
in posterior mean. The biggest winner is China which increased its posterior probability mean 
from 1 to 2 and is one of 14 countries which managed to move up by one component. Out of 
these 14 countries, half moved from the 1st component to the 2nd component, leaving the other 
half to move from the 2nd component to the 3rd component. Of the 12 countries which dropped 
by one component 5 countries dropped from the 2nd to the 1st and 7 countries dropped from 
the 3nd to the 2rd component. The average posterior probability mean increased slightly from 
1.91 in 1976 to 1.93 in 2003, which implies a slight increase in the size of the second and/or 
third components. Comparing results in 1976 and 2003, we find that 26 out of 124 countries, 
about 21 percent, changed the component of the cross-national income distribution (although a 
few further temporary changes might have taken place in between). This implies a relative low 
mobility of countries as, comparing 1976 and 2003, only one out of five countries changed its 
component position or group affiliation. 
Sub-Saharan Africa Asia 
0 C! <'i .., 
"' "' <'i <'i 
I ,,, 
0 ~ <'i J~y~ 




1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Figure 2.4: Posterior means of selected African (left) and Asian (right) countries. Africa: 
Cameroon (black), Nigeria (red), Republic of Congo (green), South Africa (blue) and Zimbabwe 
(pink). Asia: China (black), Republic of Korea (red), India (green), Malaysia (blue) and Indone-
sia (pink). 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show a more detailed story for selected countries belonging to different re-
gions. Most notably Asia composes half of the 14 countries which improved by one component 
and none of the South East Asian, East Asian or South Asian Countries experienced a deteriora-
tion of their posterior mean. Thus, the Far East is generally the most upwards mobile region, of 
which most countries belong to the second component and experienced on average higher growth 
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Figure 2.5: Posterior means of selected Latin American (left) and other (right) countries. Latin 
America: Colombia (black), Mexico (red), Brazil (green), Argentina (blue) and Venezuela 
(pink). Rest of the World: Russia (black), Poland (red), USA (green), Morocco (blue) and Egypt 
(pink). 
rates than the other countries belonging to this component. In particular, China's extraordinary 
growth is mirrored in the jump from the very bottom to a median position of the cross-country 
mean income distribution. Obviously, it is these countries in particular which account for the 
rising mean of the 2nd component over time. In fact, the average growth rate of these countries 
is more than sufficient for a catch-up in mean income to the richer group of countries. 
However, a second region is also very prominent in the 2nd group which lowers the average 
growth rate of this component, namely Latin America. Whilst only one country, Chile, managed 
to improve by one component, Latin America accounts for one third of the countries which 
moved down by one component. In particular, richer countries, like Argentina and Venezuela 
lost relatively and were assigned to the 2nd component in 2003. This sub-average performance 
of Latin America in general, of which most countries belong to the 2nd component, helps to 
explain why the growth rate in the mean is not sufficient to facilitate any catch-up of the entire 
component to the 3rd component. 
The worst performing region by far is Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for 32 of the 46 coun-
tries, about 70 percent, belonging to the "poor" 1st component in 1976 and 32 of 44 countries, 
about 73 percent in 2003 respectively. It is mostly the non-existing growth record of these coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa which accounts for the stagnant and even declining mean of the 1st 
poor component. Moreover, not only did the poorest countries remain extremely poor, but those 
countries which were relatively well-off in 1976, namely South Africa, and to a lesser extent 
Zimbabwe, belong to the group of countries, whose posterior mean decreased most. Despite 
the overall bleak record of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are a few examples which also show quite 
remarkable improvement, in particular Botswana and Lesotho. Moreover,Cameroon, Mauritius 
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and Equatorial New Guinea even improve by one component and are the only three Sub-Saharan 
African Country that display upward mobility. However, these few encouraging examples are 
not enough to change the Sub-Saharan stagnant and very poor growth record. 
Unsurprisingly, most Western countries belong firmly to the 3rd component displaying hardly 
any change in their posterior probability mean. It is mainly their growth record which accounts 
for the increase in the 3rd component mean. Eastern Europe lost in particular after the breakdown 
of the Iron Curtain, but had resurging growth, which lead to a rather stable position in between 
the 2nd and the 3rd components over time. Morocco and Egypt show the success of some Arabic 
countries, whilst Iraq is the extreme opposite and is the country which lost most over the time 
period 1976 to 2003. 
Overall, the country specific data and posterior mean helps to explain the development of the 
cross-national distribution of income from 1976 to 2003. The following general picture emerges: 
First, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts mostly for the lowest component which remains stagnant 
and "poor". Second, the emergence of the "transition" component is mostly due to the growth 
spurt of the Far East and the relative decline of Latin America. The contrary growth experience 
accounts mainly for the relatively slow growing mean of the 2nd component. Whilst most Far 
Eastern countries grow fast enough to catch up with the richer countries of the 3rd component, 
this is not the case for most of Latin America, which experienced disappointing growth records 
in particular in the 1980s. Thus, the overall cross-national income distribution does not display 
absolute cross-national average income convergence, but rather divergence over time, despite the 
fact that some countries, in particular in the Far East, are rapidly catching-up. However, in the 
global picture this is counteracted by the relatively poor growth record of Latin America and 
the average income stagnation in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, almost all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be stuck in a poverty trap in which the unit under scrutiny, the 
national economy, is not capable to deliver any form of sustained per capita growth. However, 
our data also shows that some of the most populous countries, in particular India and China, are 
doing extraordinarily well. Thus, the global (and not cross-national) income distribution, which 
takes into account the distribution of the income within countries as well as the sizes of their 
populations, might indeed be converging. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Previous investigations on the twin-peak phenomenon in the world's cross-country distribution 
of income were mostly based on nonparametric kernel density estimates, in particular concerning 
the number of modes of such estimates. 
In this essay we use finite mixtures in order to investigate the cross-country income distribu-
tion, since a. the number of modes depends on the scale (original or logarithmic) whereas the 
number of components in the mixture does not, b. finite mixtures allow for an accurate analysis 
of the intra-distributional dynamics by using posterior probability estimates, c. components in 
the mixture arguably correspond better to income clubs in the distribution than its modes and d. 
the heavy tail of the cross-country income distribution on the original scale can cause a some-
what limited performance of direct nonparametric kernel density estimates. Furthermore, we 
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argue that the number of components in the mixture model should be determined by statistical 
hypothesis testing and model selection. 
In contrast to the twin-peaks literature, we find evidence for an emerging intermediate component 
in the 70s, resulting in a three-component distribution from 1976 onwards. This alone is a strong 
indication of divergence within the distribution and might be an indicator of convergence within 
groups. 
Diverging estimates of the three group means and very different growth rates between the groups 
support this conclusion. While the mean of the third (richest) component almost doubled from 
1976 to 2003, the mean of the second (intermediate) component only increased by 40 percent 
(corresponding to a very low annual growth rate), and the first (poor) component even stagnated. 
One should mention that up- and downward movements of countries affect these growth rates. 
The growth of the third component is slowed down by countries moving up from the second 
component. Regarding the second component there are positive and negative effects, in which 
the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, since only a few countries move from the third 
to the second component. In the first component there should be positive effects from countries 
coming from the second group, which however are counterbalanced by the poor overall growth 
record within this component. 
The regional differences are remarkable. While many Asian countries managed to catch up to the 
third component, the opposite is true in the case of Latin American countries. Sub-Saharan Africa 
seems to be stuck in the first component and looses more and more contact with the other groups. 
The very populous countries China and India on the other hand performed extremely well. This 
fact would foster convergence in a global distribution of income which takes population size and 
within country inequality into account (i.e. Sala-i-Martin, 2006). 
A possible application of our methodology, beyond the conclusions already drawn in this essay, 
would be a classification of countries according to their mean income, as an alternative concept 
to the most prevalent "poor, middle and rich" classification of the World Bank. Indeed, the max-
imum posterior estimates can be used to assign countries to certain groups. Due to its statistical 
nature, this approach would be less policy dependent than current approaches. The boundary 
points of income, separating the three groups, from our point of view currently somewhat ar-
bitrarily obtained, could be replaced by the incomes where the maximum a-posterior estimate 
switches. For the year 2003 these are $2405 and $10859, respectively (PPP, base year 2000). 
However, our main aim was not to suggest a new system of classification of countries, but rather 
to obtain a better understanding of the cross-national distribution of income, its development, 
number of components and its intra-distributional dynamics over the past decades. 
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Essay 3 
Income Distribution Dynamics and 
Pro-Poor Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade increased attention has been given to the evolution of global income in-
equality and the connected questions of global welfare and poverty development. In the light of 
an ever intensifying globalization of the world economy, a rising concern is to identify global and 
regional winners and losers of this process. From a welfare point of view, the question might not 
be whether globalization generated economic growth per se, but rather how pro-poor this growth 
was or in other words which section of the global income distribution benefited most from the 
relatively successful global growth record of the past decades. 
Recent papers model the global income distribution, or a distribution limited to major economic 
players, by taking into account the underlying national income distributions (Dowrick and Ak-
mal, 2005; Milanovic, 2002; Chen and Ravallion, 2004; Chotikapanich et al., 1997; Bourguignon 
and Morrisson, 2002; Quah 2002; Bhalla, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2006). In fact, an objective way 
to construct the global income distribution from the distinct national income distributions is as a 
population weighted finite mixture of the national income distributions. Intuitively, if one picks 
at random an individual with a certain income from this global income distribution, one first 
randomly draws the country it comes from (with probability equal to that countries proportion 
of the world population), and then obtains its income from the corresponding country income 
distribution. The main task in this approach is to determine the national income distributions. 
A debate continues concerning the data sources on which estimates of the income distributions 
should be based. Two main concepts have been used so far. The first approach, labeled Con-
cept 2 by Milanovic (2006), combines national accounts income data with household survey 
inequality data to derive a global income distribution. The second approach (labeled Concept 
3 by Milanovic 2006) is purely based on income and inequality data from household surveys. 
based on joint work with Hajo Holzmann and Julian Weisbrod. 
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Both approaches have their associated merits and serious caveats, which have been discussed 
extensively in the literature (Milanovic, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Ravallion, 2003; Deaton, 
2005). 
As far as the poverty headcount is concerned, the headcount for the $2 per day poverty line of 
studies based on Concept 2 (Sala-i-Martin, 2006) roughly corresponds to the headcount of the $1 
poverty line estimated under Concept 3 (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). A simple reason is that the 
ratio of household level income to national account is about 1/2 (cf. Deaton, 2005). However, 
it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of certain poverty 
lines. We decided to stick to the $ I and $2 US (PPP) poverty lines applied to income as it makes 
our results comparable to those by Chen and Ravallion (2004) and Sala-i-Martin (2006). 1 
Sala-i-Martin (2006) argues that from the methodological point of view, one should use nonpara-
metric kernel estimates instead of parametric models for the country income distributions, since 
these do not assume any specific shape for the income distributions. While we agree with it on a 
methodological basis, in our opinion nonparametric modeling would require actual income data 
for all countries under consideration, and on a comparable basis. Thus, nonparametric modeling 
would be the method of choice when using Concept 3 by Milanovic (2006). Using Concept 2, 
Sala-i-Martin (2006) estimates the national income distributions nonpararnetrically from the five 
quintiles. However, we argue that with such data availability, it is not easily justified to be so 
sophisticated. We therefore prefer to model the national income distributions parametrically as 
log-normally distributed. The parameters of each country's log-normal income distribution can 
be determined from its real PPP GDP/per capita and its Gini coefficient (cf. Section 3.2.2). In-
deed, when testing for log-normality from the quintiles or even from the deciles, we can reject 
the hypothesis of log-normality for only less than 0.5% of all countries, and never for one of the 
population heavy weights China, India, the U.S., Indonesia and Brazil. Therefore, we choose the 
simpler and arguably more transparent parametric model. 
Using this slightly simplified model, we extend Sala-i-Martin's (2006) results to include in par-
ticular the important issues of pro-poor growth and of regional inequality. To investigate pro-poor 
growth, we construct growth incidence curves for several semi-decades, both for the world in-
come distribution as well as for different regional income distributions, specifically the OECD 
Countries, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. For the devel-
opment of regional inequality, we compute several inequality measures, focusing on Theils' 
inequality measure which can be decomposed into within and between country inequality. 
In the following, we give estimates of the evolution of global poverty and inequality over time, 
which is a benchmark with respect to other studies (Milanovic 2002; Chen and Ravallion 2004, 
2007; Sala-i-Martin, 2006). In addition, we contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature 
by providing regional and time specific between and within country income inequality based on 
Theil's measure. Moreover, we discuss semi-decade specific global growth incidence curves, and 
therefore are able to give a precise description of pro-poor growth. Morevover, we decompose 
1 Furthermore, we show in figure C.2 that any reasonably selected monetary poverty line would show a decline 
in the poverty headcount ratio as the cumulative distribution function of global income of subsequent time periods 
dominates over the cumulative distribution function of the prior time period. 
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the world into the seven main regions mentioned above and investigate the regional variation 
in poverty and inequality development. Furthermore, we also analyze the underlying regional 
growth incidence curves, which yield a regionally comprehensive picture of pro-poor growth 
and of the intra-distributional dynamics in unprecedented detail. 
3.2 Methodology and Data 
3.2.1 Data 
The subsequent analysis is based on two main data sources. Income data are drawn from the 
Penn World Tables 6.2, which report the real GDP per capita in constant international dollars 
(chain series, base year 2000), available for most countries. However, for three particularly 
populous countries, namely Bangladesh, Russia and Ukraine we estimated the initially missing 
values.2 Our second data source is the inequality data set by Grtin and Klasen (2008) based 
on the WIDER database.3 Their adjusted Gini data set derived by estimation techniques has 
substantive advantages in terms of comparability, as the raw Ginis in the WIDER database are 
not fully comparable over time and countries.4 Furthermore, as inequality does not change too 
dramatically over time, we assume the first real observation of the Gini in any given country to 
be equal to its initial level of inequality. Starting from this initial level we used a moving average 
to catch changes in trends of inequality. 5 
3.2.2 Mixtures of Log-Normal Distributions 
As stated in the introduction, the national income distributions will be modeled by a log-normal 
distribution. Formally, the log-normal distribution LN(µ, a) is defined as the distribution of the 
random variable Y = exp(X), where X ~ N(µ, a) has a normal distribution with mean µ and 
standard deviation a. It can be shown that the density of LN(µ, a) is 
f(x·µ a)= __ 1_. e-(log(x)-µ,)2/2r,2 
' ' XO' ,./Fii ' x>O, 
and its mean and variance are given respectively by 
2 2 2 Var(Y) = (er, - l)e µ+r, . (3.1) 
2For Bangladesh we calculated the values for the two initial years 1970, 1971 using the average income per 
capita growth rate of the rest of the decade. For Russia and Ukraine we used the derived (Penn World Tables 5.6) 
USSR growth rates to estimate the average income for the years before 1990. 
3We would like to thank Griin and Klasen for providing their data set. 
4This is mainly due to different methodological approaches and measurement units. The adjustment by Klasen 
and Grtin takes these methodological differences into account. 
5Unfortunately, there is no reliable inequality data for the populous Democratic Republic of Congo, hence we 
used the neighboring Central African Republics' Gini as a substitute. 
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We should briefly discuss the interpretation of the parameters µ and <J, which is different from 
that of the normal distribution. In fact, from (3.1) one sees that eµ is proportional to the ex-
pectation and ( eµ ) 2 is proportional to the variance, and in fact, eµ is the scale parameter of the 
log-normal distribution, whereas <J is a shape parameter. Since the Gini coefficient is invariant 
under changes of scale (it does not matter whether income is measured in Euro or in Dollar), it 
should be independent ofµ and only depend on <J. This is indeed the case: The Gini coeffi-
cient G of LN(µ, <J) is given by G = 2<l>( <J / v'2) - 1, where <l> is the distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. Therefore, the parametersµ and <J of LN(µ, <J) can be determined 
from the mean EY and the Gini coefficient G as follows. 
<J = v'Z<l>- 1 ( G; l) , µ = log(E(Y)) - <J2 /2. 
In summary, the parametersµ and <J of each country's log-normal income distribution are easily 
determined from the real PPP GDP per capita (EY) and its Gini G. 
Let us now formalize how the density of the world income distribution fw is obtained as a mixture 
of national (log-normal) distributions. Assuming that there are n countries under investigation 
and that the (log-normal) density of the distribution of country i is given by f(x; µ;, <J;), then 
n 
fw(x;µ1, • • • ,µn, <J1, • • •, <In,PI, • .. ,Pn) = L,PJ(x;µ;, <J;), 
i=l 
where p; is equal to the proportion of country i's population in the whole population of these n 
countries. 
It has to be stressed that although the density fw is a simple finite mixture of the component 
country densities f (x; µ;, <J;), this does not transfer to relevant quantities such as the Gini or other 
inequality or poverty measures: the world Gini Gw is not simply the corresponding finite mixture 
of the country Ginis G;. Nevertheless, once the parameters of the density fw are estimated, it is 
not difficult to compute the poverty rates as well as percentile specific growth rates numerically 
from the distribution for any given level of accuracy without sampling. Furthermore, we obtained 
a number of other inequality and poverty measures by Monte Carlo simulation from fw. To this 
end we used a random sample of size 106 to obtain the desired accuracy. Since there are no 
substantial differences between the results of different poverty or inequality measures, we will 
only discuss the poverty measures by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke as well as the Gini and Theil's 
measure of inequality. Theil's measure is especially informative since it can be decomposed into 
separate measures for inequality between and within countries. Our poverty line is set at $469.9 
US (PPP) and $935.45 US (PPP) a year, which corresponds to the World Bank 1993 poverty line 
of $1.08 US and $2.15 US per day adjusted to our income baseline year 2000 respectively.6 
Finally, let us remark that, if the world income Y is distributed as fw, then the log world income 
logY has density 
n 
lfw(x; µ1, • .. , µn, <J1, ···,<In, Pl,•••, Pn) = L, Pi'P (x; µ;, <J;), 
i=l 
6adjusted to our 2000 base year $1.08 (1993) per day=$ 1.287 (2000) per day= $469.9 per year. In the case of 
the $2 line $2.15 (1993) per day= $2.562 (2000) per day= $935.45 per year 
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where cp (x;µ, CJ) is the density of N(µ, CJ). Thus lfw is simply a finite mixture of normal densi-
ties. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
In this Section we discuss the statistical methodology used for estimating the world income 
distribution, in particular as compared to the nonparametric approach taken by Sala-i-Martin 
(2006). 
When estimating a country's income distribution from micro data (as in Concept 3 by Milanovic 
2006), it is of course well known that even more sophisticated parametric models than the simple 
log-normal distribution (see e.g. McDonald and Mantrala 1995) can be rejected by appropriate 
goodness-of-fit tests, and nonparametric modeling is the method of choice. 
It is less clear what approach is the best to estimate national income distributions under Concept 
2 by Milanovic, when only mean, Gini and quintile data from the distribution are available. In 
particular, nonparametric kernel density estimation requires the actual income data, and not only 
some few parameters. 
However, Sala-i-Martin (2006) uses Concept 2 and apparently estimates the national income 
distributions by a kernel density estimator which is not applied to actual income data, but rather 
to the five quintiles which are treated as "observations". In our opinion, when only certain 
parameters of the income distributions such as mean, Gini coefficient and quintiles are available, 
it is natural to employ a parametric model which only uses the parameters available. Of course, 
the model can and in general will still be misspecified for the actual income distribution, but it is 
the best we can do with the data at hand. 
Since the mean, Gini and the deciles for each income distribution are estimated from huge sam-
ples, they will be very close to the true parameters of the underlying distribution. A log-normal 
model then only uses two of these parameters, namely the mean and the Gini. One can check 
whether the deciles at least approximately are in accordance with this model by plotting the 
deciles of the standard normal distribution against the logarithms of the income distribution 
deciles. These pairs should, at least approximately, lie on a straight line. Note that this is not 
a QQ Plot in the statistical sense since we plot the ( essentially) "true" deciles of the income 
distribution against those of the standard normal distribution. Figure C.3 shows some plots for 
the USA, China, India and Brazil for different years. The approximations are reasonably good, 
although the lowest and in particular the highest deciles typically show some deviation. 
3.3 The Global Income Distribution 
3.3.1 Inequality and Poverty 
Figures C.1 and 3.1 show estimates of the global income distribution as well as of the log-income 
distribution, determined as discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, for selected years. 1\vo striking 
features are apparent: First, the average global income increased drastically over the given time 
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period, and second, the world income distribution has become less dispersed. Interestingly, the 
1970s and 1980s still seem to display two distinct modes in the global log-income distribution. 
However, these "twin peaks" disappear over the years and in particular between 1990 and 2003. 
Thus, the results clearly show global income expansion and convergence of real global individual 
income in $US (PPP). The Gini and Theils' inequality measures reported in Table 3.2 confirm 
this first impression as both measures decline over the given time period, from 0.68 to 0.64 and 
from 0.88 to 0.80 respectively. 7 The decomposition of Theil 's measure shows that this decline in 
inequality was mainly due to a strong decline in inequality between countries, while inequality 
within countries even increased. This observation is consistent with a first impression of the 
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Figure 3.1: Global distribution of log-income. Solid line: 1970, dashed line: 1980, dotted line 
1990, dashed-dotted: 2003. 
Table C.2 shows the results of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures for the 
poverty headcount and the poverty gap ratio. Furthermore, the absolute number of people below 
the two poverty lines is reported in Table 3.1. It is apparent that from 1970 to 2003 all measures 
of poverty, absolute and relative, declined strongly. The percentage of the world population 
living below $1 a day declined drastically from 21 percent in 1970 to 6 percent in 2003. The 
reduction of this measure of extreme poverty was particularly rapid in the 1970s and early 1980s 
as the headcount ratio dropped from 21 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 1985 which corresponds 
to a decline of the absolute number of people living with less than $469.9 (PPP, 2000) per year 
from slightly over 785 million in 1970 to roughly 400 million in 1985. From 1985 to 2003 the 
headcount fell further to 6 percent which corresponds to about 365 million people living below 
7We calculated a number of other inequality measures. However, they all show more or less the same overall 
picture, so we only report Gini and Theil. 
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$469.9 (PPP, 2000) per year. Moreover, the poverty gap ratio also displays a constant decline 
over the given time period, hence, not only did the absolute number of people living in extreme 
poverty fall, but those which remained poor saw their income improved toward the poverty line. 
The halving of the number of people living in poverty is especially impressive since the world's 
population almost doubled in the given time period. The results of the $2 poverty line follow a 
very similar pattern. The headcount declined strongly from 43 percent, almost half the world's 
population, in 1970 to 14 percent in 2003. The most dramatic decline of the $2 headcount was in 
the late 1970s and the 1980s from 42 percent in 1975 to 21 percent in 1990. Overall, the absolute 
number of people who lived below $935.45 (PPP, 2000) per year declined from 1,571 million in 
1970 to 893 million, in 2003. Furthermore, the poverty gap or "distance" of those people below 
the poverty line to the poverty line also declined considerably. 
Our findings compare well to other studies measuring global poverty and inequality. Clearly, 
there are differences in details, but our results are generally reconcilable with the underlying 
pattern and dynamics observed in other studies. Concerning the poverty headcount rates vis-
a-vis Sala-i-Martin (2006) we find higher poverty estimates in the initial years for both $1 and 
particular the $2 poverty headcount rates. However, over the course of the observational period 
these differences decline to 0.2 percentage points for the $1 and about 5 percentage points for the 
$2 poverty headcount rate. Given, as discussed above, that Chen and Ravallion (2007) calculate 
their poverty rates based on Concept 3, our appropriate benchmark is their $1 compared to our $2 
poverty headcount rate. Here, their estimate is higher ( about 5 percentage points) over the period 
from 1981 to 2003. Concerning global inequality, our results for the Gini and Theils' measure 
of inequality are rather close to those in Sala-i-Martin (2006) and also to all other estimates as 
summarized in Milanovic (2002). 
Thus, our results, as all other studies using various conceivable poverty measures, show a dra-
matic decline of global poverty in relative and even in absolute terms, although clearly some 
decades experienced more pro-poor progress than others. In order to get a more refined picture 
of the underlying dynamics of poverty change we investigate the global growth incidence curves 
and corresponding rates of pro-poor growth. 
3.3.2 Growth Incidence Curves and Pro-Poor Growth 
In Figure C.4 global growth incidence curves for different time periods are displayed, which 
show the percentile specific growth rates over the global income distribution. 8 The main results 
are also summarized in Table C.3 below. If one considers the entire observational period, it is 
apparent that the middle percentiles of the global income distribution experienced the highest 
growth rates. In fact, the growth rate from the 8.5th to the 63.5th percentile of the global popu-
lation experienced income growth rates above the mean of growth rates of all percentiles, which 
is equal to 2.3 percent per annum. Thus, the bottom-middle of the global income distribution 
experienced the fastest income growth, which also explains the declining income inequality and 
global income convergence. This effect is slightly counteracted by the less than average growth 
performance of the bottom percentiles (up to the 8.5 percentile), with the poorest percentiles ex-
8For a methodological discussion of growth incidence curves see Ravallion and Chen (2003) 
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Table 3.1: Global and regional population and number of poor people (in thousands). 
Population Poor ($1) Poor ($2) Population Poor ($1) Poor ($2) 
World OECD Countries 
1970 3,693,695 784,540 1,570,698 701,854 33 721 
1975 4,070,666 779,835 1,691,192 730,625 8 235 
1980 4,437,900 609,085 1,577,463 755,245 2 94 
1985 4,832,425 399,595 1,313,699 777,772 2 61 
1990 5,255,923 370,810 1,097,183 802,713 1 32 
1995 5,660,651 385,708 1,006,770 829,867 3 81 
2000 6,052,688 359,184 894,835 854,570 1 27 
2003 6,275,048 365,006 893,394 869,918 1 31 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 1,167,975 530,322 913,422 282,977 20,595 53,936 
1975 1,307,614 452,382 946,337 321,049 21,521 54,661 
1980 1,419,429 332,907 869,163 360,466 9,450 33,328 
1985 1,534,017 125,390 601,954 400,724 12,795 41,643 
1990 1,662,816 94,202 414,950 442,008 17,500 53,657 
1995 1,776,351 53,042 229,147 482,773 21,805 63,503 
2000 1,877,921 38,277 140,236 522,037 23,046 65,913 
2003 1,929,034 45,379 158,974 544,279 23,602 67,207 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe Central Asia 
1970 137,202 11,594 32,309 387,557 6,034 16,875 
1975 157,584 10,927 32,308 408,977 4,255 13,057 
1980 184,880 7,180 26,057 429,959 5,276 15,128 
1985 219,384 8,846 29,005 451,243 3,396 12,059 
1990 253,947 8,942 29,433 469,334 1,625 7,835 
1995 282,784 13,259 31,838 477,391 2,744 15,936 
2000 314,504 10,140 30,611 480,881 773 7,564 
2003 333,963 16,957 37,634 480,573 670 5,649 
South Asia Sub-Sahran Africa 
1970 726,192 99,960 353,579 289,938 106,307 176,593 
1975 813,860 162,234 421,552 330,957 116,482 195,182 
1980 906,662 103,946 377,792 381,259 143,776 232,441 
1985 1,009,753 75,083 335,824 439,532 171,901 275,029 
1990 1,118,609 46,775 263,634 506,494 200,578 314,139 
1995 1,231,644 60,695 285,100 579,841 232,567 370,463 
2000 1,346,805 47,109 238,323 655,972 238,775 404,047 
2003 1,416,242 36,126 199,439 701,039 242,947 419,153 
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Table 3.2: Global and regional inequality measures and inequality decomposition 
Year Gini Theil Theil Theil Gini Theil Theil Theil 
Between Within Between Within 
World OECD Countries 
1970 0.682 0.881 0.615 0.266 0.385 0.251 0.020 0.231 
1975 0.684 0.887 0.612 0.275 0.377 0.240 0.D15 0.225 
1980 0.679 0.875 0.608 0.267 0.378 0.244 0.D15 0.229 
1985 0.669 0.859 0.592 0.267 0.387 0.259 0.019 0.240 
1990 0.662 0.848 0.571 0.277 0.387 0.259 0.014 0.244 
1995 0.655 0.845 0.531 0.314 0.404 0.284 0.016 0.269 
2000 0.646 0.816 0.502 0.314 0.404 0.285 0.019 0.267 
2003 0.640 0.796 0.468 0.328 0.407 0.290 0.018 0.272 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 0.497 0.522 0.269 0.253 0.573 0.620 0.072 0.547 
1975 0.509 0.551 0.307 0.244 0.591 0.686 0.048 0.639 
1980 0.524 0.583 0.334 0.249 0.540 0.541 0.040 0.501 
1985 0.475 0.484 0.257 0.227 0.544 0.558 0.031 0.527 
1990 0.495 0.501 0.248 0.253 0.567 0.619 0.034 0.585 
1995 0.491 0.482 0.196 0.285 0.582 0.654 0.042 0.612 
2000 0.477 0.436 0.150 0.286 0.590 0.677 0.050 0.627 
2003 0.504 0.473 0.124 0.350 0.583 0.657 0.048 0.609 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970 0.551 0.570 0.144 0.426 0.362 0.221 0.048 0.172 
1975 0.555 0.572 0.190 0.382 0.357 0.214 0.045 0.169 
1980 0.513 0.484 0.089 0.395 0.360 0.220 0.052 0.168 
1985 0.505 0.468 0.087 0.382 0.367 0.226 0.062 0.164 
1990 0.489 0.439 0.077 0.363 0.368 0.226 0.063 0.163 
1995 0.491 0.450 0.116 0.333 0.448 0.356 0.027 0.328 
2000 0.506 0.474 0.100 0.374 0.436 0.334 0.034 0.300 
2003 0.512 0.480 0.114 0.366 0.441 0.345 0.049 0.296 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970 0.351 0.207 0.001 0.206 0.637 0.879 0.347 0.532 
1975 0.413 0.295 0.002 0.292 0.638 0.859 0.349 0.509 
1980 0.375 0.239 0.004 0.235 0.660 0.948 0.411 0.537 
1985 0.373 0.238 0.005 0.232 0.666 0.968 0.452 0.516 
1990 0.366 0.229 0.006 0.223 0.677 1.027 0.432 0.595 
1995 0.396 0.269 0.008 0.261 0.666 1.040 0.442 0.599 
2000 0.412 0.295 0.009 0.286 0.663 1.049 0.448 0.601 
2003 0.412 0.295 0.009 0.286 0.659 1.033 0.442 0.590 
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periencing the lowest income growth overall. Furthermore, the global average income grew by 
1.8 percent per annum, whereas the median global individual experienced a per annum income 
increase of 3.0 percent. The rate of pro-poor growth9 for the $1 per day poverty line exceeds with 
2.2 percent per annum the growth rate of the mean by about 0.4 percentage points per annum. 
Hence, the 34 years from 1970 to 2003 can be termed pro-poor in the relative sense, as the poor 
experienced higher income growth rates than the average income. 1° For the $2 per day poverty 
line the period was even more pro-poor as the rate of pro-poor growth with 2.7 percent per annum 
exceeds the growth rate of the mean with almost 0.9 percentage points per annum and is even 
greater than the mean percentile growth rate. Hence, the global growth incidence curves over the 
period from 1970 to 2003 confirm and strengthen our inequality and poverty results above, as 
they show that over the 34 years the incomes of the poor have grown much faster than the average 
income. In fact, the bottom-middle income percentiles experienced the highest income growth 
rates explaining global income convergence, declining inequality and falling poverty headcounts. 
In order to understand in which era growth was particularly pro-poor, we take a closer look at 
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Figure 3.2: Global Growth Incidence Curve 1970-2003. Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, solid 
vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: Mean of Growth Rates, dashed line: 
Growth Rate of Mean, dotted line: Rate of Pro-poor Growth 
For the first half of the 1970s the top and bottom percentiles of the global income distribution 
experienced the highest growth rate. If one considers the $1 per day poverty line, these years 
experienced relative pro-poor growth. However, this is not the case, if one applies the $2 per day 
line, since the bottom-middle of the income distribution experienced only modest growth rates 
9The rate of pro-poor growth is defined as the average growth rate of the percentiles below the poverty line. 
10Note: a time span is considered to have been relatively pro-poor if the mean growth rates of the percentiles 
below the poverty line is larger than the growth rate in mean. 
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compared to the mean. The second half of the 1970s is characterized by the strongest global 
growth performance of 2.2 percent per annum in mean income and can be considered relatively 
pro-poor under the $1 and the $2 per day poverty definition. It is apparent that the bottom half 
of the distribution had higher growth rates than the average percentile growth rate and thus the 
bottom-middle of the global income distribution gained the most. 
The first half of the I 980s can be considered the most pro-poor over the given time period as 
the bottom half of the distribution experienced very high growth rates compared to the top per-
centiles. The mean income grew by only 0.8 percent per annum, but the rate of pro-poor growth 
was 4.6 and 4.7 per annum for the $1 and $2 per day poverty lines respectively. The second 
half of the 1980s experienced an increase in the global mean income growth rate to normal 1.9 
percent per annum and is characterized by negative pro-poor growth rates for the extreme poor, 
at -0.9 percent per annum, and growth rates for the poor, at 1.0 percent per annum. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the very bottom percentiles experienced an income decline, whereas 
the bottom-middle part of the distribution was doing reasonably well, so the bottom-middle half 
of the income distribution did catch up further to the upper percentiles. However, it is also im-
portant to note that the overall poor percentiles in 1985, which are considered to be poor under 
the $1 and $2 per day definitions, have been extremely reduced from the previous very pro-poor 
growth spell. In particular, the bottom-middle percentiles grew consistently, closing the income 
gap between the developing and developed world, which can also be seen if one looks at the 
log-income distribution where the two modes start to dissolve over the course of the 1980s. 
The 1990s cannot be considered relatively pro-poor. The highest growth rates over the decade 
are achieved by the inter-quartile percentiles that experience above mean percentile growth rates. 
This implies further global income convergence over the 1990s, and at the end of the 1990s no 
hint of a second peak in the global log-income distribution remains. However, these percentiles 
are no longer considered poor. The overall growth rate of mean income follows the previous 
decade pattern with the first half being characterized by relatively slower growth rates, 0.7 per-
cent per annum, followed by stronger growth rates of 2.0 percent per annum in the second half. 
For the first four years in the new millennium the growth rate of mean income has slowed down 
again to 1.3 percent per annum. The rate of pro-poor growth is below the average income growth 
rate with the bottom percentiles growing at only 0.5 percent per annum for the $1 per day poverty 
line and 0.6 percent for the $2 per day poverty line. The highest growth rates are observed in the 
upper-middle part of the income distribution. 
3.4 Regional Income Distributions 
3.4.1 Regional Income Distributions 
In order to get a more detailed picture, we decompose the world into seven regions which are 
analyzed separately: the OECD countries, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Table C.1 for the countries belonging to each region). 
The income and log-income distributions for these regions, modeled as described in Section 3.2, 
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are shown in Figures C.l and 3.1. One observes a significant increase in the mean of the income 
distributions of East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia, whereas Latin America as well as the 
Middle East and North Africa, which were at the beginning relatively rich regions in comparison 
to the other developing regions, only saw rather slow progress. In contrast, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia is the region which was initially characterized by the lowest inequality levels 
followed by a sharp increase in inequality after the breakdown of the Iron Curtain. However, due 
to its relative wealth, the region contributes little to the global poverty count if one considers the 
$1 and $2 per day poverty lines. Sub-Saharan Africa's distribution hardly shifts at all implying 
virtually no gains and a relative deterioration compared to the other regions. 
3.4.2 Regional Poverty and Inequality Measures 
Poverty and inequality measures for these seven regions, which reflect the overall picture above, 
are reported in Tables 3.1,3.2 and C.2. Indeed, the region with the highest poverty headcount 
in 1970, namely East Asia and the Pacific, experienced the most breathtaking poverty decline 
from 78 percent in 1970 to 8 percent in 2003 combined with a strong decline in inequality 
between countries in this region. Moreover, the absolute number of poor decreased, despite 
strong population growth, from about half a billion or one billion to about 45 and 160 million for 
the $1 and $2 poverty definition respectively. Furthermore, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
as well as the Middle East and North Africa saw their poverty headcounts decline by almost 
half. However, their absolute number of poor increased slightly under both definitions due to 
population growth. Moreover, South Asia also experienced a remarkable poverty decline even 
though less spectacularly and from a lower initial level than East Asia, causing the absolute 
number of poor to fall from about 100 or 350 million to about 36 and 200 million for the $1 
and $2 poverty lines, respectively. This experience was combined with rising inequality from an 
initially very low level driven by within country inequality. Furthermore, the often lamented case 
of Sub-Saharan Africa is confirmed by our numbers, as it is the only region which experiences 
virtually no improvement in any of the measures. This stagnation of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
relative decline in comparison to all other regions becomes even more apparent if we take a look 
at the regional decomposition of the absolute number of poor as part of the global population. 
While the poverty rates remained more or less constant over the years, the absolute number of 
people living in poverty more than doubled due to population growth from about 100 and 180 
million to about 240 and 420 million for the $1 and $2 poverty lines, respectively. Moreover, 
inequality measures even saw an increase from initially already very high levels, both for within 
and between country inequality. This implies that Sub-Saharan Africa is nowadays by far the 
most unequal and poorest region of the world in relative and absolute terms overall. However, 
as far as within country inequality is concerned Latin America still has to be considered the 
most unequal region, as seen by the within Theil inequality measure. Furthermore, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia contributes little to the global poor if one considers the $1 and $2 per 
day poverty lines and thus is characterized by very low and slightly declining poverty rates and 
absolute number of poor combined with strongly increasing within country inequality after the 
breakdown of the Iron Curtain from initially rather low levels. Finally, for completeness' sake, 
a quick glance at the OECD countries shows that it basically contributes nothing to the global 
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Figure 3.3: Global and regional distribution of log-income. Solid line: 1970, dashed line: 1980, 
dotted line 1990, dashed-dotted: 2003. 
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poverty dynamics under the applied definitions. 11 However, the region experienced a marked 
increase in inequality due to an increase in within country inequality. 
3.4.3 Regional Growth Incidence Curves 
The poverty and inequality dynamics described above become even more apparent if one takes 
a closer look at the regional growth incidence curves and results over the entire period as shown 
in Figure C.5. Moreover, a closer look at the semi-decade specific results conveys an even more 
detailed picture of the regions' growth experience during shorter time periods. 
The OECD Countries. The results for the OECD countries show that even though the average 
growth rate varied between better semi-decades, such as the late 1990s or late 1970s, and less 
strong growth periods, as the early 1990s and the early 1980s, the overall intra-distributional 
growth pattern is very stable. During all semi-decades, except for the start of the new millennium, 
the growth incidence curves show higher growth rates for the richest percentiles. Thus, the 
higher the population percentile the higher the income growth rate, with the logic consequence 
of increasing inequality over time. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is telling a more interesting 
story as it is much less homogeneous. It is clear from the growth incidence curves that during the 
first half of the 1990s the bottom half of the regional income distribution saw their income decline 
drastically, see Figure 3.4. These high negative growth rates, directly after the Soviet Regime's 
collapse, are causing a slight increase in the poverty rate by 1995. The other semi-decades can 
be characterized as more pro-poor, except for the very bottom percentiles, accounting for the 
slightly declining inequality up to 1990 after which inequality increases rather rapidly, before it 
improves again. 
East Asia and the Pacific. The fact that East Asia is by far the most dynamic region and 
accounts for most of the dramatic global poverty reduction is apparent from a closer look at the 
regional growth incidence curves. Except for the start of the new millennium, which displays 
a slow down in the mean of growth rates to about 2.5 percent per annum, and the early 1970s 
which had around 3 percent, all semi-decades are characterized by a high mean of growth rates 
of about 4 percent per annum. Furthermore, the early 1980s and 1990s saw most remarkable 
mean percentile growth rates of more than 6 percent per annum, combined with rates of pro-poor 
growth of 9.2 and 8.1 percent per annum for the early 1980s respectively (see Figure 3.4); no 
other region has such a consistently high growth record. From the seventies onwards, the poverty 
headcount index is steadily declining mainly due to good growth records in the bottom middle 
of the regional income distribution. In the early 1980s it is in particular the bottom percentiles 
which grew most rapidly. Moreover, the growth spurt of China, as the region's most populous 
country, accounts mostly for these very high growth rates, and thus accounts for a major share 
of the dramatic poverty headcount reduction from 61 percent to 39 percent over a 5 year period. 
For the bottom half of the distribution the 1990s were rather successful, lowering poverty rates 
even further from 25 to 8 percent. Moreover, the region is displaying a clear lead concerning the 
11 Clearly neither the $1 nor the $2 poverty line is a very suitable poverty measure for rich countries in general. 
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overall growth rate in mean, and is therefore the main driving force behind the convergence of 
the global income distribution. 
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Figure 3.4: Growth Incidence Curves for selected years. Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, 
solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean of growth rates, dashed 
line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America saw the second lowest growth rate in mean, 
which was almost distribution neutral, and is characterized by the third and second lowest rates 
of pro-poor growth (for the $1 and $2 lines, respectively). Consequently, the poverty headcount 
dropped only slightly from 19 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 2003 with inequality remain-
ing high. Hence, Latin America was relatively outperformed in terms of growth and poverty 
reduction by all other regions except for Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the overall rather stag-
nant picture there are some marked semi-decade specific variations. Most pro-poor were the late 
1970s, however, the promising high growth rates were not maintained. Thus, the relative deteri-
oration with respect to the other regions is mainly due to the 1980s, which are characterized by 
negative growth rates except for the very rich percentiles and are thus known as the lost decade in 
Latin America (compare Figure 3.4). The 1990s again display low positive growth rates in mean, 
however, the rate of pro-poor growth remains negative in the first half of the decade. Overall, 
Latin America's growth record is disappointing as poverty reduction could have been much more 
rapid and a further divergence from the richer regions is apparent. 
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Middle East and North Africa. Overall, the Middle East and North Africa display a similarly 
disappointing growth rate as Latin America with equally bad rates of pro-poor growth. In partic-
ular, the very low pro-poor growth rate at $1 per day is almost as low as in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
however, the proportion of the population living below $1 per day is clearly much lower. Over 
the 34 year time period the region managed to lower its poverty headcount rate from 23 to 11 
percent whilst reducing regional inequality slightly. Taking a closer look at the overall growth 
incidence curve, one can see that the very poor of the region experienced by far the lowest or even 
negative income growth. However, from about the 10th percentile the growth incidence curves 
look relatively pro-poor explaining the slight drop in the Gini coefficient and Theil's inequality 
measure. 
Given this overall 34 year development a closer look at the semi-decade specific pro-poor growth 
rates for the Middle East and North Africa shows a particularly strong fluctuation of the pro-poor 
growth rates ranging from -13.7 to 8.8 percent per annum and -8.3 to 5.5 percent per annum for 
the $1 and $2 poverty lines respectively. Whilst the 1970s saw positive and strong growth rates 
of the poor, the first half of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s are characterized by a growth collapse of 
the poor. In contrast, the second half of these decades saw compensatory pro-poor growth rates, 
such that overall the region saw a poverty decline and a lower Gini coefficient at the end of the 
observational period. However, like Latin America the region has been outperformed in terms of 
growth and poverty reduction by South and East Asia. 
South Asia. South Asia is the second most dynamic and populous region of the world over 
the given time period. Even though growth has not been relatively pro-poor, the overall growth 
record was sufficiently strong to lower the headcount at $2 per day from half the population to 
14 percent, whilst regional inequality saw an increase from initially very low levels due to an 
increase in within country inequality. In particular, India's growth record accounts for much 
of the regional dynamics as it is by far the largest country. Even though the early 1970s were 
characterized by negative growth rates the second half saw very high rates of relative pro-poor 
growth, initiating a constant poverty decline. The entire 1980s display relative pro-poor growth 
rates. In particular, during the 1980s the very poorest experienced growth rates of about 3 percent 
per annum. Average growth rates for the percentiles below the $2 per day poverty line increased 
from 2.7 to 3.2 percent per annum from the first to the second half of the 1980s respectively. 
The early 1990s are characterized by a general growth slow down with negative pro-poor growth 
rates, before growth resurges in the second half of the 1990s and during the first years of the new 
millennium, however, with only modest gains for the very bottom percentiles (see Figure 3.4). In 
general, the region's pro-poor and overall growth record is the second major driving force behind 
global income convergence with India accounting for a large proportion of this income catch-up. 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As mentioned above, Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most troublesome 
region as it remains virtually stagnant with constantly high rates of poverty and inequality. This 
is mainly due to the non-existent growth record of the region as a whole and is combined with 
a worsening of regional inequality at a very high level both within and between countries. This 
leaves Sub-Saharan Africa in 2003 as the most distinctively poor region in relative and absolute 
terms, as well as most unequal region in the world. The overall growth rate in mean over the 34 
year period is 0.3 percent per annum, with even lower rates of pro-poor growth for both poverty 
lines with the very bottom of the distribution experiencing even a negative growth record. 
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Indeed, the semi-decade specific analysis shows relatively successful early 1970s followed by 
a devastating picture for the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, all of which are characterized 
by a negative average growth rate and negative or only slightly positive growth rates in mean. 
Results for pro-poor growth are similar, even though the early 1990s saw the first positive pro-
poor growth rates after 15 years. The late 1990s and the start of the new millennium indicate a 
more encouraging picture. Despite remaining low growth rates at least some slow progress has 
been made in particular for the poor, which still account for almost 60 percent of the regions' 
population and experienced positive and for the region unparalleled rates of pro-poor growth. 
However, over the entire period the region has been virtually stagnant. Whilst it was "only" the 
second poorest region in the world in 1970, it is by far the poorest region in the world in the new 
millennium and experienced high relative income deterioration. In fact, about two thirds of the 
world's extreme poor and about half of the world's poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa nowadays 
(compare Table 3.1). Hence, it is clear that any serious attempt to further reduce global poverty 
will fail, if it fails to reach Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In contrast to studies analyzing the polarization of the cross-national average income per capita 
distribution, this study of the global income distribution as a whole shows strong global income 
convergence amongst all the world's citizens. We use a simple parametric mixture approach, 
with log-normal national income distributions and weights determined by the country's popula-
tion, which appears to be adequate for the data available in the WIDER database. Our results 
show that the past 34 years witnessed a strong global income convergence accompanied by a 
drastic decline of global inequality and poverty no matter what conceivable monetary poverty 
line is applied. Noticeably, overall inequality declined because of declining inequality between 
countries, whilst inequality within countries increased. Furthermore, the analysis of growth in-
cidence curves shows that the bottom-middle part of the income distribution experienced above 
average percentile growth rates, which explains the occurring global income convergence. In par-
ticular, the late 1970s and early 1980s are characterized by high global rates of pro-poor growth, 
initiating the rapid decline of global poverty rates. 
A regional decomposition of our data reveals that in particular the extraordinary growth record 
of East Asia and South Asia, which includes the two population heavy weights China and India, 
accounts mostly for the global income convergence and rapidly declining poverty rates. Latin 
America and the Middle East and North Africa showed slower but steady progress in poverty 
reduction. However, their more modest growth experience implies a relative income deterioration 
vis-a-vis the richer regions and also East and South Asia, and thus, can be seen as a remaining 
diverging factor in the global income distribution. Lastly, Sub-Saharan Africa has remained 
virtually stagnant and has become the poorest region in relative and absolute terms, implying 
a steady divergence and disconnection from the global growth process. Nevertheless, from a 
global perspective, the observational period is characterized by an unparalleled improvement of 
income per capita and an unprecedented poverty reduction. This in itself can be considered a 
great success and is in particular due to the fact that the bottom-middle global income percentiles 
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managed to catch up to higher levels of income, thus reducing the dispersion of income from a 
global perspective. On the other hand, the remaining very lowest percentiles also experienced 
the lowest percentile growth rates, such that the remaining extreme poor might be particularly 
hard to reach. 
Given the high share of global extreme poor and high poverty headcounts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
it is clear from our analysis that any further massive extreme poverty reduction can be only 
achieved by pro-poor, or at least distributional neutral, growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The re-
maining poor seem to be, if Chen and Ravallion's (2007) rural-urban poverty decomposition is 
any indication, mostly to be found in rural areas. Thus, any attempt to reduce global poverty 
even further must focus mainly on fostering growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and on remaining, in 
particular rural, national pockets of poverty. 
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Essay 4 
EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements 
4.1 Introduction 
Until 2007 the European Union (EU) granted non-reciprocial trade preferences to African, Carib-
bean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This policy did not comply with the WTO principle of most-
favoured treatment and was only temporarily covered by a WTO waiver which expired in Decem-
ber 2007. Under Cotonou the principle of reciprocity was introduced implying that developing 
countries had to honour trade concessions given by developed trading partners. Hence, in or-
der to avoid distortions of EU-ACP trade new trade agreements, so called Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), were negotiated with a target date of January 2008. 
The EPAs between the EU and ACP countries are a new approach to promote trade and to achieve 
more general development goals at the same time. At the core of the EPAs are regional trade 
agreements between the EU and each of the six regional ACPs. The EPAs intend to support 
ACP regional integration to create larger regional markets and foster their integration into world 
markets. While the previous trade preferences for ACP countries were determined unilaterally 
by the EU, the EPAs are jointly designed in negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries. 
ACP countries are requested to open to some extent their markets to EU products in return for 
their access to EU markets. The long-term goal is quasi duty-free and quota-free market access 
on both sides and simplified rules of origin in the EU. However, the ACP countries have to open 
their markets to a smaller extent than the EU does (on average 80 percent within 15 years). 
Moreover, EPAs give incentives to ACP countries to increase regional trade and cooperation - to 
replace the previous arrangements that favoured a hub-and-spoke structure discouraging interac-
tion with neighbours. Understandably, some countries are unwilling to cooperate on issues where 
they might lose. The EU as a third party can provide incentives to strengthen a regional resolve 
based on joint work with Inmaculada Martfnez-Zarzso, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. and Nils 
Klann. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
56 4. EU-ACP ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 
to enforce cooperation, and help to overcome such differences. Experience shows however, that 
(north-south) trade liberalization alone does not always promote economic development. EPAs 
could take a broader approach and try to improve coherence between trade and development. 
Besides trade of goods the EPAs also include trade in services as well as trade related issues such 
as investment, public procurement and competition law. While the agreements on trade of goods 
and services are about mutual, however asymmetric, trade liberalization, the trade related issues 
follow another objective. They aim to support regional integration by common regional regu-
lation, harmonization and implementation, helping to improve political and economic stability 
and creating a better business and investment climate. The EU may thus have to subordinate its 
commercial interests to the development needs of the ACP countries. 
In this essay we estimate the potential welfare effects of a trade agreement between the EU and 
ACP countries for nine African countries: Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda. The contributions to the existent literature on 
this field are twofold: First, instead of rather arbitrarily choosing elasticities of import demand, 
we estimate bilateral elasticities between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa and between the nine 
African countries and the EU from highly disaggregated data. Second, instead of simulating 
general scenarios like full, medium or low liberalization, we apply the actual tariff reduction 
rates recently negotiated between the EU and the African countries to estimate the agreement's 
welfare effects of trade liberalization for the African countries. 
4.2 State of the EPA Negotiations 
The EU started EPAs' negotiations with six ACP regions, which were self-defined by the ACP 
countries in 2003. These regions include the Caribbean (CARIFORUM), Central Africa (CEMAC), 
South-East Africa (ESA), West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern Africa (SADC), and the Pacific. 
The trade structure of these regions often reflects dependency on just a few products. Table 4.1 
lists the top four exported products of the six ACP regions. In most cases, these products account 
for at least two-thirds of total exports. 
Table 4.1: Top four exports of the six ACP regions 
Top export(%) Second export(%) Third export ( % ) Fourth export (%) 
Southern Africa Diamonds (42) Mineral oil ( 17) Aluminum (13) Fish (8) 
West Africa Mineral oil ( 45) Cocoa (21) Fish (5) Timber (4) 
Central Africa Mineral oil (47) Timber (23) Bananas (5) Cocoa (4) 
East Africa Textiles (15) Fish (11) Diamonds (9) Sugar (8) 
Caribbean Ships (23) a Corundum (10) Ethanol (I 0) Sugar (8) 
Pacific region Palm oil (36) Sugar (16) Copper (13) Coffee (7) 
Ships and aircraft are not actually manufactured in the Caribbean, the statistics also include cases in which 
ownership of a ship or aircraft has been transferred. Source: EU Commission and BMZ (2007). 
The schedule for negotiations was tight, since the WTO waiver expired in December 2007. In 
most cases this was insufficient time to finalize full EPAs, thus interim agreements were con-
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eluded, in many cases on a sub-regional or bilateral level. Negotiations toward full EPAs con-
tinue. 
The course of negotiations differs between the regions. For the Caribbean region, a full EPA 
including trade in services has been finalized in December 2007. The agreement implies a market 
opening of 61 percent within 10 years and 82.7 percent within 15 years. The members are: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 
For Eastern and Southern Africa two sub-regional interim agreements were concluded with the 
East African Community (EAC) and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). The agreement for EAC 
implies a market opening of 64 percent within 2 years, 80 percent within 15 years and 82 percent 
within 25 years. The members are: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The 
extent of market opening differs among the members of the other agreement between 80 percent 
(Comoros) and 97 percent (Seychelles). The members are: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Zimbabwe. The other countries of this region can use market access to the EU under 
the Everything but Arms initiative for LDCs1: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Zambia. 
The sub-regional interim agreement for Southern Africa implies a market opening of 86 per-
cent within 2 years except for Mozambique (80.5 percent within one year). The members are: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland. Unfortunately South Africa did not 
enter the agreement yet. From a development perspective it would be extremely helpful if the 
major economic driver of the region formed part of the agreement. Angola can continue to use 
market access through Everything but Arms. 
In the Pacific region a sub-regional interim agreement has been concluded with Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji. It implies a market opening of 88 percent within 15 years in the case of Papua 
New Guinea and 80 percent in the case of Fiji. The other non-LDCs of this region include Cook 
Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, and Tonga. Trade in goods is rela-
tively unimportant for this region, the agreement is therefore expected to have its focus on trade 
in services. East Timor, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu can use market 
access under Everything but Arms. 
In Central Africa, only a bilateral agreement with Cameroon could be finalized in early 2008. 
The agreement includes market opening of 80% within 15 years. The remaining non-LDCs of 
this region are Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, both continuing to negotiate own stepping stone 
agreements. Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome are 
granted market access under Everything but Arms. 
1 For Least Developed Countries (LDCs) the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative has been in force since 200 I. 
The EBA regulation is granting duty-free access to imports of all products from least developed countries to the 
EU without any quantitative restrictions, except to arms and munitions. Only imports of fresh bananas, rice and 
sugar were not fully liberalized immediately but are liberalized step by step. This special arrangement for LDCs 
is not subject to the periodic renewal of the EU's generalized system of preferences (GSP). The GSP applies to all 
developing countries, but its conditions are less favourable for ACP non-LCDs than those offered under the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
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In West Africa, bilateral agreements have been signed only with Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. The 
agreements imply market opening of 70 percent within 10 years for Cote d'Ivoire and 80 percent 
within 15 years for both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. The vast majority of exports of the region 
come from Nigeria which is a non-LDC where exports are dominated by oil and gas. The other 
countries of this region include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, all of which are 
LDCs and can use market access under Everything but Arms. 
4.3 Economic Analysis of EPAs 
4.3.1 Review of the Literature 
Before we proceed to the analytical framework let us briefly summarize the existing literature on 
EPAs and their potential impact in the ACP countries or sub-regions. The empirical approaches 
taken in the literature to estimate the potential effects of EPAs differ quite substantially. Some 
studies are based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, whereas others are based 
on partial equilibrium (PE) models. On the one hand, the CGE studies are more complex and 
can take the linkages of the economy into account, on the other hand the PE studies allow for 
more detailed statements on what is to be expected on the sectoral level. CGE models are mostly 
unfeasible for African countries due to lack of sufficiently detailed data (Milner et al. 2006). 
Although there is a considerably body of literature on the EPAs, most papers focus on policy 
options rather than assess the trade and welfare effects of the EPAs. To our knowledge, five 
main studies in the recent past have evaluated the impact of the EPAs in a PE framework. In the 
first study, Hinkle and Schiff (2004) investigate the effects of an EPA on Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries. They observe that the liberalization of trade in services which can be part of 
an EPA agreement will benfit SSA in terms of consumer gains in sectors such as transportation, 
telecommunication and finance. 
Karingi et al. (2005), evaluates the gains and losses associated with EPAs for ACP countries. 
They predict a decrease in the production of natural resources, energy and cotton and production 
increases in fishing, animal products, livestock, crops, sugar oilseeds, vegetables and cereals 
for SSA if a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU was signed. However, in case of full 
reciprocity production losses in fishing, livestock and vegetables are to be expected. With respect 
to manufacturing in the SSA countries, Karingi et al. (2005) find a decline in heavy industry, 
medium tech and low tech industry, clothing and textiles under full reciprocity, but increases in 
clothing, textiles and agriculture production under a FTA. 
Milner et al. (2006) analyze the EPA's impact on Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. The authors find 
the expected consumer gains and production losses but, more importantly, they identify Kenya 
as a country where losses outweigh benefits, mainly due to the fact that Kenya's manufacturing 
sector will be negatively affected by EU competition. 
Busse and GroBmann (2007) analyze the impact of EPAs on West African countries. They find 
that in most cases trade creation effects (more trade with the EU and some African countries) 
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outweigh the trade diversion effects (less trade with African countries that are not part of the 
agreement). They also find a negative impact on the government deficit. 
Finally, Fontagne et al. (2008) investigate the impact of EPAs for all six ACP regions. Their 
results show increased exports of vegetal production, livestock, agrifood and textiles to the EU 
and big increases in imports from the EU (in the range of 20 to 40 percent) in textiles, metallurgy, 
primary products and other industries. Huge decreases in tariff revenue (70 to 80 percent) are 
found for all six regions except for the Pacific where the tariff revenue seems to be unimportant. 
4.3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework is based on Milner et al. (2006). The authors illustrate the welfare 
effects of preferential trade agreements for a small country member of an initial PTA graphically. 
These effects arise from the transition of initial preferential trade agreements (PTA) between 
African countries to Economic Partnership Agreements. Figure 4.1 shows this initial situation 
of a PTA between an African country (H) and its regional partner (P). With a PTA in force 
home country demand for imports (DH) for a good is met by partner supply of exports (Sp), 
since domestic production capabilities are assumed to be negligible. Two additional flat lines are 
shown indicating the infinitely elastic supply of the same good from the European Union and 
the rest of the world (ROW), respectively. Prices PEu and PRow are given exogenously since the 
African countries are small in size relative to the EU and the rest of the world and thus are unable 
to trigger variations in world market prices through shifts in demand. 
In the initial phase with the PTA in force country H imposes an ad-valorem tariff on imports 
from regions not covered by the PTA i.e. global goods. The resulting price increase is taken into 
account by adding a second global export supply curve Skow· As can easily be derived from the 
graph imports amount to 0M2. These inflows originate both from country P (0M1) and the rest 
of the world (M1M2). 
In the given situation country H could benefit from two sources of welfare gains: assuming that 
Pflow is the price level consumers face, this price level undercuts the spending propensity of all 
consumers left of point B. This fact generates consumer surplus and is also the first source of 
welfare the country may derive from the initial situation. The import of M1M2 of goods from the 
rest of the world allows for further welfare gains since duties are levied on these goods resulting 
in state revenue ( a + b). 
The implementation of an EPA framework removes these tariffs on goods from the European 
Union whereas duties remain in place for goods from the rest of the world. The implication of 
such a shift in policy is a reduction of prices for imports from the EU. Consumers would now 
face a lower price regime indicated by PEu in Figure 4.1. 
Several welfare effects are triggered by this pro-European shift in trade policies: Firstly, the drop 
of the import price from Pkow to PEu will displace country H's former trading partner P as a 
supplier. Goods of the amount 0M1 are now imported from the EU. Hence, the EPA framework 
results in trade creation, represented by area c in Figure 4.1. The lower price PEu also increases 
imports and thus consumption of the good in question by M2M3 (consumer surplus increase by 
area e (Figure 4.1). This result is the consumption effect of the EPA-driven shift in the trading 
structure of the country. With tariffs favouring EU imports over goods from the rest of the world 
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0 M3 Impo11 Volwn.: {Q} 
Figure 4.1: Welfare effects of a reduction in tariffs 
the bear share of imports i.e. M1M2 is now purchased from EU suppliers in place of tapping 
supply from the rest of the world. The welfare effects of this shift, in terms of trade creation and 
trade diversion, towards the EPA framework are complex: The EU is a less efficient choice for 
importing the good in question than the rest of the world. This is indicated by the higher price 
of EU goods in comparison with suppliers from the rest of the world. The adverse effect of this 
trade preference is captured by the trade diversion effect amounting to M 1M2 . The consequence 
of employing a less efficient source for imports generates costs of the amount of area b in Figure 
4.1. In addition, since the tariff revenue is not collected anymore, the total tariff revenue lost 
by the home country is represented by area (a+ b) in Figure 4.1. The global welfare effect is 
ambiguous, and depends on the elasticities of the home demand for imports and the export supply 
of exports and is represented by the area ( c + d + e) - b in Figure 4.1. 
These three trade effects, consumption effect, trade creation and trade diversion, associated with 
a move from a PTA to an EPA usually take place simultaneously. However, for specific sectors 
(products) it could be that only one or two of the effects occur. As a matter of fact, it is assumed 
that in sectors for which the EU is the dominant supplier only consumption effects will follow, 
while in sectors for which the dominant supplier is the rest of the world, also trade diversion 
occurs. Trade creation together with consumption effects will follow in sectors where another 
ACP country (in the regional PTA) is a relatively important supplier (providing more than approx. 
25 percent of imports). 
It can be assumed for sectors in which the EU is the dominant supplier that supply from the rest 
of the world is more expensive than the supply from the EU and that there are no competitive 
regional supply capabilities. Thus the consumption effect alone is given by 
~ = (-t-) EPMEuuv.Eu I +t M o o (4.1) 
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where t is the current tariff, efj the price elasticity of import demand, Mgu the current import 
volume originating from the EU and uvrfu the current unit values2 (prices) from the EU. The 





The consumption effects with trade diversion are given by the following formulas, where ROW 
stands for rest of the world: 
Mgowuv6ww 
-tMgowuvt.ow 
0.5 (-t-) eDMROWuv.EU 
l+t M o o 
0.25tMff v - 0.5tMgow uvJww 
Finally the consumption effects with trade creation are given by: 
M5TAuvtTA 
0.5 (-t-) eDMPTAuv.EU 
l+t M o o 








We will focus on the welfare and the revenue effects of trade creation, trade diversion and con-
sumption. With this aim, sectors will be classified into three different categories according to 
who is the dominant supplier in this sector. 
According to the outlined analytical framework and in line with the empirical studies discussed 
in Section 3.1, the effects that will follow after an EPA between the EU and ACP countries or 
subgroups are now summarised. First, a lowering of tariffs in the ACP region (among African 
countries) will lead to trade creation in this region as long as ACP prices are below EU prices. 
EU countries will also profit from better access to ACP country markets because import tariffs 
will have to be lowered for EU manufactured and agricultural exports as part of an EPA agree-
ment. Given that the EU is strong in producing manufactured exports a rise in EU exports of 
manufactures to ACP countries is expected. 
Second, lower tariffs of manufactured products will put producers of manufactures ( the import 
substitution industry) in ACP countries under pressure. ACP countries with bias towards pro-
ducing products such as machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastic, glass, and ceramics will 
lose given that a lowering of import tariffs will make them less competitive and will reveal weak-
nesses in productivity or innovation. Third, better EU access to the ACP market can lead to a 
displacement (trade diversion) of previously competitive African neighbours if they are not part 
of the agreement and if their price is above the EU price in the aftermath of the EPA agreement. 
2Unit values are defined as import value divided by import volume. 
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Fourth, the consumers in all the ACP countries (in the very poor, poor and richer ACP countries) 
will profit from cheaper imports (trade concessions for the EU countries) and from a greater 
variety of incoming imports. Finally, with respect to government revenue, state earnings from 
levying duties will decrease in all ACP countries and new sources of revenue creation or taxation 
will have to be found. 
4.4 Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications 
4.4.1 Elasticities for Import Demand 
Import demand elasticities are an important ingredient of ex-ante analyses of trade reforms. Price 
elasticities are crucial for assessing the effects on trade volumes of changes in relative prices 
following tariff cuts arranged in the negotiations of regional trade agreements. Price elasticities 
are also necessary to estimate ad-valorem equivalents of quotas or other non-tariff barriers. In 
addition, trade policy is frequently detennined at high levels of disaggregation, whereas existing 
import demand elasticities are only available, for many countries, at a high aggregation level. 
This divergence can lead to serious aggregation biases when calculating the impact of trade 
policies. We aim to fill in this gap by estimating import demand elasticities for the nine African 
countries considered in this essay. We are thus able to build up on the methodology employed in 
Busse and GroBmann (2007) where elasticities are pre-defined in place of being estimated from 
the data. 
In the recent past, trade economists often used trade elasticities from the surveys of the empirical 
literature put together by Stern et al. ( 1976) and by Sawyer and Sprinkle ( 1999). More recent 
attempts to provide disaggregated estimates of import demand elasticities include Shiells et al. 
(1986), Shiells and Reinert (1993), Blonigen and Wilson (1999), Marquez (1990, 1999, 2002), 
Broda et al. (2008) and Gallaway et al. (2003), Kee et al. (2004) and Hertel et al. (2007). 
Import demand elasticities for many African countries at disaggregate level are not available in 
the existent literature. 
In order to evaluate the impact of the EPA agreements and its associated welfare effects across 
different African countries, one would need to have a consistent set of trade elasticities, estimated 
using the same data and methodology. If possible, it would also be desirable to use a framework 
for the estimation that is consistent with trade theory. Hence we will specify and estimate a 
demand for imports that relates changes in the quantity of imports to changes in relative prices. 
This follows the Annington assumption (based on the differentiation of products with respect to 
their origin and the imperfect substitution in demand between imports and domestic supply). 
The share of import in domestic demand is related to their relative prices. An increase in domestic 
price level creates an incentive for increasing the share of imports. The specification of the import 
demand is, 
M (PD 8 )a 
D= PMl-8 (4.11) 
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Table 4.2: Import demand elasticities by country 
EU25 Sub-Saharan Africa Non-Manufacturing SSA Manufacturing SSA 
(HS 0- HS 2) (HS 3 - HS 8) 
Uganda -0.967*** -0.707*** -0.522** -0.684*** 
(0.036) (0.051) (0.171) (0.053) 
Tanzania -0.815*** -0.845*** -0.935*** -0.809*** 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.110) (0.053) 
Mozambique -0.911 *** -1.044*** -1.189*** -1.005*** 
(0.034) (0.040) (0.148) (0.043) 
Ghana -0.870*** -0.589*** -0.638*** -0.566*** 
(0.055) (0.050) (0.122) (0.055) 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.588*** -0.774*** -1.059*** -0.722*** 
(0.088) (0.076) (0.200) (0.081) 
Botswana -0.997*** -0.479*** 0.222 -0.487*** 
(0.057) (0.123) (0.639) (0.126) 
Kenya -1.063*** -1.054*** -1.122*** -0.989*** 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.106) (0.041) 
Namibia -0.796*** -0.941 ••• -1.009** -0.932*** 
(0.047) (0.126) (0.331) (0.138) 
Cameroon -1.484*** -0.677*** -1.084* -0.631 *** 
(0.079) (0.091) (0.503) (0.085) 
Fixed Effects YES 
R-squared 0.74 0.7 0.563 0.746 
AIC 68891.6 64701.41 15520.4 46040.21 
BIC 69031.07 64840.83 15633.85 46173.75 
N 17123 17079 4034 12315 
Note: ••• denotes significance at 1 percent level, •• denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
63 
where M denotes import quantity, D denotes domestic demand (quantity produced and sold in 
Home), Pv is the domestic price and PM is the world market price, and a is the price elasticity of 
imports, that will be estimated. 
A way of extending this formulation to the multiple countries (regions) case consists of using 
bilateral trade at highly disaggregated level. Given this scenario two different types of elasticities 
can be considered: The elasticity for the choice between imports from different exporters and the 
elasticity of the choice between imports and domestic production. Since domestic production 
is not available at a high level of disaggregation we choose to use the first elasticity. We will 
follow a difference in difference approach that is described below. The import demand equation 
for multiple exporters and products is, 
(4.12) 
where i denotes the importing country and j, l the exporter countries (regions), k denotes a spe-
cific product (HS six digits level). M are import quantities and P are import prices. We use 
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import unit values as a proxy for import prices. By taking logarithms of equation 2 and adding 
and error term and importer fixed effects we derive the empirical model as, 
(4.13) 
where a; are importer fixed effects and e;k is the error term which is assumed to be well behaved. 
Equation ( I 3) is estimated with trade data for 2005 (Import values and import quantities are 
from COMTRADE) for nine importers (Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire, 
Cameroon, Botswana, Kenya and Namibia) and three exporting regions (European Union, Sub-
Saharan Africa and World). Two versions of equation (13) are estimated. The first one considers 
imports from the EU with respect to imports from the world as the dependent variable, whereas 
the second considers imports from SSA with respect to imports from the world. 
Table 4.2 presents the aggregate price elasticities of import demand for each importer country. 
Tables D.l and D.2 summarize the trade elasticities for imports from the EU25 and other Sub-
Saharan African countries at HS one digit levels. In essence, the disaggregated data used to 
generate the measures reported in Tables D. l and D.2 avoids imposing identical parameters on 
all classes of goods. It is interesting to note that many of the elasticity estimates across import 
categories within specific countries have very similar magnitudes. 
In the subsequent analysis we use the estimated elasticities at the highest level of disaggregation 
possible. However, for some countries and sectors there were no sufficient data to estimate a 
significant elasticity (for example Namibia and HS 0). In these cases we use elasticities obtained 
at a more aggregate level. 
4.4.2 Welfare Effects of an EPA 
Combining the trade elasticities of Section 4.1 and the analytical framework of Section 3.2 we 
are now able to assess the potential welfare effects of full trade liberalization and of the interim 
agreements. For this purpose we use trade data from UNSD COMTRADE and tariff data from 
UNCTAD TRAINS at a very high level of disaggregation (HS six digits level). As a first step 
we assume that tariffs are completely abolished with the PTA. The overall welfare effects for the 
nine African countries are shown in Table 4.3. 
It should be noted that a tariff reduction to zero describes a rather extreme case which would stand 
at the very end of an EPA process. Nevertheless, we find that in most cases trade creation effects 
outweigh trade diversion effects. Only Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Kenya experience relatively 
small welfare losses compared to their overall trade volume. Botswana, Cameroon, Mozambique 
and Namibia are identified as biggest winners under a full trade liberalization scenario. 
The overall welfare effects can be decomposed into partial effects for manufacturing (HS codes 3 
to 9) and non-manufacturing (HS codes Oto 2) products. Generally speaking one could say that 
manufacturing products account for most welfare losses, while the welfare effects are positive 
for the non-manufacturing products (except for Ghana). 
Next we calculate the short-run (five years) and long-run (end of the transition period) welfare 
effects of a trade liberalization given the actual interim agreement's tariff reduction rates. The 
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All products 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya 
Consumption 60.68 7256.11 8697.38 5741.34 2100.62 
Diversion -275.91 -27390.91 -20974.4 -148269.2 -76760.92 
Creation 163104.9 15341.28 160097.8 44628.63 46416.89 
Total 162889.7 -4793.51 147820.8 -97899.23 -28243.41 
in% 5.35% -0.08% 5.42% -1.12% -0.55% 
Revenue -1905.1 -155502.2 -120378.9 -431936.9 -228347.2 
Non-manufacturing 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya 
Consumption 0.05 4776.27 3706.5 2409.5 392.53 
Diversion 0 -3573.07 -2475.2 -48474.36 -18658.82 
Creation 2732.19 14751.16 157731.9 21264.45 33953.27 
Total 2732.24 15954.35 158963.2 -24800.4 15686.97 
in% 0.25% 0.50% 11.41% -0.93% 0.97% 
Revenue -1.02 -49668.85 -27310.43 -156580.8 -63662.65 
Manufacturing 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya 
Consumption 60.63 5185.24 4990.88 3331.95 1957.71 
Diversion -277.18 -28087.53 -18499.2 -100101.2 -74954.16 
Creation 155662 1838.58 2365.87 23892.61 15487.33 
Total 155445.4 -21063.71 -11142.45 -72876.6 -57509.12 
in% 7.90% -0.64% -0.84% -1.20% -1.40% 
Revenue -1904.07 -135051.4 -93068.45 -275978.5 -202989.4 
Note: Units are 1000 USO. 
Mozambique Namibia Tanzania 
201.68 14.87 2051.05 
-10679.51 -957.47 -34380.72 
77565.48 247078.9 57062.36 
67087.65 246136.3 24732.69 
4.27% 10.07% 1.01% 
-30452.95 -2530 -124062.5 
Mozambique Namibia Tanzania 
174.19 0.39 803.24 
-6729.47 -7.59 4166.82 
23711.4 48884.25 30997.74 
17156.12 48877.05 35967.8 
3.47% 8.06% 5.93% 
-16543.93 -255.84 -25342.99 
Mozambique Namibia Tanzania 
27.49 14.48 1259.08 
-3950.04 -949.89 -49647.93 
56173.02 198141.8 33311.55 
52250.47 197206.4 -15077.31 
4.72% 10.73% -0.65% 
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All products ;;;i '°' er 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya Mozambique Namibia Tanzania Uganda ;.' 
.i:,. 
Consumption 60.68 5934.84 8697.38 3558.57 1347.27 18.23 14.87 74.09 116.85 




Creation 163104.9 14498.93 160097.8 9754.32 10849.89 36287.77 246991.2 17725.59 11739.78 
::, 
(JQ a 
Total 162889.7 -1930.95 147820.8 -57624.84 -28635.44 34786.57 246048.6 -10308.06 -3966.17 ::, 
in% 5.35% -0.03% 5.42% -0.66% -0.50% 2.17% 10.07% -0.35% -0.20% ~ Cl> 
Revenue -1905.1 -120689.2 -120378.9 -202055.1 -117753.8 -5681.96 -2354.41 -61453.07 -38126.76 ~ Cl> 
Non-manufacturing 






Consumption 60.67 2620.05 3735.52 1691.15 349.96 9.53 0.66 34.8 4.5 
Diversion -11.96 -3721.01 -3464.15 -21493.68 -1481.43 -272.33 -7.59 -905.99 -818.37 
Creation 8194.93 13312.04 157913.9 3371.19 1249.85 6109.72 56474.26 2126.61 1533.12 
Total 8243.64 12211.08 158185.3 -16431.34 118.38 5846.91 56467.32 1255.43 719.25 















Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya Mozambique Namibia Tanzania Uganda 
(") 
(") 0 
0 3:: .... 
e, n 
Consumption 0 3510.4 4961.86 1691.15 997.31 8.71 14.22 39.29 112.36 
Diversion -265.21 -18877.95 -17510.25 -21493.68 -39351.18 -1247.1 -949.89 -27201.75 -15004.42 




s- -l z 
Cl> tT1 
5· :,:, "' Total 149934 -13802.89 -10364.53 -16431.34 -28753.83 28939.66 189528.4 -11563.48 -4685.42 
in% 8.12% -0.44% -0.80% -0.58% -0.73% 2.77% 10.97% -0.51% -0.34% 
Revenue -575.47 -90044.52 -90508.66 -71332.81 -110846.2 -4459.51 -2267.44 -58969.35 -36055.25 
- - --10 years 17 years 18 years 17 years 28 years 13 years 10 years 28 years 
Note: Units are 1000 USO. 
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results are shown in Tables 0.3 and 4.4, respectively. Table 4.4 shows that in the long-run only 
Botswana, Cameroon and Namibia realize their full potential of welfare gains under the interim 
agreements. The welfare effects for Mozambique are still positive though smaller than in the full 
liberalization scenario. 
The welfare losses of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Kenya under the actual tariff reduction rates are 
smaller compared to a full liberalization. The effects are now close to zero for these countries, 
implying that the trade effects of the agreements can be considered more or less neutral. Also 
for Tanzania and Uganda the predicted welfare effects are close to zero, although the full lib-
eralization scenario suggests that both countries have potential for welfare gains through trade 
liberalization. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Overall, we can conclude that a tariff reduction for imports from the EU has no or a slightly posi-
tive effect for the African countries in our study. One should note, that this welfare effect can not 
be interpreted as the total effect of an Economic Partnership Agreement. On the contrary, these 
effects can be seen as a price to maintain preferential access to EU markets which is compatible 
to WTO rules. Even a small negative welfare effect due to tariff reduction would not imply that 
EPAs have a negative impact on African countries. Falling back to GSP would certainly be more 
disadvantageous for those countries than an EPA. However, other aspects besides tariffs are also 
important for the potential development success of the EPAs. The interim agreements have to be 
extended with development components comparable to the Caribbean agreement. 
With respect to the loss in tariff revenues, shown in the fourth row of Table 5, although the losses 
are always compensated by consumption and trade creation effects except for the countries that 
experience welfare losses (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), this is a very 
important issue in practice. Tariff revenues contribute, on average, by 2 percent to the GDP - in 
some cases even up to 6 percent-for Sub-Saharan African countries. Given that trade with the 
EU accounts for 40 percent of total trade, lower tariffs would imp! y a stiff decline in government 
revenues, as our estimates also confirm. Two steps could be taken to resolve this problem. First, 
ACP countries should be allowed to open their markets to a smaller extent than the EU and 
with appropriate transition periods, as already acknowledged by the present state of the EPAs or 
interim agreements. Second the lost tariff revenues should be replaced by increased tax revenues 
through reforms of domestic tax systems and tax administration. 
Certainly, the EU profits the most from making the pre-2008 EU-ACP trade relations WTO 
compatible. We therefore argue that these additional profits on the EU side should be used for 
development cooperation. A more radical approach in terms of the tariff losses in Africa would 
therefore be for the EU to provide budget support to the most affected countries during a prede-
tennined transition period. Such transfers could help African countries to cope with the financial 
burden of transition costs and offset revenue losses caused by tariff reductions. For companies to 
reap the full potential of export markets African countries are also well-advised to dedicate some 
attention to creating a supportive environment for potential exporters. This may include efforts 
to improve relevant factors such as infrastructure or the legal framework. EU countries could 
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enhance the development impact of EPA policies by contributing to these improvements through 
financial or technical assistance. This assistance may also entail helping to establish a sound 
tax system which replaces tariff collection as a pivotal source of income for the government of 
African countries. In accordance African countries should make an effort to ensure that their 
tax collection scheme is able to compensate the losses incurring from tariff reduction. This also 
entails the improvement of tax administration to ensure reliable tax collection. Hinkle and Schiff 
(2004) suggest improving the countries ability to collect indirect taxes such as value added taxes 
in order to compensate losses incurring from tariff reductions. 
Comparing the revenue losses under the full liberalization scenario and the long-run interim 
agreement scenario reveals that revenues were a dominant issue when selecting the products for 
exclusion. In the case of Tanzania and Uganda the protection of tariff revenues was certainly paid 
with welfare losses. Overall it is interesting to note that infant industries and welfare arguments 
did not receive enough attention compared to tariff revenues. 
In order to improve the welfare effects, both for countries which are already profiting from a 
complete tariff offset as well as countries which would loose from a complete tariff offset, prod-
ucts and sectors which suffer from negative welfare effects could be identified and excluded from 
trade liberalization. Moreover, the exclusion of products from liberalization could be motivated 
by infant industry arguments or by their importance for government revenues. Only a limited 
proportion of products can be excluded from liberalization. Therefore we argue that the protec-
tion of infant industries should be chosen over the protection of government revenues. The tariff 
reduction tables of the interim agreements should be evaluated from this perspective. 
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Essay 5 
Political Institutions and Human 
Development 
5.1 Introduction 
Since Sen (1983, 1988, 1991, 1999, 2000, 2003 etc.), we are aware of the fact that development is 
a very encompassing and broad concept. Development as a whole depends on each individual's 
capabilities. Capabilities define the freedom to choose a valuable life in accordance with individ-
ual preferences. This approach inspired the emergence of a pluralist and integrative conception 
of "human development" and its operationalization in the form of UNDP's Human Development 
Index. Among other dimensions, income, but also health and education, enable people to shape 
their lives in line with their desires. The aim of this paper is to discuss the contribution political 
institutions can make to enhance human development. 
Political institutions are an appealing topic of research as they organize social, economic and 
political life. Hence, an obvious question would be what kinds of institutions do this job best. 
From an ideological perspective, democracy seems to be the right political system because at 
the end of the day, its beneficiaries are politically free as well as they are free to take decisions 
about their lives. Therefore, democracy is also considered an end of the political development 
process and a piece of the puzzle of the more comprehensive picture of human development 
(Sen 1999a,b, 2000). But whether democracy indeed has a positive impact on economic and 
human development is not a trivial question - neither from a theoretical nor from an empirical 
perspective. With regard to theory, three major debates are circling around the instrumental value 
of democracy for economic development: 
First, there seems to be a controversy concerning the contradictory effects of property rights pro-
tection and redistribution in a democracy on growth and well-being. There might be a trade-off 
between growth-enhancing property rights protection and equalizing, market-correcting redis-
tribution. On the one hand, property rights protection is a necessary condition for an increase 
based on joint work with Maria Ziegler. 
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in the overall wealth of a nation (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002). But whether all members of 
this nation can benefit from it highly depends on redistribution as well. On the other hand, the 
probably adverse effects of redistribution on the savings rate, growth and the labor market and 
the related effects on the overall living standard of the population including non-income human 
development come to mind. Moreover, in democracy, corporatism may lead to lock-in effects 
and a decreasing reform capacity. This danger, together with the fact that elites in democracies 
tend to produce inefficient policies supports positions like the Lee-Hypothesis1. These positions 
state that autocratic regimes are the more efficient systems to tackle market failures, to stimulate 
economic growth and as a consequence to improve human development (Alesina and Rodrik, 
1994; Barro, 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). 
A second debate revolves around causation: Is democracy cause or consequence of the develop-
ment process? A third field, which is linked to this second point, is a range of discussions that 
focus on factors that impede or foster democratic systems to work well. It is not obvious what the 
conditions are under which democracies will display a positive effect - given they are supposed 
to have one. Examples of these enhancing or impeding factors are the level of economic develop-
ment itself, inequality, country-specific and historical factors, education and social fragmentation 
(Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999; Alesina et al., 1999; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu et 
al., 2002; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; 
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Keefer and Khemani, 2005; Collier, 2001). 
Empirical research studies give no clear answer to the above questions. Persson and Tabellini 
(2006) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) show that in case of economic growth the efficiency 
argument in favor of autocratic regimes does not withstand empirical investigations. Others, on 
the contrary, find a moderately negative or nonlinear relationship between democracy and growth 
(Barro, 1996; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Minier, 1998). When studies focus on redistribution, 
i.e. the effect of political systems on income inequality or on the provision of public goods and 
the size of the public sector, results are less ambiguous (Boix, 2001; Gradstein and Milanovic, 
2004; Persson, 2002; Stasavage, 2005; Persson et al., 2000). In general, they support the view 
that redistribution might be higher under a democratic regime. But if this is the case, the question 
still remains whether this redistribution is beneficial to economic and non-income related human 
development. 
Concerning the non-income dimensions of human development, there is again uncertainty about 
the effects of democracy. There are only very few studies empirically investigating the links 
between political systems and measures for the non-income dimensions of human development. 
Whereas some find a positive relationship between democracy and human development (Besley 
and Kudamatsu, 2006; Franco et al., 2004; Tsai, 2006), others find less evidence for this influence 
(Ross, 2006). These research efforts are either confined to the sub sample of developing countries 
(Tsai, 2006), to only one of the non-income dimensions of human development (Besley and 
Kudamatsu, 2006; Franco et al., 2004; Ross, 2006) or to a cross-sectional focus leaving out 
developments over time (Tsai, 2006; Franco et al., 2004). Moreover, these investigations, while 
having in mind potential conditions influencing democracy's performance, only include these 
1 The hypothesis that authoritarian rule is beneficial to economic growth was named after the former president 
of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew (Sen 1999b). 
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requisites as simple controls in their regression models and not interacted with some institutional 
measure. 
In this paper, we want to extend the latter strand of research in the following ways: First, we 
theoretically discuss why democracy is supposed to have a positive impact on human develop-
ment. Linked to this field of interest is the question whether democracies, besides their intrinsic 
importance for the development process, fulfill a constructive and instrumental role giving peo-
ple the opportunity to express, to form and aggregate their preferences and thus to steer public 
action in an efficient and effective manner (Sen 1999a). Particularly, we base our argumentation 
on the redistributive aspect including public goods provision, not the property rights aspect of 
democracy. We argue that with respect to the quantitative as well as to the qualitative dimension 
of redistribution and public goods provision, any democracy will perform better than an other-
wise equal autocracy; thereby, we rely on implications of the median voter theory and arguments 
provided by Sen. Although redistribution is often seen as a disturbing factor leading to ineffi-
ciencies, we want to clarify why it is redistribution in democracies that makes a difference in 
non-income human development outcomes compared to autocratic regimes. We also empirically 
try to find evidence of whether living in a democratic or an autocratic political system makes a 
difference in the level of education and health, which we take as proxies for non-income human 
development. 
Second, we theoretically identify and empirically investigate the prerequisites for the functioning 
of democracy as such with respect to the provision of public goods and services that foster 
human development.2 This allows us to account for heterogeneity in human development across 
democratic regimes. 
Third, we include the time dimension of the data and all countries on that data is available into 
our empirical analysis to fully exploit all the information which is available. 
Our results indicate that democracy is favorable for human development even after controlling 
for the level of economic development. But contrary to the theoretical reasoning there is no clear 
evidence for the factors that according to the literature are supposed to influence democracy's 
performance. It seems to be democracy itself - rather independent from the circumstances -
which has a positive effect on human development. It is in particular remarkable that democracy's 
performance seems not to depend on a certain level of economic development. 
5.2 The Political Economy of Democracy and Human 
Development 
The following remarks serve to clarify the relationship between political institutions and human 
development. Recurrence on institutionalist theories provides a link from political institutions to 
the living standard of the population. This link is given, foremost, by the redistributive policies 
an institutional system produces. The median voter theory predicts that democratic systems are 
characterized by a higher level of redistribution than autocracies. Consequently, the median 
2Consequently, we do not try to explain democratization but the dependence of democracy's performance upon 
other factors once it is in place. 
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voter theory gives insights into the quantitative dimension of redistribution. Arguments provided 
by Amartya Sen capture the qualitative part of redistribution and permit to extend the median 
voter theory by stating that democratic institutions make redistribution more responsive to the 
needs of the society, i.e. that redistribution translates into a public spending for transfers, goods 
and services that increase the wealth of the society. To complete our theoretical discussion, we 
address the issue that the fulfillment of the predictions made by the median voter theory and Sen 
depends on several requisites that influence any democracy's performance. 
5.2.1 How Can Political Institutions Influence Human Development? 
Institutions attract a lot of attention in the mostly interdisciplinary studies of differences in the 
wealth of nations. Questions range from institutional effects on the one-dimensional perspective 
of economic development to the multidimensional view on human development. However, there 
still seems to be a bias in favor of the economic side of the coin (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall 
and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; La Porta et al. 2004).3 This reflects the prefer-
ence, which is probably justified, for the economy as the major driving force of the development 
process and the resulting focus on the property rights angle of institutions. We want to complete 
this picture and focus on the redistributive side of institutions and the non-monetary components 
of human development. 
With regard to institutions, the existing literature leaves the impression that there is not enough 
precision concerning the term "institution" itself. There is a big use of performance indica-
tors measuring the extent to which certain institutional systems function, e.g. when it comes 
to political stability or governance issues (Gradstein and Milanovic, 2004).4 Such performance 
indicators then are often mixed up with public policies. However, both the performance and 
the policies are the output of underlying structures and procedures as well as contextual fac-
tors. These underlying (formal) structures and procedures can be subsumed under the heading 
political system. This is what we understand by political institutions. 
According to the rational choice strand of the new institutionalism in political science or the 
field of new institutional economics and political economy, political institutions make the rules 
which govern the political game (e.g. Peters, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). They do 
not only determine via electoral rules the actors and preferences which can access the political 
arena and get heard. They also provide the means to aggregate those preferences by establishing 
procedures for decision-making and distributing political power, i.e. the right to decide (Pers-
son, 2002). The common output of institutions and preferences are policies. Although actors 
and other environmental constellations may change over time, policies in general will reflect the 
political institutions that produced them (Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Peters, 1999). We distin-
guish between two types of policies that may be favorable to human development: policies for 
the protection of property rights and policies for redistribution. 
3 A famous controversy in this context is the Geography vs. Institutions debate in the explanation and prediction 
of economic development (Acemoglu et al. 2002; Grimm and Klasen, 2008). 
4 See for example the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
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Policies for the protection of property rights encourage economic investment and contribute to 
economic development and economic growth (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2002). Growth is assumed, 
under certain conditions, to increase the welfare of the population by reducing poverty (Klasen, 
2004 ). Policies for redistribution have an equalizing impact on the distribution of wealth in a so-
ciety. Especially through broad-based programs and the provision of public goods and services, 
market failures shall be compensated and normative, social optima be achieved. The matching 
of society's and an individual's needs with an adequate redistribution scheme and an appropriate 
public provision of goods and services provides a more direct link between political institutions 
and human development than property rights protection. Of course, one might argue as we al-
ready mentioned in the introduction that there might be a trade-off between growth-enhancing 
property rights protection and equalizing, market-correcting redistribution. Nevertheless, the fo-
cus of this paper will be on policies with a redistributing character which aim at better health 
and education for the population as a whole and especially for those groups - the poor - who 
would otherwise have only limited access to these goods as these are not sufficiently provided by 
markets. 
If we assume that via these channels policies will affect the level of human development, if we 
especially focus on redistributive policies and moreover, if policies mirror the political system 
in which society is steered according to certain political decisions, then the following question 
emerges: Which political systems are more appropriate to produce market-correcting redistribu-
tive policies that will additionally match the needs of society and therefore will advance human 
development? 
The answer is democracy. Democracy is conceived as a political system whose structures and 
procedures permit the rule of the people. Of importance are free and repeated elections, political 
competition, rule of law, political and civil liberties. These component parts frame public de-
bate and deliberation that deal with the management of society. Carrying forward our reasoning, 
democratic political systems are assumed to be the most appropriate systems to ensure a redistri-
bution that fulfills societal demands.5 Although redistribution from the rich to the poor and vice 
versa exists in both autocratic and democratic systems, the following theoretical arguments make 
us believe that redistribution from the rich to the poor is more pronounced and set at a higher 
level in democracies.6 One of the most famous theoretical arguments is the model of Meltzer 
and Richard (1981). The median voter hypothesis states that in democratic governments the me-
dian voter is the decisive voter. The more his income falls short of the average income of all 
voters, the higher the tax rate, i.e. redistribution he will decide. Therefore, government spending 
should be larger and social services more extensive in democratic regimes - if the majority of the 
voting public lives at the bottom of the income distribution and only a small part enjoy richness 
(Keefer and Khemani, 2005). In contrast, in authoritarian systems, the distribution of wealth 
does not play a decisive role. All or a substantial part of the electorate is excluded from the 
decision-making process, and this is precisely the point to avoid the redistributive consequences 
of democracy. As a result, the average size of the public sector remains quite small (Boix, 2001) 
5Democracies are considered to perform best on both dimensions: property rights protection and redistribution. 
Whether the one or the other is more important depends on people's preferences and the formal and informal face 
of the considered democracy. 
6See for example Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) for an empirical study finding evidence for this linkage. 
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although there are examples of autocracies with a commitment to a relatively large public sector 
and universal well-being. 
The fact that there is more redistribution in democratic regimes does not mean that redistribution 
is aligned with societal demands. In other words, voting alone does not solve the aggregation 
problem resulting from different individual preferences. Thus, a second question related to the 
qualitative dimension of redistribution emerges: Why are democratic governments more respon-
sive to the needs of the citizenry compared to autocratic ones? According to Sen (1999a,b), 
democracy - behind its "intrinsic" value - is of eminent importance for the process of develop-
ment because of the "constructive" and "instrumental" role it plays in the formation and aggrega-
tion of values, needs and preferences and their translation into well-designed policies benefiting 
the society. Political and civil liberties - for example those related to free speech, public debate 
and criticism, as constituent parts of a democratic regime - permit the formation of preferences 
and values as well as access to the relevant information. Consequently, a better understanding of 
societal needs is possible. Democratic procedures then facilitate the transmission of these needs 
into the political arena where decision power is distributed amongst legitimate representatives of 
the society as a whole.7 
However, in the "pursuit of political objectivity" and through the facilitation of "public reason-
ing", democracy not only helps to construct policies that are matched to the needs of its citizens 
(Sen 2004 ). It is also instrumental and protective because control mechanisms such as free 
and repeated, competitive elections and the compliance with the rule of law principle reduce 
discretionary and corrupt behavior of those representatives who hold political power. Democ-
racy provides the incentives to create responsibility and accountability that induce political-
administrative leaders to listen and to act on behalf of the society they represent (Sen l 999a,b ). 
In an autocratic regime a usually small, ruling elite dictates the will of the people from above. 
This is frequently accompanied by a repression of the political opposition and the prohibition of 
free expression and opinion impeding the conceptualization of the volonte generale. The state 
apparatus is (mis-)used in favor of the welfare of the ruling elite. Political measures with a re-
distributing character increasing the welfare of the bottom quantiles of society are implemented 
not because of institutional structures but either due to ideological reasons and/or to a level that 
will help autocrats remain in power and to increase their own wealth (Olson, 1993; McGuire and 
Olson, 1996). Responsiveness, representation, accountability and the selection of competent po-
litical and administrative staff thus are uncommon in autocratic regimes (Besley and Kudamatsu, 
2006). Summarizing, whereas democracies quantitatively and qualitatively perform better than 
autocracies in terms of redistribution, there is no clear relation between inequality and societal 
needs on the one hand and redistribution on the other hand in autocracies, except for those, gen-
erally socialist ones, with a special commitment to universal welfare. In general, this leads to a 
lower level of human development in autocratic systems. 
7Tue latter means that otherwise disadvantaged groups, whether they are minorities or a broad mass of poor 
people in a developing country, get a voice and the opportunity to be heard and represented. In cases of direct 
democracy or democracy at a local level, these groups even decide for themselves. 
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5.2.2 What Determines Public Service Provision Especially in 
Democracies? 
The formal existence of democracy does not guarantee that it functions in the idealized man-
ner described above. Democratic regimes might display a lot of heterogeneity concerning the 
benefits for human development. This is the case when certain factors impede or enable that the 
relationships predicted by the median voter theory or Sen's theory can be observed. These factors 
then hamper or foster the performance of democracy with regards to the satisfaction of societal 
needs. Problems could arise if for certain reasons - located either at the agenda setting, the pol-
icy formulation, the implementation or evaluation phase - the allocation of public expenditures 
is inefficient.8 What are the reasons for an ineffective allocation of public resources, especially 
in democracies? Or more general, what are those factors that will influence the operation of a 
democratic regime either in a positive or in a negative direction? 
Our approach to explain heterogeneity in any democracy's performance follows the suggestion 
by Keefer and Khemani (2005) and hence differs from other studies that focus more on the 
pre-conditions for democracy or democratization (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Glaeser et al., 2007).9 Fol-
lowing our theoretical reasoning, the necessary timing of the presence of the respective factors 
is treated here as simultaneous. Their interaction with democracy at one point in time influences 
the output, the policies in form of public goods' provision, and the outcome, the level of human 
development. 
First, as redistribution and the provision of public goods depend upon the fact whether there is 
anything to redistribute and to invest in public goods, the performance of a democratic system 
will be the better the higher the level of economic development is. So the positive effect of 
democracies on public goods provision will be intensified by the level of economic development. 
Second, if citizens are ill-informed, this may lead to insufficient participation, which would 
be necessary for public reasoning and the expression of 'qualified' needs'. As a result, the 
quality of responsive government manifesting itself in policies that reflect society's demands 
and needs decreases. Moreover, accountability suffers from information constraints because 
voters cannot control politicians' behavior. Education IO is one of the important factors 11 as 
it has a potential to alleviate any information problem. Education in this context is not taken 
8Because poor people are highly dependent on public action as they cannot invest their own (nonexistent) private 
resources, they suffer the most from ineffective government in terms of redistribution and service provision (Keefer 
and Khemani, 2005). 
9We do not consider the question whether a country has to be prepared for democracy or whether it is a democ-
racy which lifts the country up to a certain level of development. 
10We leave out cultural factors here as they are hard to measure. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize the 
people's values as equally important as socioeconomic resources and civil and political rights. According to these 
authors, culture provides the link between economic development and democratic freedom. Without certain values 
like "human autonomy" or "self-expression values", fostering a priority on self-made choices, human development 
might not be possible (lnglehart and Welzel, 2005). Moreover, such values are dependent upon a certain level of 
socioeconomic development. We assume, although this is to be questioned, that the more education people have the 
more enlightened they are and the more freedom they demand to live the life they value. 
11 Other factors might be a well developed media sector and accountable and institutionalized parties that overtake 
political education tasks (see Keefer and Khemani, 2005). But it can be easily argued that without a certain level of 
broad-based education, a media sector will not develop because of a lack of demand (for the role of the media see 
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as an intrinsic component of human development that we want to explain, but as a means to 
human development. It is not only in itself a precondition for a higher living standard because it 
positively affects earnings, health and so on. It is also found to be a requirement for democracies 
to develop and to persist. Moreover, one can suppose that education leading to conscientious 
participation raises the quality of democracy. The latter may come to the fore in a more efficient 
and effective provision of public goods (Lipset, 1959; Glaeser et al., 2007; Keefer and Khemani, 
2005). 
Social fragmentation can be another factor disturbing the functioning of a democratic system 
measured by the public goods it provides. Research has found that social fragmentation or, to be 
more concise, ethnic diversity leads to collective action problems, increased patronage as well 
as clientelism and in the end to an under-provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina 
and Ferrara, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Within democratic systems, social fragmentation 
may pose problems because mechanisms which would hold the government accountable and 
responsible are undermined. In socially heterogeneous settings, governments are rewarded on the 
basis of identity and not on governmental performance (Keefer and Khemani, 2005). Moreover, 
social fragmentation leads to political fragmentation that from a certain threshold value can result 
in increasing co-operation problems (Collier, 2001). 
The last factor that is in line with our quantity-redistribution argument is income inequality, 
characterized by a distribution of income where the median income is much smaller than the 
average income. 12 Hence, the majority of people live at the lower bound of the distribution 
whereas only a few benefit from being rich. The reasoning behind the effects of inequality on 
human development can be twofold. First, such income inequality can induce inequalities in 
human development because in more unequal societies, less people can afford to live a healthy 
life and to spend their money on education. This effect should even be higher in autocracies 
where service provision according to our argumentation does not function well. Democratic 
political systems should compensate the negative effect of income inequality. The higher the 
income inequality, the larger the distance of the median voter's income to the average income. 
Following the median voter hypothesis, more redistribution will be demanded. Thus, along 
with a higher income inequality, the redistribution effect of democracy increases. Public service 
provision will be at a higher level that may result in better human development outcomes. 
5.2.3 Summary and Working Hypotheses 
Summarizing the theoretical arguments above, we can state that democratic regimes in compar-
ison to autocratic ones are expected to produce a higher rate of redistribution and thus to higher 
public expenditures. Additionally, public spending priorities in democracies reflect the needs of 
the society more than do the ones in autocracies. Execution of public budgets will be in those 
sectors where public demand is most obvious. Moreover, democratic control mechanisms will 
Besley and Burgess (2002)). The same is supposed to hold for the institutionalization of parties and accountability 
issues. 
12The argument that the median voter is farther away from the mean when a society is more unequal is true for 
right-skewed distributions. This is usually the case for the national income distributions, which are quite close to 
Jog-normal distributions. 
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assure the implementation of policies so that a high degree of compliance with laws, directives 
and orders is reached. Hence, public action can translate into the desired human development 
outcomes, for example a better health status of the population or a lower illiteracy rate. But 
the performance of democracies will vary according to the specific circumstances. We assume 
that the level of income, education, social fragmentation and the level of income inequality all 
affect the level of the provision of public goods and human development in a democratic system. 
Therefore, the following general hypotheses can be derived: 
a) Democratic political systems will yield better results in human development than autocracies, 
independently from the level of economic development. 
b) The positive effect of democracies on public goods provision will be intensified by the level 
of economic development. 
c) The positive effect of democracy on human development will be higher, the higher the level 
of education in a society. 
d) Social fragmentation lowers the positive impact of democracies on human development. The 
more socially diverse a country is the more difficult it is to provide broad-based services even 
in democracies. 
e) The redistribution effect of democracy compensates the negative effect of income inequality 
on human development. Furthermore, the higher the level of inequality, the bigger the positive 
effect of democracy on human development. 
5.3 Empirical Links between Democracy and Human 
Development 
5.3.1 Empirical Implementation 
To quantify human development, we focus on the non-income components of UNDP's Human 
Development Index and consequently use UNDP's data on life expectancy at birth and on lit-
eracy rates. Life expectancy at birth is measured in years, whereas the literacy rate is an index 
value ranging from O to 100. We choose education and health as both aspects are direct determi-
nants of capabilities and as they both influence the freedom to choose any lifestyle. Education as 
well as health raises productivity and the ability to convert income and resources into the favored 
way of life (Sen, 2003). The third dimension of human development, namely income, is not of 
interest for this paper, since detailed literature on the relation between democracy and economic 
development is already available. Our data on political institutions, especially on democracy, is 
taken from the Polity IV Project of the Center for International Development and Conflict Man-
agement at the University of Maryland. This dataset includes the Polity2 score ranging from 
10 (highly democratic) to -10 (highly autocratic), while a zero score indicates a state between 
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autocracy and democracy which we consider as not being democratic. 13 Following Besley and 
Kudamatsu (2006), we take the fraction of democratic years over the past five years as our mea-
sure for democracy (demexp). As an alternative measure for democracy we calculate the average 
Polity2 score over the past five years (mpol). The consideration of a period of five years cap-
tures the effect of democratic experience and reduces the uncertainty concerning the length of 
the delay until a change in the political system affects human development. Another reason for 
the five year period is that the values of life expectancy and literacy are not updated annually but 
roughly every five years. Nevertheless, one might argue that it is certainly arbitrary to take five 
years and not ten, but with this choice, we proxy election periods, we are in line with the existing 
literature (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006) and our study is therefore comparable. Having different 
democracy measures is rather important as a check of robustness. 
Other variables we expect to have an impact on human development or that describe possible 
conditions under which democracy affects human development are the following: GDP per capita 
PPP in constant prices 14 from the Penn World Tables 6.2; Gini coefficients15 from the WIDER 
dataset with improvements in terms of comparability across countries and time by Griin and 
Klasen (2008); a measure of ethnic fractionalization 16 as proxy for social fragmentation from 
Alesina et al. (2003) which is constant over time17 . Since education is also a factor influencing 
the performance of democracy, literacy rates are also used as an explanatory variable in our panel 
analysis for life expectancy but neglected in the analysis of literacy itself. As our additional 
control variables we consider as most important whether a country experienced some conflict 
in the period under observation and whether a high percentage of population is suffering from 
HIV/AIDS. To measure war, we take data from the UCDP/PRIO intrastate conflict onset dataset, 
1946-2006. We choose the variable warinci2 that measures the incidence of intrastate war and 
is coded I in all country years with at least one active war. 18 For HIV/AIDS, we take adult 
(15-49 years) HIV prevalence rates from the 2008 Report on the global AIDS epidemic from 
UNAIDS/WHO. Data coverage over time and countries lead us to the decision to create a variable 
that takes the value I when a country has a prevalence rate over 5 per cent in the year 2003. To 
13 According to the Polity2 measure, a system can be classified as democratic if three interdependent elements 
exist: I) competitiveness of participation, institutions and procedures allow citizens to express their political pref-
erences; 2) openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive, so that 
the executive power is institutionally constraint; 3) civil liberties. The last element as well as rule of law, system of 
checks and balances, freedom of the press etc. is not coded in the index as the latter are performance indicators of 
democratic regimes. Autocracies are defined vice versa. 
14 US$, base year: 2000. 
15 Gini coefficients are not available for every year. We therefore use a simple moving average between available 
observations to complete the dataset. 
16The ethnic fractionalization measure renders the probability that two individuals selected at random from a 
population are members of different groups. It is calculated with data on language and race using the following 
formula FRACj = 1- [:':,1 sfj• where s;j is the proportion of group i = L. .. ,Nin country j going from complete 
homogeneity (an index of 0) to complete heterogeneity (an index of I). For more details see Alesina et al. (2003). 
17 According to Alesina et al. (2003) the assumption of stable group shares is not a problem as examples of 
changes in ethnic fractionalization are rare. At least over the time-horizon of 20 to 30 years, time persistence can be 
assumed. 
18War is defined by more than 1000 battle deaths. As intrastate wars are more frequent than interstate wars, we 
decided to take the intrastate war variable. 
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take the heterogeneity between autocracies into account we introduce a simple socialism dummy 
to represent autocracies with a commitment to universal welfare. The dummy takes the value 
one for all Eastern European countries until 1990, Vietnam until 1980, China until 1975, and for 
Cuba and North Korea until today. 
Unfortunately, the available data on public expenditures were not sufficient for our purposes. 
Such data would have enriched our analysis as we could have examined the channels that democ-
racy takes to affect human development. We suspect that democracy causes different priorities 
in public expenditures compared to autocracies. Therefore, increases in public expenditures on 
health and education can be decomposed into two components: an increase due to higher total 
expenditures and an increase due to different priorities in government spending. While the first 
source is mainly driven by economic growth, we expect democracy to be a main driver of the sec-
ond source. As mentioned above, we were unable to gather sound data for relative government 
spending for the given period. Only for the more recent years does the Government Finance 
Statistics of the IMF include sufficient information concerning these issues. Thus, neither the 
public expenditures' path of causation nor the channel of private spending can be investigated 
here due to data restrictions. We must therefore rely on the theoretical argumentation that under-
pins our empirical analysis. 
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
First, it is worthwhile to take a look at the densities of life expectancy and literacy for democra-
cies and autocracies separately (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). We use kernel density estimators for this 
purpose and apply boundary corrections at O and l 00 for the literacy rate and at the minimum 
and maximum values for life expectancy. While in democracies, both for life expectancy and 
literacy the mass of the distribution tends to the right hand side, there seems to be a group of au-
tocracies with a low level and another one with a high level of life expectancy and literacy each. 
The same pattern can be observed in Tables E. l to E.8 where we classified countries according 
to three categories: low, middle and high income; autocracy and democracy; low, middle and 
high life expectancy or literacy rates. 19 On average, we observe that democracies have a higher 
life expectancy and a higher literacy rate than autocracies. Exceptions are democracies with low 
life expectancies, mainly due to the HIV/AIDS tragedy in big parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Con-
sidering the rich group of autocracies especially in 2000, it is striking that virtually all of them 
are oil states. This indicates, at least to some extent, that autocracies have problems catching up 
with the top of the income distribution, as long as they do not control a large amount of such an 
important resource as oil. But what is more important for our study is the fact that although these 
countries show a high level of income, whether caused by natural resources or not, they display 
lower life expectancies and lower literacy rates than their democratic counterparts. 
19To define the groups of low, middle and high life expectancy or literacy rates we computed quantiles of life 
expectancy and literacy. The income groups are defined according to Essay 2. 
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Figure 5 .1: Cross-country distribution of life expectancy. Solid line: Kernel density estimator for 
countries being democratic in the given year. Dashed line: Kernel density estimator for countries 
being autocratic in the given year. 1970: 41 democracies and 97 autocracies; 1980: 44 democra-
cies and 107 autocracies; 1990: 67 democracies and 85 autocracies; 2000: 97 democracies and 
58 autocracies. 
5.3.3 Panel Analysis 
In a simple model, we try to explain life expectancy and literacy with our measures of democracy 
controlling for GDP. GDP is lagged for one period to reduce the apparent problem of endogene-
ity. Additionally to the measuring of democracy and economic development, we include the 
literacy rate as a proxy of the population's ability to articulate their needs in the political arena, 
to control politicians' activities and as a proxy of the population's priority for private spending 
on education and health. We also lag literacy for one period to reduce endogeneity problems. 
We only include education and its interaction with democracy in the model with life expectancy 
as our dependent variable. In line with our theoretical reasoning, we incorporate the lagged Gini 
coefficient to measure the effect of income inequality and ethnic fractionalization as a proxy for 
social fragmentation. 
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Figure 5.2: Cross-country distribution of literacy rates. Solid line: Kernel density estimator for 
countries being democratic in the given year. Dashed line: Kernel density estimator for countries 
being autocratic in the given year. 1970: 23 democracies and 77 autocracies; 1980: 25 democ-
racies and 87 autocracies; 1990: 44 democracies and 68 autocracies; 2000: 70 democracies and 
45 autocracies. 
As pointed out, all variables describe conditions which potentially hamper or foster the function-
ing of democracy in terms of addressing the needs of the population. Thus, we are interested in 
their interaction with democracy on the one hand. On the other hand, we want to know whether 
they have an effect on human development independently from the political system. Following 
Cronbach (1987)20 , we center the variables which are used for the modeling of the interaction 
terms over the cross-section to deal with problems of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, we add a set of dummies for global regions21 as well as year dummies to all re-
gression. The region dummies should capture much of the geographical, political and historical 
heterogeneity across the world. The inclusion of period effects allows us to capture overall up-
ward trends in literacy and life expectancy that for example could be explained by technological 
20See also Jaccard et al. (1990). 
21 Following the World Bank definition. 
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Table 5.1: Panel analysis for all countries (dependent variable: life expectancy) 
DEMEXP MPOL 
Democracy 1.238*** 1.112*** 0.891 *** 0.845*** 0.089*** 0.101*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 
(0.136) (0.169) (0.139) (0.145) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0IO) 
GDP(-1) 4.140*** 3.982*** 3.585*** 3.601*** 3.813*** 3.803*** 3.544*** 3.867*** 
(0.121) (0.165) (0.118) (0.161) (0.145) (0.135) (0.144) (0.114) 
Gini(-1) 0.878 1.185 -0.696 0.019 1.155 1.065 -0.143 -0.178 
(0.719) (0.775) (0.499) (0.715) (0.716) (0.597) (0.694) (0.599) 
Literacy (-1) 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.214*** 0.210*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.215*** 0.201*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Fractionalization -2.100*** -2.474"'** -2.233*** -2.801 *** -1.919*** -2.407*** -1.895*** -2.450*** 
(0.420) (0.543) (0.509) (0.531) (0.461) (0.493) (0.512) (0.484) 
War -0.635*** -0.644*** -0.691*** -0.675"""* -0.651*** -0.543*** -0.825*** -0.566*** 
(0.163) (0.165) (0.163) (0.162) (0.158) (0.154) (0.141) (0.156) 
Socialism 2.236*** 2.039*** 2.197*** 2.370*** 
(0.600) (0.580) (0.562) (0.552) 
Aids*l975 0.240 0.192 0.305 -0.187 0.605 0.559 0.619 0.264 
(0.599) (0.618) (0.601) (0.633) (0.575) (0.617) (0.590) (0.644) 
Aids*l 980 0.420 0.362 0.445 0.050 0.763 0.759 0.770 0.533 
(0.601) (0.623) (0.606) (0.633) (0.580) (0.625) (0.596) (0.647) 
Aids*l 985 0.064 -0.012 -0.012 -0.285 0.312 0.295 0.263 0.125 
(0.616) (0.642) (0.622) (0.646) (0.598) (0.645) (0.615) (0.660) 
Aids* 1990 -2.362*** -2.421*** -2.554*** -2.603*** -2.261 *** -2.180** -2.371 *** -2.235** 
(0.652) (0.686) (0661) (0.683) (0.638) (0.690) (0.656) (0.698) 
Aids*l995 -8.044*** -8.128*** -8.376*** -8.535*** -8.116*** -8.067*** -8.249*** -8.205*** 
(0.701) (0.727) (0.715) (0.724) (0.693) (0.740) (0.712) (0.749) 
Aids*2000 -15.595"'** -15.681*** -15.786*** -16.031*** -15.749*** -15.566*** -15.704*** -15.554*** 
(0.776) (0.812) (0.795) (0.800) (0.777) (0.839) (0.795) (0.837) 
Year 1980 0.838*** 0.826*** 0.859*** 0.832*** 0.822*** 0.808*** 0.840*** 0.798*** 
(0.066) (0.062) (0.069) (0.058) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.064) 
Year 1985 1.897*** 1.845*** 1.889*** 1.849*** 1.861 *** 1.809*** 1.871 *** 1.825*** 
(0.088) (0.084) (0.094) (0.078) (0.088) (0.090) (0.093) (0.087) 
Year 1990 2.374*** 2.304*** 2.412*** 2.347*** 2.355*** 2.244*** 2.393*** 2.293*** 
(0.l03) (0.099) (0.111) (0.093) (0.l03) (0.l04) (0.110) (0.l02) 
Year 1995 2.908*** 2.823*** 2.968*** 2.830*** 2.894*** 2.715*** 2.939*** 2.752*** 
(0.115) (0.l09) (0.124) (0.100) (0.117) (0.111) (0.126) (0.111) 
Year2000 3.332*** 3.251 *** 3.355*** 3.258*** 3.316*** 3.169*** 3.290*** 3.169*** 
(0.127) (0.123) (0.140) (0.111) (0.131) (0.119) (0.138) (0.117) 
Dem.*GDP -0.132 -0.073 0.037* 0.039* 
(0.265) (0.254) (0.017) (0.016) 
Dem.*Literacy -0.008 -0.013 -0.001* -0.002••· 
(0.009) (0.0IO) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dem.*Gini 2.251 5.682*** 0.270** 0.450*** 
(1.412) (1.295) (0.088) (0.070) 
Dem.*Fract. -2.674"'** -2.526*** -0.142** -0.136** 
(0.762) (0.711) (0.050) (0.050) 
constant 60.442*** 60.687*** 61.129*** 61.235*** 60.758*** 60.412*** 61.260*** 60.803*** 
(0.200) (0.228) (0.233) (0.229) (0.224) (0.220) (0.236) (0.218) 
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 
• p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ••• p<0.001; dwmrues for global regions mcluded andJomtly s1grufficant 
improvements (Pritchett and Summers 1996). Moreover, we control in both regressions for war, 
because it destroys lives as well as infrastructure that would otherwise provide health and edu-
cation services. Additionally, we control for HIV/ AIDS in the life expectancy regressions. The 
AIDS dummy variable is interacted with the year dummies because HIV/AIDS was more of a 
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Table 5.2: Panel analysis for non-OECD countries (dependent variable: life expectancy) 
DEMEXP MPOL 
Democracy 1.159*** l .202*** 1.075*** 0.934*** 0.078*** 0.098*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 
(0.166) (0.205) (0.153) (0.186) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) 
GDP(-1) 3.334*"'* 3.339*** 3.738*** 3.438*** 3.304*** 3.495••· 3.580*** 3.594*** 
(0.214) (0.227) (0.115) (0.194) (0.206) (0.194) (0.134) (0.165) 
Gini(-1) -0.785 0.098 -1.926** -0.935 -0.683 0.859 -1.342** -O.D40 
(0.820) (0.893) (0.603) (0.942) (0.855) (0.888) (0.489) (0.782) 
Literacy (-1) 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Fractionalization -1.708* -3.379*** -2.078** -3.757*** -2.632*** -3.161*** -2.029** -3.396*** 
(0.745) (0.725) (0.668) (0.692) (0.785) (0.801) (0.668) (0.743) 
War -0.797*** -0.786*** -0.831 *** -0.745*** -0.903*** -0.779*** -0.991**"' -0.702*** 
(0.159) (0.165) (0.164) (0.167) (0.128) (0.172) (0.130) (0.169) 
Socialism 5.057*** 4.985*** 4.970*** 5.229*** 
(0.831) (0.853) (0.852) (0.890) 
Aids* 1975 0.932 0.657 0.938 0.209 1.359' 1.070 1.258' 0.672 
(0.664) (0.675) (0.640) (0.681) (0.635) (0.668) (0.625) (0.679) 
Aids*1980 0.828 0.563 0.955 0.276 1.315* 0.964 1.314' 0.724 
(0.665) (0.680) (0.643) (0.680) (0.639) (0.677) (0.630) (0.684) 
Aids'l985 0.164 -0.076 0.421 -0.203 0.613 0.215 0.706 0.099 
(0.677) (0.695) (0.656) (0.690) (0.656) (0.697) (0.646) (0.698) 
Aids* 1990 -2.477*** -2.586*** -2.124** -2.570*** -2.086** -2.426** -1.920** -2.399** 
(0.709) (0.732) (0.690) (0.721) (0.692) (0.739) (0.683) (0.735) 
Aids*l995 -8.181*** -8.200*** -7.670*** -8.204*** -7.804*** -8.031 *** -7.506"'** -8.055*** 
(0.760) (0.776) (0.744) (0.761) (0.748) (0.788) (0.741) (0.781) 
Aids*2000 -15.401*** -15.481*** -14.983*** -15.576*** -15.138*** -15.319*** -14.882*** -15.250*** 
(0.830) (0.854) (0.822) (0.834) (0.826) (0.885) (0.828) (0.870) 
Year 1980 1.186*** 1.200*** 1.113*** 1.103*** 1.172*** 1.214*** 1.086*** 1.091 *** 
(0.115) (0.121) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.123) (0.116) (0.117) 
Year 1985 2.476*** 2.507*** 2.356*** 2.361*** 2.509*** 2.582*** 2.361 *** 2.395*** 
(0.158) (0.164) (0.159) (0.158) (0.159) (0.170) (0.161) (0.161) 
Year 1990 3.195*** 3. 163*** 3.031 *** 3.009*** 3.247*** 3.252*** 3.042*** 3.048*** 
(0.192) (0.197) (0.194) (0.192) (0.193) (0.205) (0.196) (0.196) 
Year 1995 3.606*** 3.542*** 3.369*** 3.318*** 3.648*** 3.615*** 3.369*** 3.353*** 
(0.224) (0.229) (0.227) (0.224) (0.226) (0.240) (0.229) (0.228) 
Year 2000 3.880*** 3.849*** 3.715*** 3.711*** 4.009*** 3.965*** 3.760*** 3.721*** 
(0.240) (0.244) (0.233) (0.241) (0.242) (0.252) (0.231) (0.236) 
Dern.*GDP -0.329 -0.381 0.003 O.Ql5 
(0.288) (0.279) (0.020) (0.019) 
Dem.*Literacy -0.002 -0.009 -0.000 -0.002* 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dem.*Gini 2.377 4.354** 0.091 0.290' 
(1.612) (1.659) (0.116) (0.123) 
Dern.*Fract. -3.057** -3.166*** -0.146 -0.139 
(0.968) (0.925) (0.076) (0.075) 
constant 58.833*** 59.052*** 59.576*** 60.221 *** 59.674*** 59.194*** 59.879*** 60.407*** 
(0.325) (0.326) (0.219) (0.337) (0.323) (0.344) (0.224) (0.320) 
N 469 469 469 469 469 469 469 469 
• p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ••• p<0.00 l; dumm1es for global reg10ns mcluded and J0mtly s1grufficant 
problem for the more recent years in the sample and less in the earlier ones. A socialism dummy 
aims to capture heterogeneity across autocracies and an egalitarian tendency in those regimes. 
We estimate the model for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 (and the 
preceding five year periods), as both literacy rate and life expectancy are not updated annually but 
roughly every five years, while being interpolated in the other years. Pre-estimation diagnostics 
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Table 5.3: Panel analysis for non-OECD countries (dependent variable: literacy rate) 
DEMEXP MPOL 
Democracy 1.643*** 1.169** 1.261*** 1.691*** 0.300*** 0.055 0.081 ** 0.059* 
(0.374) (0.414) (0.329) (0.420) (0.018) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) 
GDP(-1) 11.685*** 10.358*** 11.101 *"'* 10.320*** 11.499*** 11.098*** 11.645*** 11.260*** 
(0.451) (0.494) (0.453) (0.502) (0.471) (0.498) (0.441) (0.441) 
Gini(-1) 5.010*"' -5.292** -2.277 -4.329 6.463** -1.452 -0.991 -2.428 
(1.570) (1.828) (1.980) (2.246) (2.379) (1.970) (2.164) (1.566) 
Fractionalization -8.857**"' -8.748*** -12.101*** -12.087*** -3.516** -10.025*** -11.158*** -12.723*** 
(1.695) (1.903) (1.617) (2.074) (1.338) (2.103) (1.594) (1.817) 
Socialism 8.627*** 6.947** 10.897*** 7.046*"' 
(2.237) (2.283) (2.175) (2.255) 
War 0.221 -0.311 -0.017 -0.304 -0.581* -0.060 -0.015 -0.099 
(0.350) (0.351) (0.350) (0.330) (0.232) (0.369) (0.372) (0.380) 
Year 1980 2.896*** 2.917*** 2.806*** 2.917*** 3.033*** 2.843*** 2.799*** 2.761*** 
(0.293) (0.286) (0.276) (0.284) (0.316) (0.286) (0.274) (0.278) 
Year 1985 6.613*** 6.724*** 6.396*** 6.620*** 6.611 *** 6.649*** 6.463*** 6.515*"'* 
(0.393) (0.385) (0.369) (0.382) (0.422) (0.385) (0.364) (0.375) 
Year 1990 9.384*** 9.618*** 9.229*** 9.455*** 9.316*** 9.437*** 9.261 *** 9.359*** 
(0.469) (0.465) (0.440) (0.462) (0.502) (0.464) (0.434) (0.449) 
Year 1995 11.841 *** 12.214*** 11.633*** ll.928*U 11.031*** 11.871*** 11.624*** 11.633*** 
(0.550) (0.541) (0.515) (0.542) (0.580) (0.540) (0.511) (0.520) 
Year2000 13.861*** 14.185*** 13.878*** 13.801 ••• 12.857*** 13.890*** 13.643*** 13.647*** 
(0.563) (0.552) (0.525) (0.573) (0.580) (0.557) (0.506) (0.519) 
Dem.*GDP -0.935* -0.250 -0.074 -0.065* 
(0.466) (0.492) (0.038) (0.033) 
Dem.*Fract. 0.867 1.988 0.106 0.129 
(1.765) (1.741) (0.144) (0.133) 
Dem.*Gini -10.606*** -10.646*** -0.451 -0.173 
(2.846) (3.064) (0.232) (0.185) 
_cons 81.373*** 81.681*** 82.580*** 79.570*** 81.667*** 82.503*** 83.806*** 82.878*** 
(0.699) (0.589) (0.564) (0.710) (0.615) (0.773) (0.518) (0.572) 
N 526 526 526 526 526 526 526 526 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, dummies for global regions included andJomtly s1gmfficant 
indicate that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation have to be dealt with. We therefore find the 
estimation of our model with a cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with panel specific 
AR(l) to be the most appropriate, addressing both issues simultaneously (stata command: xtgls). 
In case of life expectancy, we run separate regressions for non-OECD countries and the entire 
sample. For literacy, only the regression for the sub-sample of non-OECD makes sense as all 
OECD countries have a constant level of literacy of exactly 99 percent in the UNDP data. The 
results are presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.3. 
The results for the control variables are as expected in all specifications. The coefficients of the 
year dummies are positive and highly significant for all years. The numbers are continuously 
increasing over time and are thus capturing overall progress for human development due to for 
instance technology. The AIDS*time dummies are negative and highly significant for 1990, 
1995 and 2000. This result displays the tragedy of HIV/AIDS and its immense impact on life 
expectancy in many African countries during this period. The coefficient of the War dummy 
is highly negative significant in the regressions with life expectancy as dependent variable and 
insignificant in the regressions with the literacy rate as dependent variable. The coefficient of the 
socialism dummy is positive and highly significant whenever included. 
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There is a strong positive and highly significant correlation between our measures of human 
development and democracy in merely all specifications (we will discuss the one exception be-
low). The coefficients of the other main explanatory variables carry the expected signs and are 
highly significant, except for the Gini variable, which has an insignificant sign in most cases. 
The coefficient of GDP per capita is positive, the literacy rate has a positive coefficient in the 
life expectancy regressions (remember that it is not included in the regressions where literacy 
is the dependent variable), and fractionalization carries a negative sign. All these results are ro-
bust to the choice of the democracy measure; they hold both for the fraction of democratic years 
(demexp) and the average Polity2 score (mpol). 
When it comes to the interaction effects of democracy with GDP per capita, ethnic fractional-
ization, inequality and literacy respectively the results are rather ambiguous. The interaction of 
GDP and democracy sometimes carries a positive sign and sometimes a negative sign depending 
on the measure of democracy and the countries included in the sample. In fact, it is insignif-
icant in most cases. We conclude that there is no robust evidence for this interaction and thus 
the democracy's performance seems to not depend on the level of economic development. A 
similar argument holds true for the interaction of inequality and democracy. It is positive and 
significant in the life expectancy regressions when the socialism dummy is not included and it 
is not significant when the socialism dummy is included. Thus, its effect is fully captured by 
the socialism dummy22 In the literacy regression, the Gini interaction effect is only significant 
for one of the two democracy measures (demexp) and thus not fully reliable. Contrary to the 
median voter prediction, it carries a negative sign in this case. The interaction of democracy and 
literacy is only significant for mpol and not for demexp. The interaction of democracy and eth-
nic fractionalization is significant in the life expectancy regressions for the full sample; it carries 
the expected negative sign. For the sample of non-OECD countries, it is only significant when 
demexp is used as measure of democracy, both for literacy and life expectancy. Hence, there is 
more support for this interaction effect in the data than for the others, but it is still rather weak 
and not robust to different measures. 
Overall, there is only weak evidence for any of these interactions. The specifications excluding 
interaction effects are therefore the more valid and reliable ones. This might also explain why 
there is no significant effect of democracy on literacy in the model including mpol and all inter-
action effects. Summarizing, it can be said that a democracy's influence on life expectancy and 
literacy is positive and robust but does not depend on the circumstances. 
5.4 Conclusions 
We believe that our study has its associated merits explaining the linkage between democracy and 
human development. In our theoretical section, we clarified the causal channels of democracy 
influencing human development. In contrast to earlier studies, which put their focus on property 
rights, we emphasized the importance of the redistributive effects and effects of public goods 
provision in democracy. The influence of democracy on human development is investigated 
22Indeed. inequality is higher in socialist autocracies with a higher life expectancy and literacy than in other 
autocracies. 
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descriptively and analytically, the statistical analysis includes both the cross-sectional and the 
time dimension. Extending existing literature, we not only measure the influence of democracy 
on human development, but we theoretically and empirically analyze conditions that are assumed 
to be important for the functioning of democracy in terms of improving the level of human 
development. 
Empirically, we have been able to show that there is a strong and robust correlation between 
democracy and human development measured by life expectancy at birth and the literacy rate, 
even if controlling for the level of economic development and other important variables. Thus, it 
seems to be the political system that makes a difference for the population's well-being. Relying 
both on theoretical reasoning as well as careful empirical implementation, we are convinced that 
this is also a causal relationship, although we have to admit that the results give evidence for but 
do not definitely prove this claim. 
However, we can be less certain that the influence comes directly from a democratic system. 
Question remains whether it is driven by other social and political factors, which are very well 
proxied by democracy. Against the background of democracy, other factors might be at work 
as well. Future studies could incorporate social capital as well as the degree of decentralization 
of the political-administrative system. In addition, it would certainly be an improvement of our 
analysis to empirically identify and model the channels that democracy takes before it affects 
human development, for example via the public expenditures. Unfortunately, the data for this 
endeavor have not been available. 
Theoretical expectations about the concise conditions interacting with democracy in the cre-
ation of a healthy and literate society have not been met. We found only very little evidence 
for conditions and requirements that increase or decrease the impact of democracy on human 
development. The interaction of democracy and its other presumed conditions of functioning 
turned out to be insignificant or not robust to different democracy measures or samples. One 
could therefore conclude that the functioning of democracy - in terms of non-income human 
development improvements - is rather independent of GDP per capita, inequality, education and 
also ethnic fractionalization. The missing robustness of our interaction effects does not permit 
any inferences. 
Nevertheless, GDP per capita, education and ethnic fractionalization influence non-income hu-
man development levels directly. A high level of economic development and education is related 
to a high level of non-income human development. High social fragmentation, on the contrary, 
leads to lower levels of non-income human development. Income inequality has rather ambigu-
ous results and turns out to be insignificant in most cases. 
To sum up: It is democracy itself that is important and to a smaller extent the circumstances 
under which it occurs. This stands in contrast to what theoretical literature has told us. However, 
it can be considered as good news for promoting democracy in poor, fragmented or uneducated 
societies. 
To sum up, we can derive two main conclusions from our analysis. First, democracy is good 
for human development, independently from the level of economic development in a country. 
Second, even if the picture here is more ambiguous, the positive impact of democracy on human 
development seems to be rather independent from the circumstances. Since income inequality 
did not play a major role in our estimations we found no supporting evidence for the median 
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voter theory. Nevertheless, as democracy positively affects the well-being of a population, the 
main question of this paper deserves an affirmative answer. We thus cautiously support Sen 's 
argument stating that democracy fulfils its "constructive" and "instrumental" role. 
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Figure A.1: Density ofnorrnal mixture !1 (x) = f(x,0.5, -1.5, 1.5, I, I) (solid line), together with 
unrestricted fit to sample of size 500 from J1 (dashed line) and restricted unimodal fit (dotted 
line). 
Table A.I: Model selection criteria for mixture models fitted to the cross-sectional log-income 
distribution of European regions 
comp. variances no. param. AIC 1977 BIC 1977 AIC 1990 BIC 1990 
1 - 2 -131.70 -126.39 -133.96 -128.66 
2 equal 4 -160.99 -150.38 - 145.47 -134.85 
distinct 5 -159.56 -146.29 -144.26 -130.97 
3 equal 6 -156.99 -141.07 -141.47 -125.55 
distinct 8 -154.09 -132.86 -144.14 -122.91 
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Figure A.2: Densities of normal mixtures h(x) = f(x,0.3, -1.5, 1,0.75,0.75) (solid line) and h(x) = 
f(x,0.6, -1.5, 1.4,0.6, 1.4) (dashed line). 
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Figure B.l: Three-component mixture density with equal variances (solid line) and transforma-
tion kernel density estimate based on hc(3) for 1976. Scale: x-axix 103, y-axis 10-3_ 
Table B.1: Model selection criteria for mixtures models fitted to log cross-country income dis-
tribution, 197 6 
no. components - loglike. no. param. AIC BIC 
1 77.86 2 159.72 165.41 
2 70.86 4 149.72 161.10 
3 66.90 6 145.80 162.87 
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Figure B.2: Empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the log-data (logarithm to the 
base 10) for 1976 (solid line) and cdf of the three-component normal mixture with equal vari-
ances (dashed line). 
QQ-Plot 
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Figure B.3: Left: Three-component mixture density with distinct variances (solid line) and kernel 
density estimate based on hc(3) (dashed line) for the log-data (logarithm to the base 10) for 
1976. Right: QQ-Plot of the log-data for 1976 against the quantiles of the normal mixture (three 
components, distinct variances) together with least squares fit (dashed line). 
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Figure B.4: Left: Three-component mixture density with distinct variances (solid line) and kernel 
density estimate based on hc(3) (dashed line) for the log-data (logarithm to the base 10) for 
2003. Right: QQ-Plot of the log-data for 2003 against the quantiles of the normal mixture (three 
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Figure B.5: Kernel density estimate (solid line) and transformation kernel density estimate 
(dashed line) with log-transform, both with bandwidth estimated by direct plug-in, for 2003. 
Scale: x-axis 103, y-axis 10-3. 
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Table B.2: Results of Silverman's test for 2003, 124 countries 
hc(l) Pl hc(2) P2 hc(3) P3 
y;'s 0.27 0.11 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.91 
x;'s 5.72 0.01 2.14 0.44 1.83 0.24 
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Figure B.6: Left: Kernel density estimates with boundary correction at zero with bandwidths 
hc(l) (solid line) and hc(2) (dashed line) for the cross-country income distribution in 2003. 
Scale: x-axis 103, y-axis: 10-3 . Right: Kernel density estimates with bandwidths he( I) (solid 
line) and hc(3) (dashed line) for the log-income distribution in 2003. For conveniently interpret-
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Figure B.7: Weights of mixture components. Poor (solid line), intermediate (dashed line) and 
rich component ( dotted line). 
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Year Pl P2 P3 Jll JL2 µ3 (J 
1976 0.379 0.338 0.284 3.044 3.587 4.076 0.175 
1980 0.366 0.351 0.282 3.041 3.622 4.115 0.177 
1985 0.358 0.372 0.270 3.035 3.639 4.154 0.181 
1990 0.357 0.367 0.276 3.041 3.649 4.211 0.182 
1995 0.355 0.364 0.281 2.996 3.665 4.247 0.189 
2000 0.345 0.371 0.284 3.017 3.698 4.313 0.177 
2003 0.357 0.353 0.290 3.037 3.725 4.326 0.176 
Meant Mean2 Mean3 SE I 
1147 3998 12335 310 
1141 4342 13526 313 
1126 4524 14806 316 
1140 4628 16887 320 
1032 4813 18396 303 
1079 5174 21312 295 




































 PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
96 APPENDICES 
Table B.4: Posterior means, 1976 and 2003 
Land Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Change Group 
Mean 1976 Mean 2003 Posterior 1976 and 
1976 2003 Mean 2003 
China 1 115 2 60 1 1 to 2 
Korea Republic of 1.999 60 2.984 27 0.985 2 to 3 
Taiwan 2.041 47 2.994 25 0.953 2 to 3 
Sri Lanka 1.087 87 1.996 66 0.909 1 to 2 
India 1.014 97 1.891 76 0.877 1 to 2 
Equatorial Guinea 1.787 72 2.639 36 0.852 2 to 3 
Cyprus 2.195 42 2.997 22 0.802 2 to 3 
Malaysia 2.018 55 2.723 34 0.705 2 to 3 
Indonesia 1.291 81 1.994 69 0.703 1 to 2 
Pakistan 1.035 90 1.673 79 0.638 1 to 2 
Mauritius 2.339 39 2.972 29 0.633 2 to 3 
Chile 2.117 43 2.724 33 0.607 2 to 3 
Egypt 1.462 79 2 60 0.538 1 to 2 
Botswana 1.603 74 2.077 44 0.474 2 
Thailand 1.598 75 2.034 47 0.436 2 
Cameroon 1.428 80 1.761 78 0.333 1 to 2 
Bangladesh 1.024 93 1.255 82 0.231 1 
Hungary 2.645 32 2.825 32 0.18 3 
Portugal 2.832 30 2.981 28 0.149 3 
Lesotho 1.001 112 1.148 85 0.147 1 
Ireland 2.87 28 3 1 0.13 3 
Swaziland 2.051 46 2.167 39 0.116 2 
Hong Kong 2.906 26 3 I 0.094 3 
Morocco 1.903 70 1.992 70 0.089 2 
Singapore 2.918 24 3 1 0.082 3 
Puerto Rico 2.917 25 2.998 19 0.081 3 
Panama 2.036 48 2.091 43 0.055 2 
Tunisia 2.003 59 2.048 46 0.045 2 
Cuba 1.974 65 2.01 52 0.036 2 
Dominican Republic 1.988 64 2.022 49 0.034 2 
Trinidad + Tobago 2.961 21 2.989 26 0.028 3 
Guinea 1.825 71 1.853 77 0.028 2 
Philippines 1.951 68 1.977 73 0.026 2 
Spain 2.977 19 2.996 23 0.019 3 
Japan 2.991 18 2.999 11 0.008 3 
Paraguay 1.993 62 2.001 59 0.008 2 
Finland 2.992 15 2.999 II 0.007 3 
continued on next page 
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! Land Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Change Group 
Mean 1976 Mean 2003 Posterior 1976 and 
1976 2003 Mean 2003 
Italy 2.992 15 2.998 19 0.006 3 
Nepal 1.001 112 1.007 89 0.006 1 
Korea Dem. Rep. 1 115 1.006 92 0.006 1 
United Kingdom 2.995 14 2.999 11 0.004 3 
Israel 2.992 15 2.996 23 0.004 3 
Laos 1.002 111 1.006 92 0.004 1 
Austria 2.997 8 3 1 0.003 3 
Australia 2.997 8 3 1 0.003 3 
Belgium 2.996 13 2.999 11 0.003 3 
Mongolia 1.016 95 1.019 87 0.003 1 
Norway 2.998 5 3 1 0.002 3 
Canada 2.998 5 3 1 0.002 3 
Germany 2.997 8 2.999 11 0.002 3 
France 2.997 8 2.999 11 0.002 3 
United States 2.999 2 3 1 0.001 3 
Denmark 2.999 2 3 1 0.001 3 
Netherlands 2.998 5 2.999 11 0.001 3 
New Zealand 2.997 8 2.998 19 0.001 3 
Ghana 1.006 105 1.007 89 0.001 1 
Mali 1 115 1.001 100 0.001 1 
Switzerland 3 1 3 I 0 3 
Sweden 2.999 2 2.999 11 0 3 
Tanzania 1 115 1 105 0 1 
Malawi 1 115 1 105 0 1 
Cambodia I 115 1 105 0 1 
Guinea-Bissau 1 115 I 105 0 1 
Ethiopia 1 115 1 105 0 1 
Bhutan 1 115 1 105 0 1 
Burkina Faso I 115 1 105 0 1 
Oman 2.97 20 2.969 30 -0.001 3 
Greece 2.961 21 2.96 31 -0.001 3 
Burundi 1.001 112 1 105 -0.001 1 
Rwanda 1.006 105 1.003 97 -0.003 1 
Uganda 1.004 107 1.001 100 -0.003 I 
Chad 1.003 109 I 105 -0.003 1 
Gambia 1.003 109 1 105 -0.003 1 
Turkey 2.008 58 2.004 57 -0.004 2 
Mozambique 1.012 101 1.008 88 -0.004 1 
Central African Rep. 1.004 107 1 105 -0.004 1 
continued on next page 
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Land Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Change Group 
Mean 1976 Mean 2003 Posterior 1976 and 
1976 2003 Mean 2003 
Guatemala 1.993 62 1.988 71 -0.005 2 
Jordan 1.994 61 1.986 72 -0.008 2 
Benin 1.013 98 1.004 96 -0.009 I 
Kenya 1.01 103 1.001 100 -0.009 1 
Niger 1.009 104 I 105 -0.009 1 
Madagascar 1.01 I 102 I 105 -0.011 I 
Sudan 1.013 98 1.001 100 -0.012 I 
Somalia 1.013 98 I 105 -0.013 I 
Congo Dem Rep. 1.015 96 1 105 -0.015 1 
Papua New Guinea 2.015 57 1.999 64 -0.016 2 
Fiji 2.017 56 2 60 -0.017 2 
Nigeria 1.018 94 1.001 100 -0.017 1 
Colombia 2.027 54 2.008 54 -0.019 2 
Sierra Leone 1.027 92 1 105 -0.027 I 
Algeria 2.035 50 2.007 55 -0.028 2 
Romania 2.033 52 2.005 56 -0.028 2 
Togo 1.03 91 1 105 -0.03 1 
El Salvador 2.031 53 2 60 -0.031 2 
Jamaica 2.036 48 1.999 64 -0.037 2 
Ecuador 2.035 50 1.995 67 -0.04 2 
Syria 1.193 83 1.153 84 -0.04 1 
Bolivia 1.959 67 1.895 75 -0.064 2 
Zambia 1.064 89 1 105 -0.064 1 
Mauritania 1.077 88 1.007 89 -0.07 I 
Namibia 2.089 45 2.004 57 -0.085 2 
Senegal 1.1 86 1.006 92 -0.094 1 
Congo Republic of 1.113 85 1.006 92 -0.107 I 
Peru 2.114 44 1.995 67 -0.119 2 
Honduras 1.503 78 1.384 81 -0.119 2 to 1 
Poland 2.387 37 2.205 38 -0.182 2 
Liberia 1.184 84 I 105 -0.184 1 
Russia 2.861 29 2.672 35 -0.189 3 
Mexico 2.298 40 2.068 45 -0.23 2 
Brazil 2.274 41 2.031 48 -0.243 2 
Costa Rica 2.376 38 2.124 42 -0.252 2 
Comoros 1.283 82 1.002 98 -0.281 1 
South Africa 2.525 35 2.153 41 -0.372 3 to 2 
Uruguay 2.534 34 2.155 40 -0.379 3 to 2 
Zimbabwe 1.968 66 1.532 80 -0.436 2 
continued on next page 
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Land Posterior Rank Posterior Rank Change Group 
Mean 1976 Mean 2003 Posterior 1976 and 
1976 2003 Mean 2003 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.598 75 1.155 83 -0.443 2 tol 
Solomon Islands 1.549 77 1.036 86 -0.513 2 to I 
Nicaragua 2.523 36 1.965 74 -0.558 3 to 2 
Argentina 2.937 23 2.371 37 -0.566 3 to 2 
Ukraine 2.645 32 2.012 50 -0.633 3 to 2 
Afghanistan 1.651 73 I 105 -0.651 2 tol 
Iran 2.8 31 2.012 50 -0.788 3 to 2 
Venezuela 2.891 27 2.01 52 -0.881 3 to 2 
Iraq 1.912 69 1.002 98 -0.91 2 to 1 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Appendix to Essay 3 
Table C. l: Regions and associated countries 
OECD Countries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Cambodia, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongo-
lia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine 
South Asia 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzani, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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Figure C.l: Global and regional distribution of income. Solid line: 1970, dashed line: 1980, 
dotted line 1990, dashed-dotted: 2003. 
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Figure C.2: Global and regional cumulative distribution of Jog-income. Solid line: 1970, dashed 
line: 1980, dotted line 1990, dashed-dotted: 2003. 
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Figure C.3: Plots of log-deciles of the income distributions of the USA, China, India and Brazil 
for distinct years 
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Table C.2: Global and regional $1 and $2 per day poverty rates and poverty gap measures 
Year Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
Rate Rate Gap Gap Rate Rate Gap Gap 
($!) ($2) ($!) ($2) ($!) ($2) ($!) ($2) 
World OECD Countries 
1970 0.212 0.425 0.073 0.202 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
1975 0.192 0.415 0.062 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1980 0.137 0.355 0.045 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1985 0.083 0.272 0.029 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1990 0.071 0.209 0.028 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1995 0.068 0.178 0.028 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.059 0.148 0.025 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2003 0.058 0.142 0.025 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970 0.454 0.782 0.153 0.403 0.073 0.191 0.026 0.079 
1975 0.346 0.724 0.102 0.335 0.067 0.170 0.025 0.071 
1980 0.235 0.612 0.067 0.255 0.026 0.092 0.008 0.033 
1985 0.082 0.392 0.022 0.126 0.032 0.104 0.010 0.038 
1990 0.057 0.250 0.017 0.082 0.040 0.121 0.013 0.046 
1995 0.030 0.129 0.011 0.042 0.045 0.132 0.D15 0.051 
2000 0.020 0.075 0.008 0.026 0.044 0.126 0.015 0.049 
2003 0.024 0.082 0.009 0.029 0.043 0.123 0.D15 0.049 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970 0.085 0.235 0.030 0.094 0.016 0.044 0.006 0.017 
1975 0.069 0.205 0.024 0.080 0.010 0.032 0.003 0.012 
1980 0.039 0.141 0.012 0.049 0.012 0.035 0.004 0.014 
1985 0.040 0.132 0.015 0.049 0.008 0.027 0.002 0.009 
1990 0.035 0.116 0.013 0.043 0.003 0.D17 0.001 0.005 
1995 0.047 0.113 0.021 0.050 0.006 0.033 0.001 0.009 
2000 0.032 0.097 0.012 0.038 0.002 0.016 0.000 0.004 
2003 0.051 0.113 0.024 0.052 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.003 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970 0.138 0.487 0.036 0.175 0.367 0.609 0.169 0.335 
1975 0.199 0.518 0.063 0.214 0.352 0.590 0.161 0.321 
1980 0.115 0.417 0.030 0.147 0.377 0.610 0.178 0.342 
1985 0.074 0.333 0.018 0.108 0.391 0.626 0.186 0.354 
1990 0.042 0.236 0.009 0.070 0.396 0.620 0.196 0.359 
1995 0.049 0.231 0.012 0.073 0.401 0.639 0.195 0.364 
2000 0.035 0.177 0.009 0.054 0.364 0.616 0.173 0.338 
2003 0.026 0.141 0.006 0.041 0.347 0.598 0.162 0.323 
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Table C.3: Global and regional semi-decade specific growth rates, 1970-2003. 
Year Mean Growth Rate of Rate of Mean Growth Rate of Rate of 
of Rate of PPG PPG of Rate of PPG PPG 
Growth Mean ($1) ($2) Growth Mean ($1) ($2) 
Rates Rates 
World OECD Countries 
1970-2003 2.332 1.830 2.192 2.679 2.000 2.079 2.210 2.210 
1970-1974 1.640 2.008 2.272 1.646 2.836 2.434 4.994 4.994 
1975-1979 2.421 2.195 2.280 2.789 2.636 2.729 3.493 3.493 
1980-1984 2.347 0.838 4.560 4.684 1.230 1.273 2.061 2.061 
1985-1989 1.850 1.867 -0.881 0.965 2.356 2.439 1.719 1.719 
1990-1994 1.169 0.739 -0.005 0.817 0.750 0.936 -0.894 -0.894 
1995-1999 2.397 2.009 1.285 1.697 2.061 2.106 2.580 2.580 
2000-2003 1.561 1.318 0.536 0.556 0.461 0.553 -0.096 -0.096 
East Asia Pacific Latin America Caribbean 
1970-2003 5.475 5.646 4.919 5.376 1.048 1.123 0.876 0.946 
1970-1974 3.135 3.549 3.421 3.001 2.170 3.152 -0.382 0.576 
1975-1979 3.607 4.630 2.165 3.084 4.198 2.217 8.298 7.212 
1980-1984 6.562 4.578 9.257 8.151 -1.538 -1.557 -2.026 -1.764 
1985-1989 4.024 5.299 -0.693 1.606 -0.892 0.630 -3.741 -3.131 
1990-1994 6.122 6.193 4.083 5.157 0.251 1.359 -1.700 -1.501 
1995-1999 4.342 4.048 2.059 3.247 0.840 1.132 0.099 0.262 
2000-2003 2.520 4.068 -0.049 -1.363 0.015 -0.414 0.071 0.261 
Middle East North Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
1970-2003 1.384 1.222 0.375 1.175 1.274 1.536 2.905 2.230 
1970-1974 2.771 3.127 2.196 2.230 4.240 4.144 4.563 3.946 
1975-1979 3.177 1.591 6.417 5.490 2.618 2.737 -0.440 -0.321 
1980-1984 0.299 0.136 -1.538 -0.121 1.793 2.003 3.065 2.635 
1985-1989 -0.053 -0.676 1.592 1.094 1.431 1.586 5.790 4.881 
1990-1994 1.397 1.669 -4.718 -1.196 -7.764 -5.340 -2.685 -4.197 
1995-1999 2.177 2.475 8.851 5.049 1.399 0.584 7.102 5.930 
2000-2003 -0.591 0.379 -13.745 -8.323 4.150 4.401 0.762 1.976 
South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
1970-2003 2.397 2.654 1.856 2.106 0.045 0.264 -0.051 0.023 
1970-1974 -0.316 -0.277 -0.221 -0.329 1.374 1.292 1.127 1.202 
1975-1979 2.873 1.706 5.304 4.137 -0.820 0.020 -1.307 -1.160 
1980-1984 2.429 2.300 3.054 2.675 -0.588 -0.385 -0.263 -0.445 
1985-1989 3.048 2.914 3.065 3.207 -0.567 0.248 -1.566 -1.039 
1990-1994 0.281 0.958 -1.808 -1.031 -0.610 -1.463 0.409 0.164 
1995-1999 3.058 3.594 1.721 2.198 1.295 1.136 1.552 1.488 
2000-2003 2.884 2.887 2.654 2.854 1.367 0.964 1.665 1.502 
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Figure C.4: Global semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves. Solid line: Growth Incident 
Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean of growth rates, 
dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C.5: Regional Growth Incidence Curves, 1970-2003. Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, 
solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean of growth rates, dashed 
line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C.6: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, OECD countries. Solid line: 
Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean 
of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C.7: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, East Asia and the Pacific. Solid 
line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: 
mean of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C.8: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal 
line: mean of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor 
growth. 
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Figure C.9: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Middle East and North Africa. Solid 
line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: 
mean of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C. 10: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Solid line: Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal 
line: mean of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor 
growth. 
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Figure C.11: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, South Asia. Solid line: Growth 
Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean of growth 
rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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Figure C.12: Semi-decade specific Growth Incidence Curves, Sub-Saharan Africa. Solid line: 
Growth Incident Curve, solid vertical line: $2 per day poverty line, solid horizontal line: mean 
of growth rates, dashed line: growth rate of mean, dotted line: rate of pro-poor growth. 
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HS0 HSI HS2 HS3 HS4 HS5 HS6 HS7 HS8 HS9 
,,. 
Uganda -0.857*** -0.946* -I.I 13*** -1.162*** -I.I 13*** -0.603* -1.024*** -1.016*** -0.855*** -0.945*** tJ 
(0.242) (0.442) (0.122) (0.133) (0.201) (0.257) (0.074) (0.136) (0.056) (0.088) -
Tanzania -0.830*** -1.337*** -1.256*** -1.081*** -0.486* -0.526** -0.223* -0.544*** -0.975*** -0.694*** 
(0.173) (0.305) (0.108) (0.106) (0.218) (0.160) (0.094) (0.131) (0.085) (0.108) 




(0.132) (0.234) (0.158) (0.167) (0.144) (0.105) (0.086) (0.071) (0.044) (0.074) 
Ghana -0.626* -1.408*** -0.905*** -1.146*** -1.320*** -0.586*** -0.416*** -1.048*** -0.933*** -0.368 
(0.309) (0.339) (0.202) (0.204) (0.144) (0.107) (0.103) (0.126) (0.120) (0.234) 





(0.271) (0.387) (0.314) (0.230) (0.319) (0.221) (0.134) (0.183) (0.092) (0.201) "' "' Botswana -0.726** -1.027*** -1.890*** -1.042*** -1.217*** -0.575* -0.667*** -0.762*** -0.971 *** -0.713*** g. 
(0.276) (0.207) (0.251) (0.186) (0.177) (0.244) (0.176) (0.209) (0.083) (0.148) ~-
Kenya -I.I 15*** - I.I 03*** -1.415*** -0.854*** -1.186*** -0.898*** -0.877*** -0.937*** -0.954*** -0.892*** o' 
(0.178) (0.133) (0.169) (0.159) (0.125) (0.136) (0.106) (0.082) (0.061) (0.142) 




(0.168) (0.275) (0.178) (0.143) (0.129) (0.188) (0.123) (0.158) (0.084) (0.123) 
Cameroon -1.951 *** -2.787*** -1.941*** -1.683*** -1.528*** -1.240*** -0.729*** -1.846*** -1.275*** -1.019*** 
O" -0. 
(0.300) (0.426) (0.319) (0.156) (0.153) (0.163) (0.168) (0.243) (0.115) (0.245) 
Fixed Effects YES 




AIC 4009.242 3724.583 7775.706 6681.943 5548.05 3588.515 6046.93 6134.704 14866.76 5626.691 
BIC 4096.959 3809.87 7876.277 6780.732 5642.407 3673.106 6142.423 6230.793 14981.22 5722.245 






Note: ••• denotes significance at I percent level, ** denotes significance at 5 percent level. Standard errors are reported in brackets. tI1 
C: 
N 
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HS0 HSI HS2 HS3 HS4 HS5 HS6 HS7 HS8 HS9 
Uganda -0.686* -0.297 -0.568*** -0.983** -0.571*** -0.748** -0.964*** -0.665*** -0.611*** -0.578*** a "Cl 
(0.311) (0.439) (0.159) (0.353) (0.173) (0.243) (0.134) (0.163) (0.061) (0.174) 0 ::l 
Tanzania -0.902** -1.071 *** -0.892*** -0.507*** -0.738*** -0.729*** -0.738*** -1.038*** -0.885*** -0.760*** 0-
(0.301) (0.291) (0.125) (0.151) (0.146) (0.185) (0.167) (0.199) (0.072) (0.127) "' 3 
Mozambique -1.234*** -1.126*** -1.222*** -1.060*** -1.319*** -1.072*** -1.227*** -1.022*** -0.827*** -0.965*** 
., 
::, 
(0.229) (0.272) (0.113) (0.140) (0.142) (0.113) (0.067) (0.079) (0.074) (0.071) 
Ghana -0.871 ••• -0.103 -0.722*** -0.633*** -0.742*** -0.137 -1.000*** -0.548*** -0.609*** -0.478*** 
0-
~ ., 
(0.263) (0.244) (0.154) (0.137) (0.172) (0.189) (0. 139) (0.141) (0.125) (0.098) 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.971*** -1.618** -0.960* -0.765*** -0.753*** -1.304** -1.143*** -1.083*** -0.532*** -0.740*** 
(0.212) (0.530) (0.431) (0.212) (0.226) (0.436) (0.249) (0.326) (0.127) (0.205) 




(0.355) (0.465) (0.766) (0.241) (0.336) (0.302) (0.060) (0.304) (0.174) (0.258) 




(0.297) (0.306) (0.112) (0.096) (0.125) (0.243) (0.115) (0.096) (0.067) (0.131) 
Namibia -0.437 -2.886** -0.807* -4.073*** -0.491 -1.175*** -1.354*** -0.245 -0.255* -0.530 
(0.630) (0.986) (0.397) (0.620) (0.333) (0.265) (0.206) (0.373) (0.120) (0.283) 
-0-
~: 
Cameroon -0.300 -2.559** -0.536 -0.960*** -0.642 -0.055 -0.530 -0.188 -0.731 ••• -0.296 ::c:: 
Ul 
(0.620) (0.837) (0.664) (0.254) (0.422) (0.382) (0.327) (0.212) (0.113) (0.180) (") 
Fixed Effects YES ~ 
R-squared 0.556 0.560 0.591 0.716 0.716 0.663 0.797 0.706 0.815 0.775 CJ<, 0 
AJC 3837.857 3884.921 7641.013 6734.74 5167.006 4270.725 4998.589 5952.82 13235.19 4965.852 9 
BIC 3927.263 3972.051 7742.168 6833.377 5261.182 4359.875 5092.661 6049.507 13347.58 5059.527 Ul 
N 1061 935 2038 1772 1383 1046 1375 1590 3804 1345 c:: O' en 
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All products 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya Mozambique Namibia Tanzania Uganda 
~~ I~ - a" n -.., n 
::llc, < . co ~ 
'-< 
Consumption 60.68 1459.97 54 86.64 689.34 12.26 14.87 27.35 29.23 
Diversion -275.91 -6870.85 -271.2 -3912.16 -26641.35 -1365.95 -957.47 -20998.8 -3702.75 
co en el O" 
"' 0 ~~
Creation 163104.9 7456.67 390.88 300.23 5520.45 33701.15 246969.7 4754.79 3883.86 .!, ,::: 
::, 
Total 162889.7 2045.79 173.68 -3525.29 -20431.56 32347.46 246027.1 -16216.65 210.34 ~ 
in% 5.35% 0.03% 0.01% -0.04% -0.36% 2.02% 10.07% -0.55% 0.01% ~ 
J 
Revenue -1905.1 -42732.96 -3064.91 -I 1960.81 -78259.52 -4868.95 -2354.41 -44151.47 -8585.84 co 
Non-manufacturing ~ 
Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya Mozambique Namibia Tanzania Uganda &r 
0 .... 
Consumption 60.67 762.46 15.23 27.08 I 3.55 0.66 13.2 0 I» 
Diversion -11.96 -1373.6 -21.75 -1649.25 -73.26 -118.86 -7.59 -106.34 -118.94 




Total 8243.64 6075.61 286.73 -1363.36 603.41 4878.42 56445.84 -76.99 500.16 










Botswana Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Ghana Kenya Mozambique Namibia Tanzania Uganda ~ 
::, 
Consumption 0 697.51 38.77 59.56 688.34 8.71 14.22 14.15 29.23 
Diversion -265.21 -5497.24 -249.46 -2262.92 -26568.09 -1247.1 -949.89 -20892.46 -3583.81 





Total 149934 -4029.82 -113.05 -2161.94 -21034.97 27469.04 189528.4 -16139.66 -289.82 ~ 
in% 8.12% -0.13% -0.01% -0.04% -0.53% 2.63% 10.97% -0.72% -0.02% §" • 
Revenue -575.47 -28144.7 -2351.19 -7670.65 -78089.91 -4459.51 -2267.44 -43750.73 -8343.4 
Note: Units are I 000 USD. 
~ 
"C 
"C .... rn co z n 
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Low life expectancy 
Mean: 44.28; Min: 34.75; Max: 51.83; Obs: 48 
Autocracies Democracies 
Benin; Bhutan; Burk• The Gambia; (Jhana; 
ina Faso; Burundi; India; Sierra Leone 
Cambodia; Cenual 
African Republic; 
Chad; Congo, Dem. 
Rep.; Equatorial 
Guinea; Ethiopia; 
Indonesia; Lao PDR; 
Lesotho; Madagascar; 
Malawi; Mali; Mau• 
ritania; Nepal ; Niger; 
Nigeria; Pakistan; 
Rwanda; Senegal; 
Somalia; Sudan; Tan• 




Egypt. Arab Rep.; 
Guinea; Haiti; Liberia; 
Morocco; Swa:,.iland 
Gabon; Oman; Saudi 
Arabia 
Middle life expectancy 
Mean: 58.87; Min: 51.85; Max: 66.16; Obs 48 
Autocracies Democracies 
China; Congo, Rep. ; Botswana; Sri Lanka 
Kenya; Korea, Dem. 
Rep.; Mongolia; Syr. 
ian Arab Republic 
Algeria; Brazil; Do• 
minican Republic; 
Ecuador; El Sal· 
vador; Honduras; 
Iraq; Jordan; Mexico; 
Panama; P--.uaguay; 
Peru; Tunisia 








Chile; South Africa; 
Trinidad and Tobago; 
Venezuela, RB 
High life expectancy 
Mean: 70.33; Min: 66.28; Max: 74.43; Obs: 47 
Autocracies Democracies 











Costa Rica; Cyprus; 
Denmark; Finland; 
France; Ireland; Israel; 
Italy; Japan; Nether• 






























































1 High income 
Lowlire expectancy 








Congo, Dem. Rep.; 
Congo, Rep.; Equato-
rial Guinea; Ethiopia; 
Guinea-Bissau; In-







Sicmt Leone; Somalia; 
Sudan; Tan.,-.ania; 
'lbgo; 1/...ambia 
·inc Gambia; Ghana; 
India; Maldives; Nige-
ria; Uganda 
Bolivia; Cameroon; Papua New Guinea 
Djibouti; Egypt. 
Arab Rep.; El Sal-
vador; Guinea; I laiti; 
Swaziland 
Gabon 
Middle lire expectancy 
Mean: 62.63; Min: 56.43; Max: 68.60 
Autocracies 
China; Kenya; Korea, 
Dem. Rep.; Mongolia; 
Syrian Ar.t.b Republic 
Algeria; Brazil; 
Guatemala; Iran, 
Islamic Rep.; Iraq; 





Bahr.tin; Oman; Qatar; 








ritius; Peru; Solomon 
Islands; Soulh Africa; 
Thailand; Zimbabwe 
Venezuela, RB 
High lire expectancy 
Mean: 71.96; Min: 68.94; Max: 76.25 
Autocracies Democracies 
















land; Israel; Italy; 
Japan; Netherlands; 
New Zealand; Nor• 
way; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; 
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Low life expectancy Middle life expectancy High life expectancy 
Mean: 48.71; Min: 37.54; Max: 61.31 Mean: 67.62; Min: 61.36; Max: 72.18 Mean: 76.24; Min: 72.45; Max: 81.23 
Autocracies Democracies Autocracies Democracies Autocracies Democracies 
er ,,. 
rri 
Low income Afghanistan; Angola; Benin; Cambodia; Korea, Dem. Rep.; Bangladesh; llon- Syrian Arab Republic Serbia and Montenc- ~ 
Bhutan; Burkina Centra1 African Solomon Islands; duras; Moldova; gro (") 
Faso; Burundi; Chad; Republic; Cote Tajikistan; Vielnam Mongolia 




Congo, Rep. Eritrea; Ghana; Guinea- s. 
The Gambia; Haiti; Bissau; Lesotho; (1) en 
Kenya; Lao PDR; Madagascar; Ma1awi; (') 
l.ibcria; Mauritania; Mali; Mo,.ambique; ;;;-
Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Nepa1; Niger; Nigeria; 
Soma1ia; Sudan; Togo; Senegal; Tan7.ania; 
en en 
Si 
Uganda; Yemen. Rep. :t.ambia (1) p. 
Middle income Cameroon; Equatoria1 Bot,;wana; Djibouti; Algeria; Azerbai- Annenia; Bolivia; Cuba; Libya; Tunisia Albania; Costa Rica; er 
Guinea; Guinea; Iraq; Guyana; Namibia; jan; Belarus; China; Brazil; Bulgaria; Croatia; Ecuador; '< 
Pakistan; Swaziland; Papua New Guinea; Egypt. Arab Rep.; Colombia; Dominican Macedonia, FYR; 
Zimbabwe South Africa Jordan; Kazakhstan; Republic; El Sal- Mexico; Panama; 
"O 
~ 
Kyrgyz Republic; vador; Fiji; Georgia; Poland; Slovak Re-
Morocco; Pakistan; Guatemala; Guyana; public; Sri Lanka; 
g. 
e:. 
Turkmenistan; Uzbek- India; Indonesia; Iran, Venezuela, RB en 











"' Ukraine "O 
High income Gabon Qatar; Saudi Arabia Estonia; llungary; Bahrain; Kuwait; Argentina; Australia; (1) ..... 
Mauritius; Trinidad Oman; Singapore; Austria; Belgium; 
and Tobago United Arab Emirates Canada; Chile; 
(') 
.§ 
Cyprus; c .. cch Repub-
lie; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Gennany; 















nia; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; United 
Kingdom; United 
(') > s ::, "" (') "" ':;<: tT1z 









 PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Low lire expectancy 
Mean: 48.71; Min: 37.54; Max: 61.31 
Autocracies Democracies 
Low income Afghanistan; Angola; Benin; Cambodia; 
Bhutan; Burkina Central African 
Faso; Burundi; Chad; Republic; Cote 
Congo, Dem. Rep.; d' Ivoire; Ethiopia; 
Congo. Rep. Eritrea; Ghana; Guinca-
' lbc Gambia; Haiti; Bissau; Lesotho; 
Kenya; I .ao PDR; Madagascar; Malawi; 
Liberia; Mauritania; Ma1i; Mozambique; 
Rwanda; Sierra l..conc; Nepal; Niger; Nigeria; 
Somalia; Sudan; Togo; Senegal; Tanzania; 
llganda; Y~men. Rc_e_. Zambia 
Middle income Cameroon; Equatorial Botswana; Djibouti; 
Guinea; Guinea; Iraq; Guyana; Namibia; 
Pakistan; Swaziland; Papua New Guinea; 
Zimbabwe South Africa 
High income Gabon 
Middle lire expectancy 
Mean: 67.62; Min: 61.36; Max: 72.18 
Autocracies Democracies 
Korea, Dem. Rep.; Bangladesh; J Jon-
Solomon Islands; dura,;; Moldova; 
Tajikistan; Vietnam Mongolia 
Algeria; A;,.crbai-
jan; Belarus; China; 











vador; Fiji; Georgia; 
Guatemala; Guyana; 
India; Indonesia; Iran, 










High lire expectancy 
Mean: 76.24; Min: 72.45; Max: Kl.23 
Autocracies Democracies 
Syrian Arab Republic Serbia and Mon1cne-
gro 
c:uba; l.ibya; Tunisia 
Bahrain; Kuwait; 
Oman; Singapore; 
United Arab Emirates 











lic; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; 
Greece; Ireland; Israel; 
Italy; Japan; Ko-



























































Low literacy rate 
Mean: 21.30; Min: 5.75; Max: 35.36 
Autocracies Democracies 
Benin; Burkina Faso; - .lbe Gambia; Ghana; 
Burundi; Central India 
African Republic; 
Chad; Congo, Dem. 
Rep.; Congo, Rep.; 
Ethiopia; Mali; Mau• 





Egypt, Arab Rep.; 
Haiti; Iraq; Liberia; 
Morocco; Tunisia 
Iran, Islamic Rep.; 
Oman; Saudi Arabia 
rt'.fiddle literacy rate 
Mean: 54.21; Min: 35.64; Max. : 72.89 
Autocracies Democracies 
Cambodia; China; Botswana 
Equatorial Guinea; 
Indonesia; Kenya; 
Lao PDR; Lesotho; 
Madagascar; Malawi; 




minican Republic ; El 
Salvador; Honduras; 





Kuwait; Nicar.tgua; South Africa 
Singapore 
High literacy rate 
Mean: 89.07; Min: 73.21; Max : 99 
Autocracies Democracies 







Colombia; Fiji; Philip· 
pines; Thailand 
Chile; Costa Rica; 
Cyprus; Israel; 












































<> ..., ., 
r, 














Low literacy rale 




rundi; Central African 
Republic; Chad; 










Djibouti; Egypt, Arab 




The Gambia; Ghana; 
India; Nigeria; Uganda 
Middle literacy rate 




rial Guinea; Indonesia; 
Kenya; Lao, PDR; 
Lesotho; Syrian Arab 
Republic; Tan;,.ania; 
'.l.ambia 
Bolivia; Hrazil; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; 




Qatar; Saudi Arabia; 
United Arab Emirates 
Botswana; Dominican 
Republic; I londuras; 
Jamaica; Malaysia; 
Mauritius; Papua New 
Guinea; South Africa; 
Zimbabwe 
• ..., ..., 






High literacy rale S. 
Mean: 91.90; Min: 79.43; Max: 99 (> ..,, 
Autocracies Democracies 0 












" Chile; Cuba; Panama; Colombia; Costa Rica; p 
Paraguay; Philippines; licuador; Fiji; Peru; 




Argentina; Singapore; Cyprus; Israel; 






"' :::, r:,.. 
" .... "' 0 












Low literacy rate 




rundi; Central African 
Republic; Chad; 
Congo, Dem. Rep.; 
Ethiopia; Guinea-
Bissau; Lao, PDR.; 
Liberia; Malawi; Mali; 
Mauritania; Mo1.am-
bique; Niger; Nigeria; 
Rwanda; Senegal; 




bia; I laiti; India; Nepal 
Algeria; Cameroon; Pakistan; Papua New 
Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Guinea 
Rep.; Iraq; Morocco 
Oman 
Midcife Ilteracy rate 
Mean: 72.17; Min: 57.96; Max: 82.18 
Autocracies Democracies 




ian Arab Republic; 
lilru.ania; :l..amhia 
Congo, Rep.; Indone-
sia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; 
Jordan; Swaziland; 
Tunisia; Zimbabwe 
Bahrain; Qatar; Saudi 
Arabia; United Ar.tb 
l~mirates 
Albania; Bolivia; 
Brazil ; Botswana; Do-










High literacy rate 













Rica; Ecuador; fiji; 
Panama; Paraguay; 
Peru; Philippines; 









































(D .... ., 
0 














Low literacy rate 
Mean: 49.74; Min: 15.96; Max: 67.03 
Autocracies Democracies 
Burkina Faso; Bu- Bangladesh; Benin; 
rundi; Chad; Comoros; Central African Rc-
Congo, Dem. Rep.; public; Ethiopia; 
Eritrea; The Gambia; Guinca-Hissau; Mada-
1 laiti; Lao, PDR; gascar; Malawi; 
Liberia; Maurita- Mali; Mo1.ambiquc; 
nia; Mo1,ambiquc; Nepal; Niger; Nigeria; 
Rwanda; Sudan; Togo; Senegal 
lJga_.!!_da; Yemen, Rep. 
Algeria; Egypt, Arab 
Rep.; Iraq; Morocco; 
Pakislan 
Djibouti; India; 
Nicaragua; Papua New 
Guinea 
Middle literacy rate 
Mean: 80.03; Min: 68.01; Max: 88.67 
Autocracies Democracies 
Congo, Rep.; Kenya; Cambodia; Ghana; 








minican Republic; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; 
Indonesia; Iran, Is-
lamic Rep.; Jamaica; 
Namibia; South Africa 
Bahrain; Kuwait; Malaysia; Mauritius 
Oman; Qatar; Saudi 
Arabia; United Arab 
limiratcs 
High literacy rate 










Colombia; Costa Rica; 
























































 PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Bibliography 
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2008) Persistence of Power, Elites, Institutions. American 
Economic Review 98, 267-293. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2001) The Colonial Origins of Comparative Ad-
vantage. American Economic Review 91, 1369-1401. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2002) Reversal of Fortune: Geography and In-
stitutions in the Making of the Modern World income Distribution. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117, 1231-1294. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. Robinson and P. Yared (2008) Income and Democracy. American 
Economic Review 98, 808-842. 
Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2005) Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance. Journal of 
Economic Literature 43, 762-800. 
Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994) Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 109, 465-490. 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003) Fractionaliza-
tion. Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155-194. 
Alesina, A., R. Baquir, and W. Easterly (1999) Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114, 1243-1284. 
Anderson, G. (2004) Making inference about the polarization, welfare and poverty of nations: 
A study of 101 countries from 1970- 1995. Journal of Applied Econometrics 19, 537-550. 
Barro, R. (1991) Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 106, 407-443. 
Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1991) Convergence across States and Regions. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1991, 107-182. 
Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992) Convergence. Journal of Political Economy 100, 223-
251. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
132 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barro, R. (1996) Democracy and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 1-27. 
Barro, R. (1999) Determinants of Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 107, 158-183. 
Basu, S. and S. Jammalamadaka (2002) Unimodality in circular data: a Bayes test. In: N. Bal-
akrishnan et al. (Eds.) Advances on Methodological and Applied Aspects of Probability 
and Statistics Taylor and Francis: New York, 141-153. 
Beaudry, P., F. Collard, and D. Green (2005) Changes in the world distribution of output per 
worker, 1960-1998: How a standard decomposition tells us an unorthodox story. Review 
of Economics and Statistics 87, 741-753. 
Behboodian, J. (1970) On the modes of a mixture of two normal distributions. Technometrics 
12, 131-139. 
Besley, T. and M. Kudamatsu (2006) Health and Democracy. American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings 96, 313-315. 
Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002) The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: The-
ory and Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1415-1451. 
Bianchi, M. (1997) Testing for Convergence: Evidence from Non-Parametric Multimodality 
Tests. Journal of Applied Econometrics 12, 393-409. 
Blonigen, B. and W. Wilson (1999) Explaining Armington: what determines substitutability 
between home and foreign goods? Canadian Journal of Economics 32, 1-21. 
Boix, C. (200 I) Democracy, Development, and the Public Sector. American Journal of Political 
Science 45, 1-17. 
Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrisson (2002) Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992. Amer-
ican Economic Review 92, 727-744. 
Bourguignon, F. and T. Verdier (2000) Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth. Journal of 
Development Economics 62, 285-313. 
Broda, C., N. Limao and D. Weinstein (2009) Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence. American Eco-
nomic Review forthcoming. 
Busse, M. and H. GroBmann (2007) The trade and fiscal impact of EU/ACP economic partner-
ship agreements on West African countries. Journal of Development Studies 43, 787-811. 
Chen, H., J. Chen, and J. Kalbfleisch (2001) A modified likelihood ratio test for homogeneity 
in finite mixture models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 63, 19-29. 
Chen, H., J. Chen, and J. Kalbfleisch (2004) Testing for a finite mixture model with two com-
ponents. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 66, 95-115. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
BIBLIOGRAPHY 133 
Chen, J. and J. Kalbfleisch (2005) Modified likelihood ratio test in finite mixture models with a 
structural parameter. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 129, 93-107. 
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2004) How Have the World's Poorest Fared since the Early 1980s? 
World Bank Research Observer 19, 141-169. 
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2007) Absolute poverty measures for the developing world, 1981-
2004. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4211. 
Chernoff, H. ( 1954) On the distribution of the likelihood ratio. Annals of Mathematical Statis-
tics 25, 573-578. 
Chotikapanich D., R. Valenzuela and P. Rao (1997) Global and regional inequality in the distri-
bution of income: Estimation with limited and incomplete data. Empirical Economics 22, 
533-546. 
Collier, P. (2001) Implications of ethnic diversity. Economic Policy Analysis 16, 129-166. 
Cronbach, L. (1987) Statistical tests for moderator variables: Flaws in analysis recently pro-
posed. Psychological Bulletin 102, 414-417. 
Dacunha-Castelle, D. and E. Gassiat (1999) Testing the order of a model using locally conic 
parametrization: population mixtures and stationary ARMA processes. Annals of Statis-
tics 27, 1178-1209 
Deaton, A. (2005) Measuring Poverty in a Growing World (or Measuring Growth in a Poor 
World. Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 1-19. 
Dowrick, S. and M. Akmal (2005) Contradicting Trends in Global Income Inequality: A Tale 
of Two Biases. Review oflncome and Wealth 51, 201-229. 
Durlauf, S., P. Johnson, and J. Temple (2005) Growth econometrics. In: P. Aghion and S. 
Durlauf (Eds.) Handbook of Economic Growth IA North-Holland: Amsterdam, 555-677. 
Fan, Y. (1994) Testing the goodness of fit of a parametric density function by kernel method. 
Econometric Theory 10, 316-356. 
Fisher, N. and J. Marron (2001) Mode testing via the excess mass estimate. Biometrika 88, 
499-517. 
Fisher, N., E. Mammen, and J. Marron (1994) Testing for multimodality. Computational Statis-
tics and Data Analysis 18, 499-512. 
Fontagne, L., D. Laborde and C. Mitonitonne (2008) An Impact Study of the EU-ACP EPAs in 
the Six ACP Regions CEPII Working Paper 2008-04. 
Fraley, C. and A. Raftery (2002) Model-based clustering, discriminant analysis, and density 
estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 97, 611-631. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
134 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Franco, A., C. Alvarez-Dardet, and M. Ruiz (2004) Effect of democracy on health: ecological 
study. British Medical Journal 329, 1421-1423. 
Gallaway, M., C. McDaniel and S. Rivera (2003) Short-run and Long-run Industry-level Esti-
mates of U.S. Armington Elasticities. North American Journal of Economics and Finance 
14, 49-68. 
Galor, 0. (1996) Convergence? Inference from Theoretical Models. The Economic Journal 
106, 1056-1069. 
Glaeser, E., G. Ponzetto, and A. Shleifer (2007) Why does democracy need education? Journal 
of Economic Growth 12, 77-99. 
Goffinet, B., P. Loisel, and B. Laurent (1992) Testing in normal mixture models when the 
proportions are known. Biometrika 79, 842-846. 
Gradstein, M. and B. Milanovic (2004) Does Liberte = Egalite? A Survey of the Empirical 
Links between Democracy and Inequality with some Evidence on the Transition Economies. 
Journal of Economic Surveys 18, 515-537. 
Graham, B. and J. Temple (2006) Rich nations, poor nations: how much can multiple equilibria 
explain? Journal of Economic Growth 11, 5-41. 
Grimm, M. and S. Klasen (2008) Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level. CESIFO 
Working Paper 2259. 
Griin, C. and S. Klasen (2008) Growth, Inequality, and Well-Being: Comparisons across Space 
and Time. Oxford Economic Papers 60, 212-236. 
Hall, P. and M. York (2001) On the calibration of Silverman's test for multimodality. Statistica 
Sinica 11, 515-536. 
Hall, R. and C. Jones (1999) Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per 
Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116. 
Hartigan, J. and P. Hartigan (1985) The dip test of unimodality. Annals of Statistics 13, 70-84. 
Hathaway, R. (1985) A constrained formulation of maximum-likelihood estimation for normal 
mixture distributions. Annals of Statistics 13, 795-800. 
Hertel, T., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic and R. Keeney (2007) How Confident Can We Be in CGE-
Based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements? Economic Modelling 24, 611-635. 
Hinkle, L. and M. Schiff (2004) Economic Partnership Agreements Between Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the EU: A Development Perspective. The World Economy 27, 1321-1333. 
Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. The Hu-
man Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135 
Jaccard, J., C. Wan, and R. Turrisi (1990) The Detection and Interpretation oflnteraction Effects 
between Continuous Variables in Multiple Regression. Multivariate Behavioral Research 
25, 467-478. 
Jones, C. (1997) On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 11, 19-36. 
Karingi, S., R. Lang, N. Oulmane, R. Perez, M. Jallab, and H. Hammouda (2005) Economic and 
Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements. Economic Commis-
sion for Africa Working Paper 10. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2007) Governance Matters VI: Governance Indi-
cators for 1996-2006. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280. 
Kee, H., A. Nicita, and M. Olarreaga (2004) Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distorsions. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 90, 666-682. 
Keefer, P. and S. Khemani (2005) Democracy, Public Expenditure, and the Poor: Understanding 
Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. World Bank Research Observer 20, 1-
27. 
Keri bin, C. (2000) Consistent estimation of the order of mixture models. Sankhyii Series A 62, 
49-66. 
Klasen, S. (2004) In Search of the Holy Grail: How to Achieve Pro Poor Growth? In: B. 
Tungodden, N. Stern, and I. Kolstad (Eds.) Toward Pro Poor Policies - Aid, Institutions, 
and Globalization New York: Oxford University Press, 63-94. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995) Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics 7, 207-27. 
La Porta, R., F. L6pez-de-Silanes, C. Pop-Eleches, and A. Shleifer (2004) Judicial Checks and 
Balances. Journal of Political Economy 112, 445-470. 
Le Gallo, J. (2004) Space-time analysis of GDP disparities among European regions: a Markov 
chain approach. International Regional Science Review 27, 138-163. 
Levine, R. and D. Renelt (1992) A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions. 
American Economic Review 82, 942-963. 
Li, P., J. Chen, and P. Marriott (2009) Non-finite Fisher information and homogeneity: the EM 
approach. Biometrika forthcoming. 
Lipset, S. (1959) Some Social Requisites of Democray: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53, 69-105. 
Maasoumi, E., J. Racine, and T. Stengos (2007) Growth and convergence: A profile of distribu-
tion dynamics and mobility. Journal of Econonmetrics 136, 483-508. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
136 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Mammen, E., J. Marron, and N. Fisher (1992) Some asymptotics for multimodality tests based 
on kernel density estimates. Probability Theory and Related Fields 91, 115-132. 
Mankiw, G., D. Romer and D. Weil (1992) A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 407-437. 
Mardia, K. and T. Sutton (1975) On the modes of a mixture of two von Mises distributions. 
Biometrika 62, 699-701. 
Marquez, J. ( 1990) Bilateral Trade Elasticities. Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 70--77. 
Marquez, J. (1999) Long-Period Trade Elasticities for Canada, Japan, and the United States. 
Review of International Economics 7, 102-116. 
Marquez, J., (2002) Estimating Trade Elasticities New York: Springer. 
Martyn, C. (2004) Commentary: Politics as a determinant of health. British Medical Journal 
329, 1423-1424. 
McDonald, J. and A. Mantrala (1995) The Distribution of Personal Income: Revisited. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics 10, 201-204. 
McGuire M. and M. Olson (1996) The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invis-
ible Hand and the Use of Force. Journal of Economic Literature 34, 72-96. 
Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981) A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of 
Political Economy 89, 914-927. 
Miguel, E. and M. Gugerty (2005) Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in 
Kenya. Journal of Public Economics 89, 2325-2368. 
Milanovic, B. (2002) True world income distribution, 1988 and 1993: First calculation based 
on household surveys alone. Economic Journal 112, 51-92. 
Milanovic, B. (2006) Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3865. 
Milner, C., 0. Morrisey, and A. McKay (2005) Some Simple Analytics of the Trade and Welfare 
Effects of Economic Partnership Agreements. Journal of African Economies 14, 327-358. 
Minier, J. (1998) Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches. Journal of Economic 
Growth 3, 241-66. 
Millier, D. and G. Sawitzki (1991) Excess mass estimates and tests for multimodality. Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 86, 738-746. 
Olson, M. (1993) Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science 
Review 87, 567-576. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 
Paap, R. and H. Dijk ( 1998) Distribution and mobility of wealth of nations. European Economic 
Review 42, 1269-1293. 
Persson, T. (2002) Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy. Econometrica 70, 883-905. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000) Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2006) Democracy and Development: The Devil in Details. Amer-
ican Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96, 319-320. 
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000) Comparative Politics and Public Finance. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 108, 1121-1161. 
Peters, G. (2005) Institutional Theory in Political Science London/New York: Continuum. 
Pittau, M. (2005) Fitting regional income distributions in the European Union. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics 67, 135-161. 
Pittau, M. and R. Zelli (2006) Empirical evidence of income dynamics across EU regions. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 21, 605-628. 
Pritchett, L. and L. Summers (1996) Wealthier is Healthier. Journal of Human Resources 31, 
841-868. 
Quah, D. (1996a) Convergence Empirics across Economies with (some) capital mobility. Jour-
nal of Economic Growth 1, 95-124. 
Quah, D. (1996b) Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dynamics. 
The Economic Journal 106, 1045-1055. 
Quah, D. (1996c) Regional convergence clusters across Europe. European Economic Review 
40, 1353-1375. 
Quah, D. (1997) Empirics for growth and distribution: polarization, stratification, and conver-
gence clubs. Journal of Economic Growth 2, 25-59. 
Quah, D. (2002) One Third of the World's Growth and Inequality. CEPR Discussion Paper 
3316. 
Ravallion, M. (2003) The debate on globalization, poverty and inequality: why measurement 
matters. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3038. 
Ravallion, M. and S. Chen (2003) Measuring pro-poor Growth. Economic Letters 78, 93-99. 
Ray, S. and B. Lindsay (2005) The topography of multivariate normal mixtures. Annals of 
Statistics 33, 2042-2065. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Robertson, C. and J. Fryer (1969) Some descriptive properties of normal mixtures. Skandi-
navisk Aktuarietidskrift 69, 137-146. 
Rodrik. D. and R. Wacziarg (2005) Do Democratic Transitions produce Bad Economic Out-
comes. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 95, 50-54. 
Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98, S71-
Sl02. 
Ross, M. (2006) Is Democracy Good for the Poor. American Journal of Political Science 50, 
860-874. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996) The Classic Approach to Convergence Analysis. The Economic Jour-
nal 106, 1019-1036. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2006) The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and ... Conver-
gence, Period. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 351-397. 
Sawyer, W. and R. Sprinkle ( 1999) The Demand for Imports and Exports in the World Economy 
Aldershot/London: Ashgate. 
Self, S. and K.-Y. Liang (1987) Asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators and 
likelihood ratio tests under nonstandard conditions. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 82, 605-610. 
Sen, A. (1983) Development: Which Way Now? Economic Journal 93, 745-762. 
Sen, A. (1988) The Concept of Development. In: H. Chenery and T. Srinivasan (Eds.) Hand-
book of Development Economics Amsterdam: North Holland, 9-26. 
Sen, A. (1991) Capability and Well-Being. In: M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (Eds.) The Quality of 
Life Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sen, A. (1999a): Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sen, A. (1999b): Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy 10, 3-17. 
Sen, A. (2000) A Decade of Human Development. In: Journal of Human Development 1, 
17-23. 
Sen, A. (2003) Development as Capability Expansion. In: S. Fukuda-Parr and A. Shiva Kumar 
(Eds.) Readings in Human Development New Delhi/New York: Oxford University Press, 
41-58. 
Sen, A. (2004) What's the Point of Democracy? Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences Spring 2004, 8-11. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 
Shiells, C. and K. Reinert (1993) Annington Models and Terms-of-Trade Effects: Some Econo-
metric Evidence for North America. Canadian Journal of Economics 26, 299-3 I 6. 
Shiells, C., R. Stern and A. Deardorff ( I 986) Estimates of the elasticities of substitution between 
imports and home goods for the United States. Review of World Economics 122, 497-519. 
Silverman, B. (1981) Using kernel density estimates to investigate multimodality. Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society Series B 43, 97-99. 
Stasavage, D. (2005) Democracy and Education Spending in Africa. American Journal of Po-
litical Science 49, 343-358. 
Stern, R., J. Francis, and B. Schumacher (1976) Price Elasticities in International Trade: An 
Annotated Bibliography, London: Macmillan. 
Tavares, J. and R. Wacziarg (2001) How democracy affects growth. European Economic Re-
view 45, 1341-1378. 
Tsai, M. (2006) Does Political Democracy Enhance Human Development in Developing Coun-
tries. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 65, 233-268. 
Wand, M. and M. Jones (1995) Kernel smoothing London: Chapman and Hall. 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
Gottinger Studlen zur Entwicklungsokonomlk 
Gottlngen Studies In Development Economics 
Herausgegeben von/Edited by Hermann Sautter 
und/and Stephan Klasen 
Die Sande 1-8 sind Ober die Vervuert Verlagsgesellschaft (Frankfurt/M.) zu beziehen. 
Bd./Vol. 9 Hermann Sautter/ Rolf Schinke (eds.): Social Justice in a Market Economy. 2001. 
Bd./Vol.1 O Philipp Albert Theodor Kircher: Poverty Reduction Strategies. A comparative study 
applied to empirical research. 2002. 
Bd./Vol.11 Matthias Blum: Weltmarktintegration, Wachstum und lnnovalionsverhalten in Schwellen 
landern. Eine theoretische Diskussion mil einer Fallstudie Ober .. Argentinien 1990-1999". 
2003. 
Bd./Vol.12 Jan Muller-ScheeBel: Die Privatisierung und Regulierung des Wassersektors. Das Bei-
spiel Buenos Aires/Argentinian. 2003. 
Bd./Vol.13 Ludger J. Lening: Economic Growth, Biodiversity Conservation, and the Formation of Hu-
man Capital in a Developing Country. 2004. 
Bd./Vol.14 Silke Woltermann: Transitions in Segmented Labor Markets. The Case of Brazil. 2004. 
Bd./Vol.15 Jorg Stosberg: Political Risk and the Institutional Environment for Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Latin America. An Empirical Analysis with a Case Study on Mexico. 2005. 
Bd./Vol.16 Derk Bienen: Die polilische Okonomie von Arbeitsmarktreformen in Argentinian. 2005. 
Bd./Vol.17 Dierk Herzer: Exportdiversifizierung und Wirtschaftswachstum. Das Fallbeispiel Chile. 
2006. 
Bd./Vol.18 Jann Lay: Poverty and Distributional Impact of Economic Policies and External Shocks. 
Three Case Studies from Latin America Combining Macro and Micro Approaches. 2007. 
Bd./Vol.19 Kenneth Harttgen: Empirical Analysis of Determinants, Distribution and Dynamics of Po-
verty. 2007. 
Bd./Vol. 20 Stephan Klasen / Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann: Poverty, Inequality and Migration in Latin 
America. 2008. 
Bd./Vol. 21 Isabel Gunther: Empirical Analysis of Poverty Dynamics. With Case Studies from Sub-Sa-
haran Africa. 2007. 
Bd./Vol. 22 Peter Dung: Malaysia und Indonesian: Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategien in zwei 
Vielvolkerstaaten. 2008. 
Bd./Vol. 23 Thomas Otter: Poverty, Income Growth and Inequality in Paraguay During the 1990s. 
Spatial Aspects, Growth Determinants and Inequality Decomposition. 2008. 
Bd./Vol. 24 Mark Misselhorn: Measurement of Poverty, Undernutrition and Child Mortality. 2008. 
Bd./Vol. 25 Julian Weisbrod: Growth, Poverty and Inequality Dynamics. Four Empirical Essays at the 
Macro and Micro Level. 2008. 
Bd./Vol. 26 Johannes Grab: Econometric Analysis in Poverty Research. With Case Studies from De-
veloping Countries. 2009. 
Bd./Vol. 27 Sebastian Vollmer: A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic and Human Development. 
2009. 
www.peterlang.de 
Sebastian Vollmer - 978-3-631-75349-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 06:03:51AM
via free access
